Why did the Japanese economic miracle end. Japanese economic miracle: some facts

The essence of the phenomenon called "Japanese economic miracle"

Definition 1

"Japanese economic miracle"- this is a historical example of the phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy, which began in the mid-$50s. $XX$ c. and continued steadily until oil crisis$1973$

In those days, the growth of the Japanese economy was about $10%$ per year. At that time it was the highest growth rate among all developed countries. Among the main reasons for the "economic miracle" can be identified insignificant tax burden, as well as a very intensive development of new technologies.

Record GDP growth rates in a short time allowed the "Land of the Rising Sun" to fully recover after the exhausting World War II, and also to become the second most powerful economy in the world (overtaking France, Canada, Italy, Germany, the USSR, Great Britain and losing, of course, to the United states). Japan remained the second largest economy in the world for four decades, losing to China only in $2010.

Distinctive features of the Japanese economy during the period of the "economic miracle"

They were:

integration of resource suppliers, manufacturers, banks, product marketers into closely related groups - "keiretsu" (conlogomers and holdings "in the Japanese style")
mutually beneficial relations between government and business representatives
powerful unions
"lifetime employment" in large companies

The main reasons for the Japanese economic breakthrough

They can be called:

successful reforms
cheap labor and, as a result, low cost of production and its high price competitiveness
American occupation
high level of confidence in the financial system
strong support for export industries
tight state control over foreign trade
political stability
rational policy to support the national manufacturer
active development of the latest, advanced technologies.

Remark 1

In this way, economic success Japan were due to a variety of reasons. The first thing that can be called is a significant reduction in military spending and the demilitarization of the economy.

The next factor that significantly stimulated economic growth was the enormous income of the Japanese budget from the fulfillment of American military orders. Thus, during the wars in Korea and Vietnam, Japan became the main supply base for the US Army.

An important factor in the innovative development of the Japanese economy has become tight government control over the entire sphere foreign economic activity . So, for example, it was forbidden to import goods that could be produced by a national manufacturer into the country. Only at the beginning of the $70s of the $20th century, when the country had already established itself quite firmly on world markets, was state control somewhat relaxed.

All over the world, the Japanese were actively buying up the most advanced technologies, which made it possible to significantly save on investments in R&D. Very often, innovative technologies were introduced much earlier than in the countries where they were developed.

The state in every possible way supported innovative activity, and especially those firms whose products were produced for export. The competitiveness of the most famous Japanese corporations was initially ensured largely due to government subsidies, as well as the low price of highly skilled labor. The highest quality and relatively low price of Japanese products made it possible to conquer the world market very quickly and successfully.

Political stability post-war Japan is also an important source of its economic triumph.

Remark 2

The transformation of Japan into one of the most developed economies in the world was also largely facilitated by unique national traditions. Of great importance was the clan-professional solidarity of the owners of enterprises, thanks to which most firms did not compete, but rather cooperated with each other.

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Introduction

Interest in Japan around the world is huge. The impressive achievements of the Land of the Rising Sun, especially in the economy, are well known and attract close attention, evoke mixed feelings: from surprise and admiration to envy and fear. Indeed, how did Japan, which suffered a severe defeat in the war, suffered enormous material and moral damage, manage to not only rise from ruins and devastation, but also turn into a first-class economic power leading in many areas of industry and trade, practically within the life of one generation, science and technology.

The unprecedented pace of industrial development that the Japanese economy has achieved every year for three decades is still being studied by economists around the world, cited as an example and pointing the way for developing countries. The industrial development and economic growth of Japan is interesting as a unique phenomenon of our time, but the results achieved by Japan are especially impressive, given the obvious unsuitability of the geographical and climatic conditions in which this country had to develop.

It is not surprising that an extensive literature is multiplying in the world (from travel notes to fundamental research dedicated to the "Japanese phenomenon" and "Japanese challenge"). They contain both prophecies foreshadowing the rise of Japan as a world economic power that will lead the whole world, and gloomy predictions about the inevitable collapse of the "Japanese miracle".

Today, the achievements of Japan will not surprise anyone. It is much more important to understand and explain the causes of the "Japanese economic miracle", or, rather, the phenomenal post-war breakthrough of Japan, which brought it into the category of an "economic superpower".

1 . "Japanese economic miracle"

Japanese economic miracle - this term refers to the breakthrough in the economic development of Japan, which occurred during the years 1955-1973, when the average annual rate of its economic growth was 9.5%.

Until the middle of the 20th century, the Japanese economy was practically isolated from the main world centers of industrial development due to the colossal distances that made it unprofitable and even impractical to transport raw materials and finished products to the islands, due to the aggressive foreign policy of the country's imperialist leadership in the interwar period, due to the centuries-old self-isolation of the islands until 1868, which left a deep psychological boundary that still sometimes separates the so-called. Japanese and European civilizations.

Industrial production by the end of the war was reduced by 10 times compared with the pre-war level. Therefore, it is natural that the restoration here lasted longer than in other countries: the pre-war level of production was restored only in 1952. But something else is more significant: the restoration took place on the old technical basis, i.e. the technical upgrade that was made during the recovery in other countries was not here. Japanese industrialists hoped to continue to win on the cheapness of labor and restored industries that did not require large capital and high technology, but a lot of living labor. But by the end of the recovery period, it became clear that under the new conditions, the old methods of social dumping were ineffective: Japan was increasingly losing its former position in the world economy.

It would seem that in such unfavorable conditions, forcing the use of more expensive construction and transport technologies, overcoming huge distances when delivering products to the main markets, and, moreover, by producing and transporting almost all products using imported raw materials and fuel, it was impossible for Japanese corporations to achieve competitiveness in world markets and become one of the global economic leaders. However, the history of Japan's industrial expansion proved otherwise, using factors of growth that had previously not been given sufficient attention in other countries. It can be said that Japan taught the whole world a magnificent economic lesson, the assimilation of which and the repetition of the success achieved on the islands is becoming a priority task for governments and business executives in many countries today.

In this situation, the discussion about the dilemma that arose in Japan immediately after the end of the war, where to start the exit from the post-war devastation - from the development of production (the concept of recovery through production) or the suppression of inflation (the concept of monetary reform), ended in favor of the first option. japanese economic miracle economy

When the leaders of the economy of Japan changed their priorities sharply, a sharp increase in economic indicators began, in terms of which Japan was ahead of the rest of the world.

Such superiority in pace over a number of years gave rise to the first wave of publications about the Japanese "economic miracle" in the late 60s and early 70s. In these works, the causes were analyzed, the existing rates were compared, extrapolated, and on this basis, stunning forecasts were made for Japan to become a world leader.

1.1 Economic implicationsWorld War IIwars

The economic situation in post-war Japan was extremely difficult. Although its industrial and technical base suffered relatively little damage during the war, Japan's economy was on the verge of collapse. Japan lost all the occupied territories and thereby lost its colonial supplies of raw materials, fuel, and food. Japanese goods were forced out of world markets. Inflation and unemployment were high in the country. The industry was in a difficult position. In 1945 its production volumes were only 28.5% of the level of 1935-1937. even two years after the end of the war - in 1947. release industrial products was 3.5 times less than in 1938.

