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Heavy tank

Official designation: KV-1
Start of design: 1939
Date of construction of the first prototype: 1939
Completion stage: serially produced in 1939-1943, used on all sectors of the Eastern Front until May 1945.

The rapid progress of anti-tank artillery, which fell on the mid-1930s, led to the fact that literally recently adopted tanks have already become obsolete. First of all, this affected the cars of the middle and heavy class. By 1936, the only Soviet heavy tank was the five-turret T-35, which, in addition to its grandiose size, was distinguished by its very powerful armament. Then he fully met the requirements, but after evaluating the use of anti-tank equipment in the civil war in Spain, it was concluded that the "thirty-fifth" in terms of the degree of protection practically does not differ from light tanks. In addition, the T-35 had very low running characteristics, which greatly reduced its chances of surviving in modern combat. Attempts to strengthen the reservation by shielding (applying an overlay layer of armor) and the introduction of conical towers were temporary measures that practically did not affect the combat effectiveness of these machines, but they were in no hurry to abandon the construction of multi-turret giants. The fact is that at that time there was no worthy replacement for them, and then they made a compromise decision - to continue the construction of the T-35 and at the same time start designing a completely new heavy tank, with no less powerful weapons and strong armor.
In the fall of 1938, the NKO of the USSR put forward requirements for such a combat vehicle, still focusing on the old concept of a multi-turret tank with an armor thickness of at least 60 mm and obligatory armament consisting of 76-mm and 45-mm guns. This is how the QMS projects appeared (developed by SKB-2, chief designer Zh.Ya.Kotin) and T-100 (developed by the design bureau of plant No. 185 in Leningrad). At first, options were really considered with the placement of weapons in five towers, but later their number was reduced to three. Both machines turned out to be surprisingly similar both in appearance and in technical characteristics, it remained only to determine which of them would be adopted ...

At the same time, the NGO ordered the design of a heavy tank with one turret. Apparently, it was not only a matter of "safety net, just in case." The practice of using multi-turret T-35 tanks in a mock battle showed that the vehicle commander had a very difficult time controlling all parts of the fighting compartment. Sometimes it turned out that the commander of each of the five towers chose his own target and fired independently. Of course, it was much easier to handle two or three towers, but their presence was considered to be somewhat redundant.
The design of a single-turret tank was entrusted to SKB-2, where, under the leadership of engineers L.E. Sychev and A.S. Ermolaev, a group of VAMM graduates developed an out-of-competition project of the tank, better known now as Kv ("Klim Voroshilov").
The SMK tank was taken as a basis, which is quite natural, but one should not assume that the KV was its “reduced one-turret copy”. The length of the tank was indeed noticeably reduced, and the main armament, which consisted of 76.2-mm and 45-mm tank guns, was concentrated in one turret, which in terms of its dimensions (both external and internal) was almost the same as the SMK. At the same time, however, it was necessary to abandon the DK turret machine gun, since there was simply no room for it.
The crew was accordingly reduced to 5 people. The total weight thus saved made it possible to increase the thickness of the frontal plates of the hull and turret to 75 mm, thereby surpassing a kind of record previously held firmly to the French heavy tank 2C. In addition, instead of the AM-34 aircraft engine, the V-2 diesel engine was installed on the KV. Although it had less power (500 hp versus 850 for the SMK) given type the engine burned less expensive fuel and was more fireproof. This entailed a change in the aft part of the hull, the height of which became less due to the use of a new roof of the over-engine compartment. The undercarriage of the tank, applied to one side, consisted of six road wheels with internal shock absorption and individual torsion bar suspension, and three rubberized support rollers. The pinion drive wheel had a removable toothed ring and was installed at the rear. The combat weight of the KV reached 47 tons.

At the beginning of December 1938, the prototype commission approved the final appearance tank SMK, recommending that the third (aft) turret be removed from it and the armament be strengthened. Then one of the first variants of the KV was presented, which also received good feedback and recommended for construction. Five months later, on April 9, 1939, the technical design was approved and the construction of a prototype soon began, which was completed at the end of August. After completing the modifications, on September 1, 1939, the KV prototype made the first run at the factory test site.
Further events unfolded no less rapidly. On September 5, the tank was sent to Moscow to demonstrate the new vehicle to the country's leadership. The premiere screening took place on 23 September and made the most favorable impression. Together with the KV, the SMK tank demonstrated its capabilities, so that the country's top leadership could easily agree on an opinion about both machines.
The QMS was the first to enter the test track. According to the recollections of the driver-mechanic of the KV tank P.I. Petrov, there were strong fears that the "two-tower", which had a longer base chassis, would show better data when overcoming obstacles, but everything turned out quite the opposite. The SMK easily overcame the escarpment, then the ditch and lingered a little on the craters. A shorter CV, on the other hand, easily passed all the obstacles, which caused applause from those present. However, not everything was as smooth as we would like. The V-2 engine regulator worked intermittently and therefore Petrov had to drive the tank at constantly high revs, which threatened an accident. In the course of overcoming water obstacles on the Moskva River, the tank began to be flooded with water, but the KV was very lucky that time.