The largest reduction in production capacity occurred in the light industry - textile and food, satisfying the consumer demand of the population.

Since Japan was forbidden to maintain direct ties with other countries, the import of raw materials, fuel and food into the country was practically stopped. As a result of this, as well as the general economic disruption production capacity, slightly affected by hostilities, could not be fully used for several years.

The economic situation in the country was also complicated by the fact that at first the Japanese monopolies resorted to the tactics of sabotaging the restoration of the national economy. First, the former military-industrial corporations refused to start production until the government compensated them for the losses incurred during the war, citing unprofitability, lack of raw materials and funding. Secondly, the reluctance to restore production by big capital was motivated by fears of reparation seizures, i.e. compensation by Japan for material damage caused by it during the war years to other countries through the transfer of technological equipment. However, it soon became clear that equipment for this purpose would not be exported from the country.

An essential feature of Japan's recovery period was that, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, it was occupied by American troops acting on behalf of the Allied Powers and adopting a number of directives for the democratization and demilitarization of the country. Until the beginning of the 50s. the supreme power in the country was in the hands of the American army of occupation. However, the United States did not exercise this power directly, but through the Japanese government.

To cover a significant shortfall state budget, paying off obligations to the monopolies, the national government embarked on the path of mass issuance of paper money. From 1945 to 1947 the total money supply quadrupled. Inflation has risen sharply, and the standard of living of the population has declined. By 1946 the real wages of workers were about 13% of the pre-war period.

The restoration of the country's economy required the development of a fundamentally new development strategy. It was necessary not to restore the destroyed structure of the economy, but to move from total state control to a free market. The most significant in economic terms were the following reforms.

First, in 1945. A law was passed to eliminate the zaibatsu, which prohibited the formation of industrial cartels. Control over the merger of firms was introduced, freedom was established trade deals, private sources of financing became available to all entrepreneurs. The elimination of the zaibatsu was seen in the country as a just retribution against those magnates who were the masterminds of aggression.

Secondly, in 1947-1950. Japan underwent agrarian reform. The state forcibly redeemed land from the landowners and sold it to the peasants in installments. As a result, landownership was abolished, and the peasants became the owners of the land. These transformations completed the accomplishment of the tasks of the Meiji revolution and were of a bourgeois character. Although the country was still dominated by small-scale peasant production, the reform contributed to the development of commodity-money relations, the growth of the capacity of the domestic market and agricultural production. Since 1946 to 1970 it has more than doubled.

Thirdly, social relations were reformed. Thus, under the new labor legislation, an eight-hour working day, paid holidays, and social insurance were established. These measures limited the arbitrariness of entrepreneurs and encouraged them to master new technology.

Fourth, in 1949. Japan passed a tax reform. Corporate taxes were reduced and taxes on excess profits were abolished, but the taxation of the population was significantly increased. This allowed entrepreneurs to accelerate the accumulation of capital, but at the same time, the low purchasing power of the population hindered the growth of production.

Fifth, in 1950. budget reform was carried out. Since that time, the country stopped paying compensation to military plants for conversion, and gratuitous subsidizing of unprofitable enterprises. The issue was put under control. A single fixed exchange rate was adopted. Inflation was gradually brought to a halt and price controls lifted. This meant a transition to a market economy.

Sixth, much attention was paid to the restructuring of the economy. Since Japan did not have its own natural resources, she had to create modern processing industries based on import-substituting technologies.

1.2 Reasons for"Japanese economicmiracle"

Gradually, Japan increasingly lost its former position in the world economy. Then the leaders of the Japanese economy sharply changed their priorities, and the Japanese "economic miracle" began: in terms of the growth rate of the main economic indicators, Japan was ahead of the whole world. By main economic indicators- gross national product and industrial production - Japan took 2nd place in the capitalist world. It took 1st place in the world in the production of ships, steel, cars, a number of electrical and radio products, etc.

In the scientific literature, the following factors of Japan's rapid economic growth are usually identified.

First, the special nature and special conditions of fixed capital. During the post-war reconstruction industry is equipped with the latest technology, i.e. there is a technological leap. At the same time, the structure of industry is also changing: the newest industries come to the fore. But in Japan, the degree of war destruction required a particularly complete renewal of fixed capital.

The speed of technical restructuring was increased by the fact that instead of independent scientific and technical developments, Japan took the path of acquiring their scientific and technical experience from other countries, buying patents and licenses. It turned out to be cheaper and faster. Saved not so much money as time. Japan was forced to do this by circumstances: according to the calculations of Japanese experts, by the mid-50s. its industry lagged behind the advanced countries by 20-25 years in scientific and technical terms, and to start from the very beginning meant to consolidate the lag.

Secondly, special forms of labor exploitation and the high share of capital investment in the national income. About a third of capital investments are "private savings". In other words, the Japanese spend relatively little on their consumption, save, and put the saved money in the bank or buy shares of industrial enterprises with them. This is due to the peculiarities of labor exploitation in Japan. Wages here have risen a lot, but remain lower than in other countries in relation to the cost of production.

Japan is characterized by a lifetime attachment of an employee to an enterprise. This attachment, of course, is provided not by coercion, but by economic factors. The salary of a novice worker is relatively low, but it is increased annually by seniority allowances, so that a worker at the age of 45 earns 2.5 times more than a novice worker. Naturally, when moving to another form, the employee must start from the lowest level of salary. In addition, with an increase in the length of service, the vacation lengthens, certain privileges expand, and the pension increases in the future. Under these conditions, the worker's life is connected with the prosperity of the company. Naturally, this increases productivity.

In addition, in the Japanese industry, much attention is paid to socio-psychological factors. The administration takes measures to unite the members of the labor collective, to organize family holidays. A pension in Japan is a one-time payment of an amount based on one monthly salary for each year worked. Since the pensioner will no longer receive anything from enterprises, he tries to invest this money in the business, i.e. buys shares in them. Obviously, this is also due to a third of capital investment from private savings.

In addition, in Japan there is such a practice: production operations, which do not require high technology, but require a lot of living labor, large firms do not perform themselves, but transfer them to small, sometimes even semi-handicraft establishments. This is much cheaper.

Third, the high share of development spending Agriculture was associated with low military spending. According to the Japanese constitution, military spending cannot exceed 1% of GNP. They are growing because the national product itself is growing.

Fourth, the high growth rates of Japanese industry were associated with the peculiarities state regulation economy. The Japanese economic system, held together by typically Asian informal ties between the business community and the business community and the state, is one of the toughest in terms of the government's impact on the economy. The most important method of solving economic problems is protectionism. The state pursued a policy of soft loans, high customs tariffs for the import of finished products, restrictions on foreign investment, authorized the creation of the largest financial and industrial groups, organized central planning, and so on.

Economic planning is carried out by the body, which is called the “Department of Economic Planning”. Representatives of financial groups and corporations actively participate in it. Parliament does not participate in the development or approval of plans. Two types of plans are being developed - nationwide and sectoral. The goal of nationwide plans is to ensure a certain growth rate. The purpose of the sectoral plans is to eliminate the weak points of the Japanese economy, i.e. ensure the growth of those parts of the economy that cannot do without state aid. While national plans are supported by private investment, sectoral plans are provided by the state.