After that, on October 8, KV was returned to the Leningrad plant for current repairs and obsolescence of the identified defects. A little more than a month later, on November 10, 1939, the tank was sent to the NIBT proving ground, where they began full-scale factory tests. Within a few days, having covered 485 km, another 20 different defects were revealed in the KV design, primarily related to the operation of the power plant and transmission.

Based on the results of the tests, it was determined that the main characteristics of the KV tank are better than their two-turret counterparts. The lower height of the KV, obtained due to the absence of a turret platform, favored better protection and projectile resistance of the tank. The running characteristics were also higher, since the KV had a shorter undercarriage while maintaining its width. But most importantly, now the vehicle commander could control the fire of guns and machine guns without dispersing his forces. As negative qualities, it was noted the tightness of the crew in the fighting compartment, the absence of a course machine gun and the overweight of the vehicle. The last drawback, first of all, negatively affected the operation of the most important components and assemblies of the KV. If the chassis and suspension of the tank could still withstand significant loads, then the transmission and engine worked at their limit. The developers were advised to deal with these shortcomings as quickly as possible, but throughout the entire period of operation of the KV tanks, it was not possible to fully eliminate them.

The tests of the KV were quite expectedly interrupted in December 1939. Just a few days after the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, units of the Red Army faced a very serious problem in the form of long-term fortifications erected on the Karelian Isthmus. The “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be an extremely “tough nut to crack” and it was not at all easy to break through it with the help of artillery and aviation alone. For the assault on Finnish positions, a powerful assault tank with anti-cannon armor was required, and such a mass was not produced in the USSR at that time. The only heavy vehicle capable of operating in harsh winter conditions was the T-28 medium tank, but its 30-mm frontal armor could easily penetrate the Finnish anti-tank defense system. Fortunately, they did not come up with the idea of ​​using five-turret T-35s, although some domestic and foreign “historians” affirm without a shadow of embarrassment that the Red Army lost 60 to 90 (!) Tanks of this type on the Karelian Isthmus. So the appearance of new heavy tanks, even in prototypes, became very timely.

Thus, the range tests smoothly turned into combat ones, with all the ensuing consequences. The decision to transfer tanks to combat units was made by the leadership of the Leningrad Military District, sending KV, SMK and T-100 to the 91st tank battalion (tb) of the 20th tank brigade (tbr). The crew of the KV tank during the combat tests was mixed: G. Kachekhin (tank commander), military technician of the 2nd rank P. Golovachev (driver mechanic), Red Army men Kuznetsov (gunner) and A. Smirnov (radio operator), as well as specialists testers of the Kirov plant A. Estratov (minder, who is also the loader) and K. Kovsh (reserve driver, was outside the tank during the battles). The new vehicles were not immediately thrown into the Finnish positions. The first two weeks the crews mastered the tanks. Along the way, the 45-mm cannon was removed from the KV, replacing it with a 7.62-mm DT machine gun. This tank went into battle only on December 18th. The tankers had a difficult task - to break through the Finnish defenses in the Babokino area. Prior to this, they tried to solve the problem using medium-sized T-28s, but in conditions of a strong anti-tank defense system, the weakly armored "twenty-eighths" suffered losses and did not achieve a positive result. The battle, which began on the morning of December 18, unfolded in approximately the same scenario, only heavy tanks were marching next to the T-28. In winter conditions, when the snow well camouflaged the pillboxes of the Finns, the KV crew had to act almost blindly. At the very beginning of the battle, the T-28 in front was hit and blocked the KV road. Bypassing it, the commander noticed an enemy fortified point and ordered to open fire on it. A few minutes later it became clear that several bunkers were firing at the tank at once, but the 37-mm Finnish anti-tank guns never once were able to penetrate the thick armor of the KV. While the fight against the first bunker was going on, another shell hit the front of the tank. Since the shelling continued to establish the nature of the damage, it was then impossible and Kachekhin decided to move on. At the end of the battle, an order was received to approach the next damaged T-28 and, if possible, evacuate it, which was done. The result of the first experience of the combat use of the KV turned out to be impressive: not a single hit through, one hit each in the barrel, frontal sheet and hub of the 4th road roller, three hits each on the tracks of the right track and on the side. The damage was examined by senior officers and the head of the armored department, concluding that the KV tank was invulnerable to modern anti-tank guns.

The barrel of the gun was replaced not the next day, and in the evening of December 19, by a decree of the NKO of the USSR, the KV tank was adopted by the Red Army. And this despite the fact that even the installation series of these machines has not yet been ordered, and the first prototype traveled no more than 550 km. Concerning additional verification Such important components as the suspension, transmission and chassis, which were out of order in the first place, did the following: since these elements had a greater degree of unification with the QMS, the test results of both tanks were combined, concluding that they were passed satisfactorily. The director of the Kirovsky Zavod (LKZ) was ordered to “eliminate all defects discovered during testing” and from January 1, 1940, to begin mass production, having handed over 50 tanks by the end of the year.

It also played its role in the fact that the combat use of a two-turret SMK was far from so successful. This tank, in terms of projectile resistance, showed its best side, but during the battle on December 17, 1939, on the Kameri-Vyborg road, the SMK ran into a disguised land mine and lost its speed. The crew was successfully evacuated in a nearby T-100, but they were able to tow the damaged car for repair only after the war. At the same time, the Finnish scouts managed to remove the hatch cover from the tank.
At the same time, the situation with the KV pilot batch was corrected. A total of 12 vehicles were ordered, which received additional indexes "U" - for example, according to the documents, the prototype KV passed as U-0 (a tank of the installation series, zero sample). In addition, the military demanded to equip the tank with a 152-mm howitzer, which was somewhat of a surprise to the designers. The main problem was not so much in the modifications of the tank's design as in the absence of a corresponding tank gun. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that nowhere in the world were guns with a caliber of more than 105 mm placed on heavy tanks - by the way, here, too, the championship belonged to the French 2C, one of the samples of which was operated for some time with such a weapon.

For the "artillery" tank, it was necessary to re-develop a new turret of increased size on the previous pursuit and to look for a 152-mm howitzer. The first version with a howitzer model 1909 \ 1930 was immediately rejected, giving preference to the newer M-10 model 1938. Work in this direction was carried out by a team of engineers, which included about 20 people, under the leadership of N. Kurin. The young designers were given only a few days, transferring them to the barracks position. Two weeks later, the production of the first prototype of such an installation, called MT-1, began. In January 1940, it was installed on an experimental KV tank, recently recalled from the front for modifications, and on February 10, it was fired on at a shooting range. In addition to the original MT-1 design, the barrel of the gun was covered with a special cover, which was supposed to protect it from bullets and shrapnel, but this improvement turned out to be ineffective and not the rest of the tanks abandoned it. Instead, special rings made of 10 mm thick armor were put on the howitzer barrel. In production, this solution was used on all production tanks.

On February 17, 1940, the U-0 and U-1 tanks (with MT-1 mounts) were again sent to the front. On February 22, the U-2 tank with the turret of the U-0 experimental tank with a 76.2-mm gun went to the front, and on February 29, the U-3 tank with the MT-1 installation. They also managed to build and send to the front the U-4 tank (the last of the installation series with the MT-1), but on March 13, 1940, an armistice was signed and it was not possible to test this tank in battle. Since numerical designations began to be used much later, the KV with the MT-1 installation was called "KV with a large turret", and with a 76-mm cannon - "KV with a small turret".

The received KV tanks and a single copy of the T-100 were brought together into a separate tank company, first transferring it to the 13th and then to the 20th tank brigade. Since in March the line of fortifications had already been broken through, it was not possible to test the tanks with the "big tower" by firing at pillboxes in combat conditions. Nevertheless, the report on the combat use of the KV indicated that the tanks showed themselves on a good side, but also noted their overweight and insufficient engine power.

The production of serial KV tanks "with a small turret", renamed KV-1, was planned to begin at the end of March 1940, but due to the fact that LKZ was not ready for mass production of new products until the beginning of May, KVs were still assembled here. from the installation series.