Fifth, it should be noted the features of the Japanese national character that influenced the economic development of the country. The specificity of Japanese culture and philosophy, the preservation of feudal traditions contributed to the establishment of such traits of the national character as obedience, devotion to the owner, belief in Japanese exceptionalism, etc. It's about, therefore, that the civilizational features of the country were organically included in the Japanese economic model as a system element.

The technical re-equipment of Japanese industry and structural changes in it have gone through a number of stages. Since the second half of the 50s of the twentieth century. The development of new technological processes and new branches of production begins. During this period, Japan's industry is moving from labor-intensive industries to capital-intensive industries. The share of light industry is declining, the automotive industry, electrical engineering, and the production of technical materials are developing rapidly. Big changes have taken place in the agricultural sector. Under the influence of the agrarian reform, a steady growth in agricultural production began. In 1961 The Basic Agricultural Law was adopted, aimed at transferring agriculture from small-scale to large-scale production. It was supposed to reduce the share of rice, to stimulate the production of livestock products, vegetables, and fruits.

1.3 sunset japaneseeconomic miracle

Somewhere in the mid-70s, the “Japanese economic miracle” comes to an end. The seventies were the years of the so-called oil shocks, the end of the era of cheap energy carriers. Structural restructuring is going on throughout the capitalist world, accompanied by acute crisis phenomena. Structural adjustment is also taking place in Japan. Energy-intensive industries turn out to be inefficient, especially in Japan, where there are no significant domestic energy resources. Industries such as metallurgy and chemistry turn out to be structurally depressed.

The aging of the Japanese labor force is beginning to have an effect, and, at the same time, the exhaustion of the factor of cheap labor. There are sharp disproportions between the development of the country's economic and social infrastructure, and the consequences of a long neglect of protection problems become apparent. environment. The attachment of the Japanese economy to the world market is growing, primarily export dependence on the US market.

However, the line of Japanese entrepreneurship, supported by the state, towards continuous technical renewal of production continues to increase the productivity, and at the same time, the competitiveness of Japanese goods. Japan continues to increase its exports, throwing an increasing number of ultra-modern cars and electronics onto the world's markets. growing active balance trade balance of the country and at the same time the export of capital.

Repeated attempts by the government to turn the development of the Japanese economy inwards end in failure. The “reconstruction plan for the Japanese archipelago” put forward in 1972 by Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka failed even before it began to be implemented. Although the plan itself was quite reasonable and justified, assuming a significant expansion of living space for the population of Japan, almost 90% of which is concentrated in a narrow coastal strip, which makes up about 10% of its entire territory. The plan provided for the extensive development of industrial and social infrastructure, major road construction, and the creation of new industrial centers in the hinterland of Japan. The same fate befell the “life cycle plan” proposed by another Prime Minister of Japan, T. Miki, aimed at overcoming “social disproportions” (in the areas social insurance employment, education, etc.). After the first successes, the proposed in 1982 was soon “forgotten and abandoned”. a plan to switch the work of the Japanese economy to the domestic market.

The implementation of these plans would make it possible to use the huge foreign exchange earnings from Japanese exports to relieve the bottlenecks of the Japanese economy, which were rooted in the backwardness of the industrial and social infrastructure, primarily land shortages and the human factor, to solve ecological problems. This, in turn, would increase the absorptive capacity of the Japanese economy for investment and help re-energize waning economic growth.

However, large Japanese corporations and banks got a taste of easy profit - from the transfer of production to other countries, as well as from speculative operations on the land and stock exchanges. The bottlenecks that were not embroidered reduced the scope of possible profitable investments within Japan. To open up these bottlenecks, huge, mainly state investments, and increased state intervention were required. But this came into conflict with the selfish interests of powerful forces within Japan's financial capital. On the other hand, external pressure on Japan from its foreign trade partners from among the developed countries, primarily the United States, increased. The latter were particularly concerned about the growing US trade deficit with Japan. This pressure was aimed at blowing up Japan's highly structured capitalist economy in order to weaken Japanese competition in its markets. The US was especially concerned about reducing its trade deficit with Japan, and if that failed, creating a mechanism to refinance it. Under the pressure of these forces, Japan begins in the late 1970s and early 1980s to develop the process of liberalizing its economy. Since 1980, the Japanese government began to implement the so-called administrative and financial reform, one of the main directions of which was the course towards the privatization of public sector enterprises.

Following this, a series of events shook the stability of financial ties within Japanese financial and industrial groups. The interaction of two factors affected - the successful conquest of foreign markets by Japanese corporations (including through the creation of foreign enterprises) and the decline in the ability of the Japanese economy to absorb new investments. At the same time, the Japanese domestic market was oversaturated with consumer goods. In order to dramatically expand effective demand, it was necessary to create a new lifestyle in a new living space. Japan's aging population needed to create a decent standard of living so that a new structure of effective demand could emerge. It was necessary for able-bodied pensioners to be provided with work with decent pay.

The country needed an active population policy, which would allow, instead of a sharp slowdown in demographic growth, to ensure a smooth transition to a more mature age structure. This required an appropriate youth policy, including the creation of new population and production centers. Without this, domestic investment in Japanese production was doomed to stagnation, and left to the mercy of the market element, they could not compete with foreign investment opportunities.

Since the second half of the 1980s, a speculative wave has been added to these negative impacts. The country has entered an era of unbridled speculation in land and shares of the most promising companies. The development of the so-called "bubble economy" began.

This time Japan's ruling elite was not up to the task it faced. Again, looking ahead, we can say that there has been a generational change in the Japanese leadership. The creators of the “Japanese economic miracle”, those who still participated in the creation of the Japanese military-industrial complex in Manchuria and understood the need to combine market flexibility with a planned start and a strong organization of production, those who selflessly restored economic ties destroyed by the Americans, such figures as Matsushita , Honda, Okita became very old and gradually passed away. The leaders of the younger generation, such as Morita, also passed away. All of them carried the deep traditions of Japanese society into modern times and at the same time looked far ahead, one might say - beyond the horizon. In their place came young people, brought up on American textbooks of economics and management, and generally strongly influenced by Americanism. They saw the way for further development of Japan in the internationalization of its economy, i.e. in its inclusion in the general wave of globalization as a junior partner of the United States, and did not notice the dangers that lay in wait for the country along this path.

2. Economy of Japan

2.1 Period of high economic growth (1960-1971)

The period of high growth rates occupies a special place in the economic development of Japan. The successes achieved by her in those years were so impressive that the world started talking about the Japanese "economic miracle". For 15 years - from 1958 to 1973. -- Japan's gross national product has increased 6.5 times, and the volume of industrial production - more than 10 times. Surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, already at the end of the 60s Japan took second place in the capitalist world in terms of industrial production, and in the early 70s in terms of gross national product. The growth rate of the Japanese economy at that time was the highest among the developed capitalist countries and amounted to about 11% per year.

Japan's economic successes were mainly due to the rapid development of the manufacturing industry, primarily due to huge investments in the expansion and renewal of fixed capital. During the period of high growth rates, an average of about 30% of the country's GDP was spent on accumulation, and of these funds, about 2/3 was directed to the development of industry.

With the completion of the recovery processes in industry in 1957, it became obvious that its further development was impossible without a fundamental technical reconstruction. Since the second half of the 1950s, an intensive process of renewal of fixed capital in old industries (ferrous metallurgy, oil refining, electrical engineering, shipbuilding, textile and food industries, and chemical industries) began in Japan. At the same time, there was a rapid construction of enterprises in new industries and industries, such as radio electronics, petrochemistry, the production of plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibers, etc.

Both the reconstruction of old industries and the creation of new ones were largely based on the import of foreign machinery and technology. So, for 1950-1971. Japan acquired over 15,000 foreign patents and licenses, of which more than 60% came from the United States.

The implementation of the course towards technical reconstruction and the creation of an advanced industrial structure has led to the fact that the basis of economic growth has become a huge and ever-increasing demand of enterprises for machinery, equipment, building materials and other investment goods. This was accompanied by an increase in the concentration of investment and production in heavy industries that served the investment goods market. At the same time, machine-building industries developed at the highest rates.

As a result, by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the face of Japanese industry had changed radically. First, the share of heavy industry in its structure increased significantly: from 51.7% to 67.8% in 1956-1973. (including the share of branches of the machine-building complex from 17.9% to 35.3%). Secondly, by the end of the 1960s, Japan had created an almost universal sectoral structure of industrial production, in which all types of modern industries, including the latest ones, were represented to one extent or another. And, thirdly, all the old branches of Japanese industry have switched to new production technologies and mastered the production of modern products. Thus, in ferrous metallurgy a decisive turn was made from the open-hearth method of steel smelting and the oxygen-converter method; in shipbuilding was introduced new technology the construction of giant tankers and bulk carriers, more efficient equipment for the production of ammonia, artificial fertilizers, etc. was installed in the chemical industry.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the technical level of Japanese industry was already one of the highest in the world. The share of machinery and equipment under the age of 3 years in the early 70s was almost half the value of fixed assets, and in a number of leading industries in terms of capacity and productivity of equipment, Japan managed to bypass not only European countries, but also the United States (primarily in ferrous metallurgy, petrochemistry, and shipbuilding). The place and role of Japan in world production have changed radically. By the end of the 1960s, it became the world's largest producer of many important types of heavy industry products, ranking first in the world in terms of production of ships, film and photographic equipment, and chemical fibers, and in steel smelting, production of electrical equipment, electronic equipment, cars, sewing machines, etc. -- on the second after the USA, having outstripped the Great Britain and Germany.

Relying on its ever-increasing industrial power, Japan gradually turned into one of the world's largest exporters of industrial products. The volume of Japanese exports in 1957--1973. increased by almost 10 times, with a sharp change in its internal structure. The export of textiles, which at the end of the 1950s accounted for 20-25% of the value of exports, faded into the background, giving way to a wide range of heavy industry products, such as steel, ships, cars, radios, optical instruments, electrical equipment, sewing machines, cameras, televisions, etc. In 1973, textile products accounted for only 9% of the value of exports, machinery and equipment for 55%, metals and metal products for 8.5%, and chemical products for about 6%. Moreover, if earlier the Japanese niche in the world markets was filled mainly with goods of relatively low quality and a low degree of complexity, then by the end of the 60s Japan already had a reputation as a supplier of high-quality, technically complex products. Being deprived of any significant reserves of the main types of natural resources, Japan, in order to maintain the rapid development of industry, was forced to increase the import of raw materials and fuel from year to year. Taking advantage of the fact that the prices for these goods on the world markets were stable and even falling for a long time, Japan preferred to import unprocessed raw materials, organizing a full cycle of its processing on its own territory. For 1957-1973 the volume of imports increased by almost 7 times, while at the end of the period raw materials accounted for about a third of its value, and mineral fuels for about 22% (including 16% for oil). As before, a rather high share in imports - over 15% - was occupied by food products. Although since the late 1950s, Japan has been able to meet the needs of the population in the main food product - rice - through domestic production, the growth in the standard of living of the population required an expansion of imports. various kinds food (primarily livestock products and fruits). As for machinery and equipment, Japan's dependence on their supplies from Western countries has significantly decreased (with the exception of a small group of the most sophisticated science-intensive equipment, which it itself could not yet produce), and the share of these goods in imports in the early 70s was less than 10%.

The onslaught of Japanese goods on world markets was so powerful that, despite a multiple increase in imports, from the second half of the 60s, Japan's trade balance began to almost constantly reduce to a positive balance, which allowed it to accumulate significant gold and foreign exchange reserves and begin active export of capital. . In total for 1951-1970. Japanese investments abroad amounted to about 2.7 billion dollars, of which 1.88 billion dollars, or about 70%, were invested in the second half of the 60s.

The manufacturing industry at that time, of course, acted as the locomotive of the country's economic growth. As for other spheres of the economy, their fate was different. The abundance of cheap and high-quality raw materials in the world markets predetermined the beginning of the actual curtailment of our own mining industry. In 1957-1970. the volume of production in the extractive industries increased by only 11%, while their share in the total volume of industrial production decreased from 5.1% to 2.1%. At the end of the 1960s, only about 500,000 people, or about 1% of the total number of people employed in industry, were employed in the extractive industry. Decisive for this dynamic was the curtailment of production in the largest sub-sector, coal mining. The maximum level of coal production - 54.5 million tons - was reached in 1961, then it began to decline rather quickly and in the early 70s was only about 33 million tons. At the same time, Japan's dependence on imports coal over the years increased from 36 to 56%.

The extraction of all other types of raw materials and fuel was carried out in extremely small (often symbolic) volumes. Quite quickly, during the period of high growth rates, transport developed: in 1960-1973. the volume of freight and passenger traffic almost tripled. Significant development has been road transport - in In the early 1970s, it accounted for almost half of passenger traffic and about 40% of cargo traffic. Maritime transport carried over 40% of domestic cargo and the entire volume of external cargo, and about 20% of cargo and about half of passenger traffic fell on rail transport.

The length of Japan's railways has practically not increased since the mid-1930s and in the early 1970s was about 27 thousand km (of which 21.3 thousand km were state railways), but in the 60s this industry has made a number of important technical innovations. One by one, sections of the Shinkansen high-speed rail line, which was supposed to connect all the main cities of Japan, began to be put into operation. The average speed of trains on this highway was more than 160 km/h. At the end of the 60s, the construction of a railway tunnel between the islands of Honshu and Hokkaido (with a total length of 36.4 km and a length of the underwater part of 22 km) was also begun, and a little later, the construction of two largest railway bridges, which were supposed to connect the Osaka- Kobe with the island of Shikoku. Finally, in the second half of the 60s, a complete transition to thermal and electric traction was carried out, and steam locomotives continued to be produced only for export.