The leadership of ABTU RKKA, very concerned about the incoming reports, proposed to conduct a full test cycle in order to identify all defects in the design of the KV. In May 1940, such tests were carried out at the proving grounds in Kubinka and near Leningrad on the U-1, U-7 tanks (both with a 76-mm cannon) and U-21 (with a 152-mm howitzer).
After passing 2648 km, the tank of the U-1 installation series failed several times for technical reasons due to breakdowns in the transmission and the engine, which was replaced twice. The U-7 and U-21 tanks traveled a little less - 2050 and 1631 km, but this did not save them from similar problems. Among the most significant shortcomings were the poor design of the transmission and the air filter, the insufficient strength of the tracks and road wheels, the tightness in the fighting compartment, and poor visibility. The tower also caused a lot of problems: on the KV-1 it weighed 7 tons, and on the KV-2 it weighed 12 tons. In this regard, there were problems with rotation associated with large efforts on the handles of the guidance mechanisms and the low power of the electric motors. In addition, during a roll, the turret on tanks of the first series could not turn at all.

The required order of 50 vehicles was quite realistic to hand over by the end of the year, but at the end of May the plant received a new order. Now it was required to produce 230 KV of both modifications in the period from July to December, of which 15 units by August and another 70 by September. The plant was pressed “from above”, insisting on the delivery of finished products on time. In fact, in July 1940 the plant produced 5 tanks, while the remaining 10 were accepted on August 22-24.
Knowing what measures might follow for the failure to comply with this order, the director of the LKZ Zaltsman reported that the supply of tanks was on schedule. Understanding the current situation, 2nd rank military engineer Shpitanov, who was a military representative from the army, went to meet the factory workers and signed payment certificates backdating(July 31). This fact of "flagrant violation" was described in detail in a letter drawn up by another representative of the military acceptance, military engineer of the 2nd rank Kalivoda. The full text of this document can be read in the issue “Frontline Illustration. The history of the KV tank ”. Its essence boiled down to the following:

- the plant does not rush to finalize the KV tanks

- all tanks, even those adopted by the military representative, have a huge number of defects

- the plant's management hides the shortcomings of the KV.

In addition, a few more significant flaws in the tanks of both the installation and the first series were revealed. At the same time, the military engineer only indirectly took into account the fact that LKZ and SKB-2 are heavily loaded with current work, and the plan was required to be fulfilled without delay. As a result, an authoritative commission was appointed, which generally confirmed the conclusions drawn by Kalivoda, but as a punishment, only “disciplinary sanctions” were made for all the guilty.

However, it was impossible to say that the plant did nothing to eliminate the identified defects. In July 1940, 349 design changes were made to the tank's drawings, of which 43 were related to the technological process. In August-September, the number of changes increased to 1322 and 110, respectively. For the entire 1940, LKZ produced 243 tanks, exceeding the plan, but the quality of the products still suffered greatly due to the great rush.

The design of the KV tank of the 1939 model was based on the design of the SMK and borrowed many elements from it. This primarily concerned the chassis and individual hull elements. However, the rest of the components and assemblies were redesigned.

The chassis of the KV model of 1939, in comparison with the SMK, was shortened by one road roller and one supporting roller, respectively, which had a positive effect on the weight characteristics and maneuverability of the tank. Applied to one side, the undercarriage consisted of the following elements:

- six road wheels with internal shock absorption and individual torsion bar suspension;

- three supporting rollers with rubber bands;

- front steering wheel;

- rear drive wheel with a cast hub and two 16-tooth rims;

- caterpillar chain of 87-90 tracks 700 mm wide and 160 mm pitch, tracks - cast, made of 35HG2 steel with two rectangular windows for the drive wheel teeth.

The body was a rigid welded box with differentiated armor, during the assembly of which corners and pads were used to increase rigidity. The bow of the hull consisted of upper, middle and lower armor plates. The upper and lower armor plates with a thickness of 75 mm were installed at an angle of 30. The middle armor plate with a thickness of 40 mm had an installation angle of 85 and a hole on the left side for the antenna output. In the upper armor plate, cutouts were made for the driver's hatch and a ball machine gun mount. The bottom plate was equipped with two towing hooks.

The side armor plates were made in the form of a single casting with a thickness of 75 mm. 6 holes were made in them for the passage of the axles of the suspension balancers and 3 holes for the passage of the brackets of the supporting wheels. In the front part, a crank bracket was welded on to which the idler was attached, in the rear there were holes for installing the final drive. The fighting compartment was separated from the engine compartment by an armored partition.

The roof was made in the form of three armored sections. The first section, 40 mm thick, covered the fighting compartment and had a cutout for a turret shoulder strap, to protect which side strips 80 mm high and 40 mm thick were welded. A second section, 30 mm thick, with access hatches to the engines and cooling system fillers, protected the engine compartment. In the roof of the transmission compartment of similar thickness, there were two hatches for access to the transmission mechanisms.

The bottom consisted of a front sheet with a thickness of 40 mm and a back sheet with a thickness of 30 mm. The armor plates were butt welded and attached to the side sections. In front of the bottom, next to the driver's seat, there was an emergency hatch. In the rear there were four fuel drain holes and a sub-engine hatch.

The turret of the KV-1 tank of the first series was riveted-welded and had a faceted shape. The forehead, sides and stern were made of 75 mm armor, the gun mantlet was 90 mm. The sides were installed at an inclination of 15, the frontal armor plate - 20. The wing was made of a solid 40-mm armor plate. It had cutouts for the commander's hatch and sighting devices. The sides had inspection slits with glass blocks. At the base of the hatch, a machine-gun turret was sometimes mounted for firing at air targets.

Unlike the SMK tank, on which the M-17 aviation gasoline engine was installed, the KV tank received a V-2K diesel engine. Its maximum power was 600 hp. at 2000 rpm, rated - 500 hp at 1800 rpm The engine had 12 cylinders arranged in a V-shape at an angle of 60 °; The fuel used was diesel fuel of the DT brand or gas oil of the E brand, which was stored in three fuel tanks with a capacity of 600-615 liters. Two tanks were installed in the front of the hull in the control compartment (with a capacity of 230-235 liters) and in the combat compartment (with a capacity of 235-240 liters). The third tank, with a capacity of 140 liters, was located on the left side in the fighting compartment. Compared to the T-34 medium tank of the same year of production, such an arrangement of fuel tanks was more rational and made it possible to avoid unnecessary losses. The fuel was supplied by the NK-1 pump. The engine could be started using two 4.4 kW CT-4628 electric starters or compressed air from two cylinders. To cool the engine, two tubular radiators with a capacity of 55-60 liters were used, installed on the sides of the engine with an inclination towards it.

The mechanical transmission consisted of a dry-friction multi-disc main clutch, a 5-speed two-shaft gearbox, dry-friction multi-disc side clutches with floating band brakes and two planetary double-row final drives.

Communication facilities consisted of a telephone and telegraph radio station 71TK-3 and an internal intercom TPU-4-bis. The electrical equipment (made according to a single-wire circuit) included a GT-4563A generator with a capacity of 1 kW and four 6-STE-144 batteries with a capacity of 144 amperes each. The consumers of electricity were the turret swivel mechanism, communication facilities, control devices, interior lighting equipment, headlights and an electrical signal.

The tank's crew consisted of five people: driver, gunner, radio operator, commander, gunner and loader. The first two of them were located in the control compartment in the front of the corps, the other three were in the combat compartment.

On the KV-1 tanks of the 1939 model, the 76.2 mm L-11 cannon with a barrel length of 30.5 calibers was installed. This artillery system, created by KB LKZ, had good armor penetration characteristics and could hit any type of enemy tank at a distance of up to 500 meters. The initial velocity of the armor-piercing projectile was 612 m / s, which made it possible to pierce a vertically installed armor sheet with a thickness of up to 50 mm at a specified distance. The vertical guidance angles ranged from -7 ° to + 25 °; A cannon shot was fired using foot and manual mechanical triggers. To aim at the target, a TOD-6 telescopic sight and a PT-6 panoramic periscope sight were used.

At the same time, the original recoil system used on the L-11 was its weak point. In the design of the recoil device, the compressor fluid was in direct contact with the air of the recoil mechanism through a special hole, which was blocked at certain angles of rotation of the tool. As a result, after several shots, the liquid boiled, which often led to damage to the gun. This defect was most acutely revealed during the 1938 maneuvers, during which most of the T-28 tanks, recently rearmed from the KT-28 to the L-11, turned out to be incapable of combat. The defect was corrected by using an additional hole, but this did not save the situation as a whole.

Light small arms included four 7.62 mm DT machine guns. The first of them was installed in the frontal sheet of the hull on the left in front of the radio operator's place. The ball mount provided shelling horizontally within 30 °, and vertically from -5 ° to + 15 °; The second machine gun was paired with a cannon, and the third was mounted aft also in a ball mount. In contrast to the course diesel fuel, the vertical firing angles ranged from -15 ° to + 15 °; The fourth machine gun was a spare and was transported in a stowage on the left side of the hull.