By the beginning of the 70s, Japan had become one of the largest automotive powers in the world. In 1971, there were already more than 12 million cars in the country (including over 5 million cars), and according to this indicator, it ranked 2nd (after the USA) in the world. The 1960s became a period of intensive road construction. In particular, in 1969, the Tokyo-Nagoya-Kobe high-speed highway with a length of 536 km was put into operation. Road construction consumed a lot of money, and to alleviate the tense situation with its financing, in 1968 a law was passed according to which, when buying a new car, each buyer had to pay a tax of 3% of its value for road construction purposes. Although the length highways By the beginning of the 70s, Japan ranked 3rd in the world (after the USA and France), in terms of the state of the road network, it still lagged far behind many advanced countries: for example, out of 150 thousand km of roads, only about 45% had a hard surface .

The period of high growth rates was decisive in the development of the Japanese navy. Only by the end of the 1950s did it manage to restore the maximum pre-war tonnage level of the navy (6.1 million tons), which had suffered colossal damage as a result of the war. However, in subsequent years, the replenishment of the fleet proceeded at such a rapid pace that already in 1971, in terms of its total tonnage - over 30 million tons - Japan took second place in the world. In terms of technical level, the Japanese fleet was one of the most advanced in the world: it included giant tankers, powerful bulk carriers, and container ships.

Important changes also took place in the Japanese countryside during this period. Around the mid-1950s, a rather rapid outflow of rural population to the cities. In 1955-1973. more than 11.5 million people left the village, and by 1973 the rural population had decreased to 24.7 million people. (23% of the total population). The total number of peasant farms also decreased by about 900 thousand and amounted to about 5160 thousand by 1973. Although the reduction in the number of farms occurred mainly due to the category of small and smallest (with plots up to 1 ha), the latter still formed the basis of Japanese agriculture : in 1973 there were more than 3.5 million, or two thirds of the total number of households.

There has been a significant reduction in land leases. By the beginning of the 1970s, there were almost no landless peasant tenants left in the countryside, and the number of farms resorting to renting had decreased to about 1 million (in 1950 there were more than 2 million).

The total volume of agricultural production increased by 1.5 times over the period under review. In the 1960s, agricultural machinery (mini-tractors, combine harvesters) became relatively widespread in the countryside, but most agricultural operations were still carried out manually or using draft power. In general, in terms of the level of mechanization of agricultural production, Japan in these years was much inferior to Western countries. At the same time, by the end of the 1960s, it took one of the first places in the world in the consumption of chemical fertilizers. Thanks to the intensive use of fertilizers, pesticides, as well as the improvement of agrotechnical production methods, Japanese peasants managed to significantly increase productivity, and at the end of the 60s, the average yield of rice, sweet potato, onion, etc. Japan occupied one of the first places in the world.

The material situation of the peasants also improved. The average total income of a peasant family in 1957-1973. grew almost 7 times, but at the same time, the share of agriculture in it decreased from 56.6% in 1957 to 32.1% in 1973, and the share of side income increased accordingly from 43.4% to 67, nine%. By the beginning of the 1970s, only 15% of households managed with income received from agriculture, and 85% resorted to side earnings to one degree or another (from working for hire to starting their own business).

In general, the appearance of the Japanese village has changed a lot. Refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, not to mention televisions and radios, entered the everyday life of peasants; many families were even able to purchase cars. At the end of the 1960s, there was no longer such a sharp contrast between the city and the countryside as existed before the war and even at the end of the 1950s.

In the development of industry, agriculture and other areas of the Japanese economy in that period, the state continued to play an exceptionally important role. Although the dimensions public sector decreased significantly, the government played a leading role in determining the strategy economic development.

During the period of high growth rates in Japan, government programming has developed significantly. The most famous of the plans prepared in these years was the "Plan for doubling the national income", which provided for the achievement of this goal in 1961-1970. and the elimination of the economic and technological gap between Japan and the leading Western countries. Although government plans and programs were indicative, they served as an important guide for private business, as they indicated areas and industries that would receive the attention and support of the government. In addition, the state used a wide range of credit and financial levers to encourage the private sector to develop in given directions, and when this was not enough, resorted to coercion using administrative methods.

In the 1960s, ferrous metallurgy, oil refining, petrochemistry, and a number of machine-building industries were the primary concern of the government.

2.2 Weaknesses of the Japanese economy

In spite of clear progress, the Japanese housekeeper has its weaknesses. We are talking, first of all, about the products of labor-intensive manufacturing industries, especially in terms of assembly, and high-tech production. Other industries and sectors of the economy of Japan, and in terms of labor productivity, and in terms of the technical level of production, as a rule, lag significantly behind the United States and Western European countries. First of all, this applies to agriculture, food, paper, cement, chemical, aluminum, mining, pharmaceutical, aviation industries. The same can be said for most service industries.

In addition to the above, Japan is characterized by the so-called innate weaknesses: first of all, certain distortions in the structure of the economy, the comparative threat of the domestic market, the development of which chronically lags behind the growth of production. As a result, the country's dependence on the external market is growing, which is further exacerbated by the lack of its own raw materials and energy base, insufficient development of agriculture and growing food imports. Underdevelopment has a negative impact on the Japanese economy housing stock and social infrastructure, weak social support from the state in the field of pensions, benefits, health care, long working hours.

Due to the non-complex structure of the economy and the growing dependence on the foreign market, Japan is distinguished by low indicators of social well-being. There is a low level of old-age pensions, the number of divorces and appeals to the police is growing, there is a high level of crime, especially among children.

The housing problem is not solved. Living space per person is very small. The quality of the buildings themselves and the internal layout, as well as the equipment of Japanese dwellings, are significantly inferior to the level typical of the United States and Western European countries.

Compared to other developed countries, Japan has very short paid holidays and high labor intensity.

Thus, the Japanese economy has both strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, the previously backward country managed to take one of the leading places in the world in terms of economic power in a short historical period.

3. The results of the "Japanese economic miracle"

From 1950 to 1970, the average annual growth rate of industrial production was about 15%. By 1990, Japan's industrial production had grown by a factor of 21.1 compared to the level of 1938 (or 1952).

Bok Zi Kou provides data on the volume of national income of the leading economic powers as early as 1978.

AN Izotov publishes information on the rates of economic growth of the most developed capitalist countries in the period 1973-1983.

Against the general background of the rather sluggish economic development of other capitalist countries, even the relatively modest figures of Japanese growth observed in the 1980s look very impressive.

Conclusion

The Japanese economic miracle is a historical phenomenon of record growth for the Japanese economy, which began in the mid-1950s and continued until the 1973 oil crisis. The growth of the economy during the period of the economic miracle was almost 10% annually, these were the highest growth rates among the developed capitalist countries of that time. One of the reasons for the “miracle” is low taxes (the army did not exist, and state funds were not spent on its maintenance) and the intensive development of new technologies by Japanese science, information about which almost did not come to Japan before World War II due to the isolation policy of the authorities .The rapid growth rates in the shortest possible time allowed Japan not only to fully recover from the defeat in the war, but also to take second place in terms of economic power, consistently surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, Germany and second only to the United States.

The hallmarks of the Japanese economy during the period of the "economic miracle" were: the amalgamation of manufacturers, input suppliers, product distributors, and banks into closely related groups called keiretsu; mutually beneficial relations between entrepreneurs and the government; guarantee of lifetime employment in large corporations; active trade union movement.

WITHlist of literature

1. Alekseev, V.V. Economy of Japan / V.V. Alekseev. - 2nd ed., revised. - Moscow: MGIMO - University, 2006. - 241 p.

2. Bock, Z.K. Economy of Japan. What is she? / Bok Zi Kou. - M .: Economics, 2002. - 349 p.

3. Volgin, N.A. Japanese Experience: Solutions to Economic and Social and Labor Problems. - M.: Economics, 1998. - 255 p.

4. Druzhinin, N.L. Japan. Economic miracle / N.L. Druzhinin. - St. Petersburg: Peter: Leader, 2003. - 265p.

5. Izotov, A.N. Japan: the concept of taking the lead. - M.: Economics, 1991. - 113 p.

6. History of Japan / Ros. Acad. Nauk, Institute of Oriental Studies, etc. T. ". 1868-1998/ [V.N. Eremin, A.E., Zhukov, I.P. Lebedeva and others]. - 703 p.

7. Osamu, N. Modern Japanese Economy / Osamu Nariai. - Baku: Elm ve hayat, 2003. - 146 p. - (From the series "About Japan").

8. http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_economic_miracle.

9. http://yandex.ru

10. Volgin N.A. Japanese Experience: Solutions to Economic and Social and Labor Problems. - M.: Economics, 1998.

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Causes of the "Japanese economic miracle"

Gradually, Japan increasingly lost its former position in the world economy. Then the leaders of the Japanese economy sharply changed their priorities, and the Japanese "economic miracle" began: in terms of the growth rate of the main economic indicators, Japan was ahead of the whole world. According to the main economic indicators - gross national product and industrial production - Japan came out on the 2nd place in the capitalist world. It took 1st place in the world in the production of ships, steel, cars, a number of electrical and radio products, etc.

In the scientific literature, the following factors of Japan's rapid economic growth are usually identified.

First, the special nature and special conditions of fixed capital. During the post-war reconstruction, industry is equipped with the latest technology, i.e. there is a technological leap. At the same time, the structure of industry is also changing: the newest industries come to the fore. But in Japan, the degree of war destruction required a particularly complete renewal of fixed capital.

In addition, there is such a practice in Japan: production operations that do not require high technology, but require a lot of living labor, are not performed by large firms themselves, but transferred to small, sometimes even semi-handicraft establishments. This is much cheaper.

Thirdly, the high share of spending on agricultural development was associated with low military spending. According to the Japanese constitution, military spending cannot exceed 1% of GNP. They are growing because the national product itself is growing.

Fourth, the high growth rates of Japanese industry were associated with the peculiarities of state regulation of the economy. The Japanese economic system, held together by typically Asian informal ties between the business community and the business community and the state, is one of the toughest in terms of the government's impact on the economy. The most important method of solving economic problems is protectionism. The state pursued a policy of soft loans, high customs tariffs for the import of finished products, restrictions on foreign investment, authorized the creation of the largest financial and industrial groups, organized central planning, and so on.

Economic planning is carried out by the body, which is called the “Department of Economic Planning”. Representatives of financial groups and corporations actively participate in it. Parliament does not participate in the development or approval of plans. Two types of plans are being developed - nationwide and sectoral. The goal of nationwide plans is to ensure a certain growth rate. The purpose of the sectoral plans is to eliminate the weak points of the Japanese economy, i.e. ensure the growth of those parts of the economy that cannot do without state assistance. While national plans are supported by private investment, sectoral plans are provided by the state.

Fifth, it should be noted the features of the Japanese national character that influenced the economic development of the country. The specificity of Japanese culture and philosophy, the preservation of feudal traditions contributed to the establishment of such traits of the national character as obedience, devotion to the owner, belief in Japanese exceptionalism, etc. We are talking, therefore, about the fact that the country's civilizational features were organically included as a system element in the Japanese economic model.

The Japanese economic miracle is a historical fact of the record growth of the Japanese economy. Economic growth was 10% annually, it was the highest growth rate among the countries of that time. The rapid growth rates in the shortest possible time allowed Japan not only to fully recover from the defeat in the war, but also to take second place in terms of economic power, consistently surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, and the USSR.

So, on September 2, 1945, Japan capitulated. The country was under the rule of the American military, the economy was in a state of ruin. “Industrial output has fallen to 20% of the pre-war level.

The economy revived slowly: the pre-war level of production was restored not in 1949, as in Western Europe, but only by 1953. Being in such a situation, Japan needed a transition to a new development strategy, and the essence of this strategy was a fundamental departure from the past. It was necessary to create a new structure of the economy, new incentives for work, the democratization of society, the development market relations and entrepreneurship. Thus, it was decided to invite American entrepreneurs and managers, who developed a program relating to all aspects of Japanese life.

The Japanese economic miracle emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. 20th century

This phenomenon seems incredible, because having suffered a severe defeat in the war, Japan suffered significant damage, both morally and materially, and, despite this, was able to break into economic leaders.

The main problem in Japan at that time was that the lack of its own raw material resources limited the opportunities for extensive growth and predetermined the need for an intensive development path. Japan was forced to import 99% of the necessary natural resources (100% of bauxite and nickel, cotton, natural rubber, more than 90% of oil, iron ore, non-ferrous metals). The limited natural resources forced Japan not only to constantly modernize production, to develop and implement material and energy saving technologies, but also to develop an export orientation of the economy. The export of national products was supposed to provide financial resources for the import of raw materials, energy and food resources. Export orientation in the face of fierce competition required the Japanese industry to produce products to the highest international standards, to ensure its competitiveness in terms of price, quality, service, etc.

A number of factors contributed to the rapid recovery of the Japanese economy:

1. Total control over export-import processes was undertaken, the import of foreign finished products that could drown out Japanese industry was prohibited, but imports were encouraged modern technologies Western production, which was ultimately aimed at the development of the technology industry in Japan.

2. On state level producers of new products were supported, and dealers were in a less enviable position, pressure in their direction made this type of activity unprofitable. As a result, the number of primary producers increased and thus the national wealth increased more rapidly.

3. Effective use achievements of scientific and technological revolution. Japan skillfully applied the achievements of world scientific thought, acquiring patents, licenses, know-how and putting them into practice. This made it possible to save Money and make, on the basis of the scientific and technological level already achieved by other countries, a colossal breakthrough in science and technology

4. The active economic role of the state, which was a major owner and buyer, was of great importance for the economic rise of Japan. The state also influenced economic development on the basis of planning, but the plans were developed by representatives of financial groups and corporations. Two types of plans were developed - nationwide, the implementation of which was provided by private investment, and sectoral, implemented by the financial resources of the state.

However, first of all, this merit is directly to the Japanese workers who performed the most difficult tasks, so the "Japanese economic miracle" is primarily based on the system of labor relations.