Ammunition for the gun consisted of 111 rounds. The range of ammunition was wide enough and included unitary cartridges from divisional guns of the 1902 \ 1930 model. and sample 1939, as well as from the regimental cannon of sample 1927:

- high-explosive fragmentation grenade OF-350 (steel) or OF-350A (cast iron) with a KTM-1 fuse;

- high-explosive grenade F-354 with fuses KT-3, KTM-3 or 3GT;

- armor-piercing tracer unitary projectile BR-350A and BR-350B with MD-5 fuse;

- a projectile with bullet shrapnel (Sh-354T) or Hertz shrapnel (Sh-354G) with a 22-second tube or T-6 tube;

- a projectile with a rod shrapnel Ш-361 with a tube Т-3UG;

- shell with buckshot Ш-350.

One of the main tasks for the coming 1941 was the rearmament of the tank with a more reliable weapon. Although the L-11 guns, released in 1939, were revised, their installation in the KV-1 and T-34 tanks was considered as a temporary measure. Instead of them, in 1940, it was necessary to deploy the production of F-32 guns, developed for the design bureau of plant No. 92 under the leadership of V.G. Grabin. Using the regimental 76.2-mm cannon as a basis, the "Grabinites" managed to create a simple and reliable tank artillery system. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1940, the L-11 continued to be produced in Leningrad, in parallel trying to improve its design. Only after the direct intervention of the head of ABTU D.G. Pavlov (in May 1940), the LKZ began to establish production of the F-32. Until the end of the year, only 50 guns were manufactured, and they began to be installed on the KV-1 tanks only in January 1941.

Compared to the L-11, the vertical guidance angles slightly decreased (from -5 ° to + 25 °), but this disadvantage was compensated for by the better reliability of the gun and higher combat qualities. The F-32 guns with a barrel length of 31.5 caliber were equipped with a wedge-type semiautomatic shutter of a mechanical follower type. The failure brake was hydraulic, the reel - hydropneumatic. The maximum recoil length was 450 mm. The balancing of the gun was carried out with the help of a weight fixed to the bracket of the sleeve catcher. In addition to this, the TOD-6 telescopic sight was replaced by the TOD-8.

The delay in rearmament of the KV did not go well. The fact is that at the same time, the T-34 tanks received the F-34 guns, the power of which was higher than that of the F-32. It seemed a reasonable solution to install a more powerful artillery system with a caliber of 85 mm or 95 mm. The same design bureau of plant # 92 was actively involved in the development of such weapons, and during 1939-1940 several promising samples were submitted for testing. For the KV-1 tank, the 76.2-mm F-27 gun was chosen, which had the ballistics of a 3K anti-aircraft gun of a similar caliber with an initial projectile speed of 813 m / s. In terms of weight and dimensions, the F-27 fit perfectly into a tank turret, and in April 1941 the prototype tank was successfully tested. However, due to the beginning of work on the KV-3 project, it was concluded that the KV-1 could well do with a less powerful weapon.

As part of further modernization, a tank project was developed under the designation Object 222... A distinctive feature of this vehicle was a new turret with an F-32 cannon and a new turning mechanism, the thickness of the frontal armor increased to 90 mm, a 10RT radio station, a new planetary gearbox, a commander's cupola, an improved driver's observation device and a number of other changes. Partially individual upgraded units were tested on experimental KVs in April-May 1941, but the project of the improved tank could not be fully implemented due to the outbreak of the war.

The only unit in service with KV tanks after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war was then the 20th tank brigade, which was armed with 10 vehicles of the installation batch (U-0, U-2, U-3, U-11, U-12 , U-13, U-14, U-15, U-16, U-17). The crews of the tank brigade had considerable combat experience and, most importantly, mastered the new technology well. During the operation of the KV tanks of the installation series in the interwar period, the question of the low reliability of the transmission, which could not withstand overloads and often broke down, as well as the overweight of the vehicles, was repeatedly raised. Based on the experience gained, it was supposed to create training units for each tank brigade, but in the summer of 1940 all KV tanks were removed from the 20th tank brigade and transferred to the 8th tank brigade of the 4th MK. At the same time, new tanks began to receive the 2nd TD of the 3rd MK in the Baltic States, where the first KV-1 and KV-2 (with the MT-1 installation) arrived in August. To train tank crews, several KV-1s were sent to the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (Moscow), Leningrad advanced training courses for the commanders of tank forces and the Saratov Tank Technical School. By December 1, 1940, the troops had 106 new heavy tanks, and by June 1, 1941, their number had grown to 370. They were distributed among the military districts as follows.

Kiev OVO - 189

Western OVO - 75

Baltic OVO - 59

Privolzhsky VO - 18

Odessa VO - 10

Oryol VO - 8

Leningradsky VO - 4

Moscow VO - 3

Kharkiv VO - 4

It is worth noting here that only 75 machines were in direct operation, while the remaining 295 were idle waiting for spare parts or were in current repair... However, further the number of heavy tanks continued to increase.