The main features of such a system can be distinguished:

– lifetime employment system, which is based not on the formal legal "fixing" of a person, but on the real provision of the interest of employees to work at this enterprise for the maximum time and link their fate with it for life. An increase in work experience affects the level of wages and future pensions, the duration of vacation, and the receipt of some additional privileges;

– socio-psychological factors, which are of great importance in modern conditions to improve production efficiency. The administration of the company takes measures to create a good psychological climate and unite the workforce. An understanding of the company and its employees as a single family is formed, all members of which help and support each other;

– wage system. The amount of wages of employees of firms consists of many elements. The formation of the total earnings of an employee is influenced by age, length of service, education, position and duties, working conditions, work results, family allowances, housing, and transport. A feature of production in Japan is the relatively low share of wages in the cost of the final product compared to other countries. Thus, the share of wages in the finished product in the US is 32%, in the UK - 27%, in Japan - 11%. This is due to the fact that in Japan the growth of labor productivity significantly outpaces the growth of wages, and the rate of growth in labor productivity is higher than in many other countries.

– personnel rotation system, involving the movement of workers horizontally and vertically every 2-3 years. The main purpose of the rotation is to determine the place that most contributes to the realization of the potential abilities of the employee and, ultimately, the performance of the company as a whole;

– workplace training system associated with a clear division of functions between secondary and higher education, which provides fundamental knowledge, and in-house training, which provides professional training;

– reputation system, involving the compilation of annual characteristics for each employee at the place of work by his colleagues. Such characteristics help employees to objectively evaluate themselves both in the labor process and in relationships in the team.

By the 80-90s. Japan has managed to firmly gain a foothold in second place in the world, second only to the United States.

Thus, within just one generation, the country's economy grew more than such economic giants (at that time) as the USA, France, Canada, Germany and Italy. From this arose the concept of the Japanese economic miracle, which characterizes the dizzying rise of a country with mediocre territorial and human resources. However, in the 90s. this phenomenon was replaced by a disease known as the Lost Decade, which happened after the collapse of the country's financial industry.

Japan after the war

In the first half of the 20th century, Japan pursued a policy of militarism and expansion. The Japanese tried to compensate for the lack of natural resources by seizing the territories of a number of East Asian countries.

But as a result of World War II, the Land of the Rising Sun suffered a crushing defeat and, after the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on September 2, 1945, was forced to sign the Act of Unconditional Surrender. The country was occupied by "allied forces".

During the war, a significant part of the Japanese economic potential was destroyed, the housing stock was significantly destroyed, and the supply of foreign raw materials was stopped. Industrial production fell to the level of 1926, the total damage was estimated at 1.3 trillion. Yen. The development of the country was thrown back for a good ten years.

Recovery using the American model

The US victory was perceived by the Japanese elite as proof of the effectiveness of the American model of social and economic organization. Yesterday's militant samurai changed "sword to plowshare" in the blink of an eye. The emperor publicly renounced divine origin, women gained the right to vote, trade unions were revived, a directive on political and religious freedoms appeared, and the activities of opposition parties, including socialists and communists, were allowed.

In 1947, one of the most belligerent countries in history adopted a new constitution in which it set a course for pacifism and liberal democracy. At the same time, in 1946-1949, according to the plan of the economist Wolf Ladezhinsky, a land reform was carried out. Large land ownership was destroyed, the peasants stopped renting land - they became its owners.

Following that, in 1949-1950, an American banker developed a plan to stabilize the Japanese economy (the so-called "Dodge line") through "shock therapy". To overcome inflation, a tough tax reform was carried out, which was based on the principle of a progressive income tax. Instead of subsidizing industrialists, the government sent assistance to banks, which began to issue loans to companies under their own responsibility.

On many large enterprises the payment of the already meager wages was frozen, there was a wave of mass layoffs, the Japanese tightened their belts tightly. A hard exchange rate of the yen against the dollar (360 to 1) was established. The result of the reforms in line with the "Dodge Line" was the adoption of a deficit-free state budget, the stabilization of the yen and the gradual establishment of foreign trade.

Free swimming

At the end of the occupation (April 1952), the state's economy was almost completely restored. Japan has become a moderately developed country. Transferring experience to Japan marshall plan, American organizations and firms, along with Europeans, invited Japanese delegations to business courses, where they shared practical knowledge about their production technologies.

The Japanese proved to be just as remarkably teachable as the ancient Romans once were. The American experience made it possible to effectively reconstruct obsolete areas of industry. Industry switched from labor-intensive industries (light industry, textiles) to capital-intensive ones (heavy industry), and then to science-intensive ones. The manufacturing industry served as the locomotive of the country's economic development.

At the same time, the Japanese went through the active import of foreign equipment and technology. Over 15,000 patents and licenses were acquired between 1950 and 1971 (mostly in the US). Instead of huge financial and time expenditures on research, the Japanese bought the rights to the developed product and often made improvements to it. By the end of the 1960s, Japan had created an almost universal sectoral structure of industrial production, using the latest production technologies.

A striking example: the American Du Pont concern has been developing a process for the production of nylon for 11 years, having spent $ 25 million on this, the Japanese company Toyo Rayon bought a patent for its production for $ 7.5 million. At the same time, the Japanese paid this amount during 1951-1959, having received over the years on the export of nylon an income of 90 million dollars.

Orientalist Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: “After the war, the Japanese convinced the Americans that they themselves would rebuild their highly militarized economy. However, in essence it remained state capitalist. The essence of the Japanese miracle lies in the amazing mutual trust of the supreme power and big business. In Japan, the state, together with big business, developed economic strategy. They clearly defined the priorities of the country's development. At the first stage, emphasis was placed on the development of metallurgy, shipbuilding, and petrochemistry. They created the most advanced metallurgy in the world, began to smelt 100 million tons of steel. Japan became the first shipbuilding power in the world, building tankers with a displacement of 200-300 thousand tons. In order to process oil at home, they began to develop petrochemistry. At the second stage, priorities were given to household electrical appliances and automotive industry. It was necessary to break the prevailing stereotype - before the Second World War, Japanese goods were cheap, but of poor quality. At the cost of great effort on their transistors, on their TVs, and then on their cars, they convinced the world that Japanese means quality.

"Golden 60s"

A period of rapid economic growth between 1955 and 1961 paved the way for the so-called "Golden Sixties", the second decade of which is usually associated with "Japanese economic miracle» . In 1965 Japanese nominal GDP was valued at little more than $91 billion. Fifteen years later, in 1980, nominal GDP soared to a record $1.065 trillion.

The volume of Japanese exports in 1957-1973 increased almost tenfold. Japan literally bombarded the world with cars, ships, optics, electrical equipment, sewing machines, radios, cameras and televisions. For a number of important products, Japan came second after the United States. At the same time, Japan, dependent on the export of raw materials and fuel, imported raw materials and carried out a full cycle of its processing.

In the same period, road and sea transport was actively developing. Each of them accounted for 40% of domestic cargo transportation. Already by 1971, Japan had become one of the largest automobile countries in the world, in which there were over 12 million cars, and the total tonnage of the marine fleet (including giant tankers) exceeded 30 million tons. In both industries, it was second in the world after the United States.

As a result, during the period from 1950 to 1973, the average annual growth rate of the Japanese economy was about 10-11%. This was the highest rate among developed countries. The record economic growth that began in the mid-1950s continued until the oil crisis in 1973, during which time Japan's GDP increased 6.5 times, and industrial production more than 10 times.