As you can see, the vast majority of KV-1s were concentrated in the border districts. Although the existence of a plan for an attack on Germany (Operation Thunderstorm) is highly questioned, such a large number of heavy vehicles in shock units (mechanized corps) makes one think otherwise.

At the forefront of the main blow of the Soviet strike group in the western direction was the 6th Mechanized Corps, subordinate to the 10th Army. The formation of the corps began on July 15, 1940 near Bialystok, and by June 1, 1941 there were 999 tanks, 114 of which were KV-1 and KV-2. According to the latest data, the 6th MK received the largest number of new types of vehicles before the war, even to the detriment of other units. On June 22, the total number of tanks increased to 1,131, which was 110% of the regular strength. However, such a rapid quantitative growth also had negative consequences. In view of the wide variety of types of tanks (HT-26, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, T-28, T-34, T-37, T-38, T-40, KV-1, KV-2 and AT-1 tractors), there were great difficulties in providing fuel and spare parts, so that not all vehicles were in a combat condition. And yet the 6th MK was a very formidable force. The largest number KV tanks then had the 4th TD (63 units), and the 7th TD had 51 vehicles of this type.

On June 22, 1941, the corps, due to the lack of communication about the army headquarters, did not conduct active operations. At this time, it was possible to repair the apartments in which the officers were quartered. Only in the evening did Marshal Timoshenko instruct him to strike at Suwalki and destroy the enemy by June 24. General IV Boldin ordered to concentrate the tank divisions north-west of Bialystok, but this decision later proved fatal for the entire corps. During June 23, units of the 6th MK tried to break through the roads to the designated line through the randomly retreating units of the 10th Army. The corps was repeatedly subjected to bombing strikes from the air, suffering significant losses on the march. Finally, having arrived at the designated area, Boldin's group is in a very difficult situation. The neighboring units retreated, exposing the flanks, there was no air support, and there was practically no fuel left in the hull. Despite this, the front command ordered to strike at 10 o'clock in the morning on June 24 in the direction of Grodno - Merkinė and to capture the Lithuanian city by the end of the day. The tanks of the 6th MK moved in the indicated directions: the 4th division to Indura, the 7th division in two columns - the 13th TP to the Kuznitsa, and the 14th TP to the Old Dubovoye. The offensive was immediately opened by German reconnaissance aircraft, which made it possible for the infantry and tank units, located 20-30 km from the initial line, to prepare a dense defense. Having practically no contact with the enemy, the 4th TD entered the Lebejan area, having lost many tanks from the strikes of dive bombers. At the same time, in the report of the division commander, it was indicated that the KV tanks withstood direct hits from aerial bombs and suffered the least losses. At this time, the 7th TD entered into battle with German infantry units in the Kuznitsa - Old Dubrovoe area.

Despite the weakening of the corps by constant battles on June 25, the offensive continued. No reconnaissance and artillery preparation was carried out - the tanks went into frontal attacks on German positions, being destroyed by anti-tank gunnery fire, however, due to the presence of a huge mass of tanks, the enemy's defenses were broken through. The advance of the 6th MK was stopped at Indura and Staraye Dubrovoye.

Unaware of the state of affairs and losses incurred by the corps, Marshal Pavlov ordered on the evening of June 25 to start a retreat and go to Slonim for regrouping. This order remained unfulfilled - the Volkovysk-Slonim road was literally filled up with broken and abandoned equipment and in some places it became impossible to detour. In addition, the Germans landed troops, capturing several important bridges, so that the surviving tanks simply had to be abandoned or flooded in the rivers.

In fact, by the evening of June 29, the corps ceased to exist. Separate groups were still trying to break through the environment, although it was practically impossible to do this. Many light tanks were burned near the villages of Klepachi and Ozernitsa, through which the corps headquarters was breaking through.

Probably the last battle was held by the tankers of the 6th MK on July 1. In the evening of that day, two T-34s and one KV-1 from the 13th tank regiment broke into Slonim from the side of the forest. They managed to knock out one German tank and fire at the headquarters of one of the units. The Germans, in turn, knocked out both "thirty-fours", but they could not cope with the KV - they tried to transport the heavy tank to the other side of the Shchara river, but the wooden bridge could not withstand the 47-ton vehicle and collapsed.