This historical phenomenon will be further characterized as Japanese economic miracle.

The rapid growth rates in the shortest possible time allowed Japan not only to fully recover from the defeat in the war, but also to take second place in terms of economic power, consistently surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, the USSR and second only to the United States.

Distinctive features of the "Japanese economic miracle" were:

association of manufacturers, resource suppliers, product distributors and banks into closely related groups called keiretsu - large corporate conglomerates and holdings;
mutually beneficial relations between entrepreneurs and the government;
guarantee of lifetime employment in large corporations;
active trade union movement.

Reasons for record performance

Among the reasons for the “miracle” are low taxes and the intensive development of new technologies by Japanese science, information about which was almost never received in Japan before the Second World War due to the isolation policy of the authorities.

The Japanese did not find a simple secret. The key to success was a number of very different factors:

American occupation reforms
US loans
political stability
competent technical restructuring
development of new technologies by Japanese science
export orientation
support of the national manufacturer
Japanese mentality
low cost of labor
confidence in the banking system
control over foreign trade

The Americans, who caused the greatest harm to the Japanese, actually brought the maximum benefit. The result of the American reforms was the stabilization of the political situation in the country and the gradual establishment of foreign trade. At an early stage, the absence of an army played an important role, which made it possible to significantly reduce taxes. According to the Japanese constitution, military spending cannot exceed 1% of the gross national product.

In the future, the features of the Japanese economic model, in particular "keiretsu", did not allow foreigners (including the United States) to occupy a niche in the country's domestic markets. Keiretsu is a large association of various holdings and corporations around a powerful bank that finances all the companies of the group and virtually excludes the possibility of their absorption by other market participants. Besides, this system- a successful model of protection against the expansion of foreign companies.

Particular attention should be paid to the Japanese mentality. The Japanese have always been an isolated nation with a centuries-old practice of building a society in accordance with a strict hierarchy. This was reflected in modern business relations within the country. For example, Japan was characterized by a life-long assignment of an employee to an enterprise.

This was achieved both by the generally accepted way of life and by economic factors. The beginner always had the maximum low salary, which grew over the years for the length of service. At its core, the company is like a second family. From the enterprise itself, the Japanese receive a pension in one single payment, according to the principle of 1 monthly salary for each year worked.

And of course, it is necessary to note the peculiarity of state regulation of the economy. The state owns about a third of all major production assets, forming ~30% of GDP. At the same time, economic planning is occupied by the management, consisting of representatives of financial groups and corporations, and not politicians from parliament. Therefore, the plans are implemented strictly: sanctions for violations will come not from the state, but from fellow craftsmen, which is much worse.

Japanese financial bubble

The end of the “miracle” is attributed to 1985, when Japan signed the famous Plaza Agreements (named after the hotel where they were signed), as a result of which the yen grew 1.5 times, and the economic growth rate in Japan fell from 8% to 2%. %.

In the second half of the 1980s, financial deregulation, euphoria about the economic outlook, and monetary easing by the Bank of Japan, coupled with large savings, led to aggressive speculation in the stock and real estate markets. The Nikkei 225 reached its all-time high on December 29, 1989, closing at 38,915.87. Plus, banks began to issue more risky loans.

At the end of 1989, the Treasury, taking into account the instability of the financial bubble, sharply raised interest rates. The bubble burst, followed by a massive crash in the stock market, followed by a debt crisis, which in turn led to a crisis in the banking sector.

In the early 1990s, high land values and exceptionally low interest rates led to a short-term improvement when credit was very cheap and available. This led to massive borrowing, the proceeds of which were invested in domestic and foreign stocks and securities.

Eventually a wave of consolidation set in, leaving only four national banks in Japan. The situation is critical for the long term economic perspective, as Japanese firms were saddled with huge debts, which affected both their attractiveness for investment and their ability to obtain credit. Even now, the official interest rate is 0.1%. Many borrowers turn to loan sharks for loans.

Unemployment began to rise at a significant pace:

during the 1970-1980s, its level fluctuated within 2-2.8%;
in the 1990s, the figure slightly exceeded 3%;
by 2011 it was 4.9%.

The economic bubble in Japan from 1986 to 1991 was characterized by a complete halt in economic growth, a multiple increase in prices in the real estate market and the stock market. The bubble continued to deflate for more than a decade, with the stock market bottoming out in 2003 but subsequently hitting a new low in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis. The bursting of the bubble resulted in a prolonged period of economic stagnation, called "lost decade".

Lost decade

The period of "stagnation" in the Japanese economy after the collapse of the Japanese financial bubble initially included the period from 1991 to 2000, but in Lately the span from 2001 to 2010 is also included, hence the entire period of the 1990s and 2000s is referred to as the "lost decades" or "lost years".

The Nikkei index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, reflecting the quotes valuable papers Japan's top 225 companies are still less than half of what they were at the time,” Xinhua said in January 2013, noting that “the Japanese economy is currently characterized by high debt, low savings and a passive trade balance, and therefore threatens a third decade of recession.

Recovery in the 2000s

In the Ginza quarter real estate prices peaked in 1989 at 100 million yen (about $1 million) per square meter. In other business quarters, prices were only slightly lower, but by 2004 commercial real estate class A in Tokyo cost less than 1% of its peak price, residential property prices fell more than 10 times, but still remained the highest in the world until the second half of the 2000s, when Tokyo gave way to Moscow and other cities as the most expensive city . Trillions of dollars have been lost in the wealth of the Japanese as a result of the deflating of the bubble. It wasn't until 2007 that real estate prices began to rise, but fell again as a result of the global economic crisis.

The Japanese economy, driven by high levels of investment, was particularly affected by the deflating bubble. Investments began to be directed outside the country, manufacturers began to lose their technological advantage. Japanese goods became less competitive overseas, and low consumption caused deflation. The Japanese Central Bank has lowered interest rates to almost zero. After this failed, some economists suggested using inflation targeting- a set of measures taken by state authorities in order to control the level of inflation in the country, i.e. setting a target inflation rate for a certain period (for example, one year).

Affordable credit, which fueled the bubble, remained a problem for the next few years, in 1997 banks were still making loans with a low probability of repayment. Loan and investment managers struggled to find assets that could turn a profit. Sometimes they even resorted to investing money in the deposits of competing banks, causing complaints from their managers. Correcting the situation in the banking system was even more complicated when the government began to subsidize troubled banks and enterprises, creating so-called "zombie companies". In the end, this led to the emergence of the carry trade, when money is borrowed in Japan through low rates, are invested in more profitable assets abroad, and then the loan is repaid at a significant profit.

Despite the recovery of the economy in the 2000s, the conspicuous consumption of the 1980s, such as spending on whiskey and cars, has not yet fully returned. This was due to the traditional Japanese emphasis on frugality and economy, as well as the fierce competition that Japanese firms that dominated the 1980s experienced from companies in South Korea and Taiwan. Most Japanese companies began to replace the permanent workforce with temporary workers who had no job security; these employees now make up over a third of Japan's workforce.