Obviously, in the same area, the KV-1 and the 11th MK subordinate to the 3rd Army finished their combat path. In total, the corps had 3 heavy tanks of this type (two in the 29th TD and one in the 33rd TD), and the bulk of the tanks were BT and T-26 of various modifications. They entered the battle at about 11 am on June 22, covering the approaches to Grodno. After a series of battles on the line Gibulichi, Olshanka, Kulovce (16 km south-west of Grodno), Sashkevets, the corps, according to the command, lost 40-50 tanks in two days, mostly light ones. This was followed by what was to be expected - the 11th MK was deployed to strike at Grodno, which was captured by the Germans just a few hours ago. The offensive began on June 24 and led to the fact that in both divisions a total of about 30 tanks and 20 BA remained. During the retreat, the corps withstood a heavy battle near the Ross River, blowing up the bridges behind it. Coming out to the Shchara river, the commander of the 29th TD ordered to prepare for the attack 18 of the most efficient tanks, draining the fuel from the rest and removing small arms. Having destroyed the German barrier, the strike group moved on, and at this time the Germans again captured the bridge and the main forces of the corps had to knock out the enemy again. The next day, the crossing was restored, but the German aircraft destroyed it and did not allow it to be restored anymore. As a result, on the western bank of the Shchara, it was necessary to destroy almost all the remaining equipment, ferrying only a few tanks to the opposite bank. KV was no longer among them ...

Located to the north of the 2nd TD of the 3rd MK, whose headquarters was in Ukmerge (Lithuania), on June 20 had 32 KV-1 and 19 KV-2 out of 252 tanks. It was this division that withstood the first blow of the Germans, detaining the enemy on the Dubissa River. The feat of the crew of a single KV-2, which blocked the passage of the Germans across the river, can be read in separate article... Further, the actions of the corps as a whole will be considered.

From 23 June to 24 June, instead of taking up a tough defense, Soviet tanks launched several counterattacks. So, on the morning of June 23, German tanks, breaking through a loose defensive order, bypassed the positions of the 3rd and 4th TPs from the left flank. To remedy the situation, 6 KV tanks were allocated from the 3rd TP, which forced the enemy to withdraw, knocking out two tanks without losses on their side. At noon, the division launched an offensive on a front only 10 km wide. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, the density of tank formations was so high that almost every shot of the German anti-tank defense system reached its target. Having reached the city of Scowdville, Soviet tanks met with a powerful German grouping, which, in addition to the 114th motorized division, included two artillery divisions and a combination of light tanks (about 100 units). In the oncoming tank battle, the KV especially distinguished themselves, which destroyed enemy anti-tank guns and tanks not only with cannon-machine gun fire, but also crushed with caterpillars.

Being subjected to constant attacks from the air and remaining practically surrounded by the command of the 2nd TD did not receive an order to retreat to a new line. All this led to the fact that on the afternoon of June 26, a group of German tanks and motorized infantry bypassed the brigade's positions from the rear, completely surrounding it and almost completely destroying the command of the 3rd MK. In the evening, when the German attacks were repulsed, no more than 20 tanks remained in the 2nd TD, most of which had almost no fuel and ammunition. The new commander, General Kurkin, ordered to disable all the surviving vehicles and make their way to his own. Subsequently, the crews that emerged from the encirclement, having acquired precious combat experience, formed the backbone of the 8th Tank Brigade under the command of P.A. Rotmistrov.

In the 7th MK, which arrived near Polotsk at the end of June, there were 44 combat-ready KV-1 and KV-2 tanks. However, already on a short march, inexperienced driver-mechanics burned the main clutches on 7 cars, and several more KVs were out of order for other reasons. The corps went into battle on July 7, having lost 43 KV tanks of both types by the 26th - in other words, as a combat unit, it practically ceased to exist.

One of the first to accept the battle was the 20th TP (10th TD, 15th MK), fully equipped with KV tanks. The regiment, stationed in the city of Zolochev near Lvov, was alerted on June 22 at about 7 am. The battalion column moved out of the city towards the border a few hours later, ahead of it there was a combat outpost consisting of light tanks. They were the first to be ambushed approximately and were unable to warn the following KVs about the danger. On the way of the convoy, the Germans placed several anti-tank guns and light tanks, hoping that the following Soviet vehicles would also become their easy victims. However, everything happened quite the opposite. Despite the fact that the KV-1 had to attack the enemy head-on in an open wheat field, heavy tanks showed an undeniable advantage over German vehicles, forcing the enemy to leave their positions with minimal losses. However, it was not possible to build on this success. The command of the Southwestern Front sought to oust the Germans by “crushing them with a mass,” which ultimately led to the loss of the most combat-ready 20th Tank Regiment, which suffered heavy losses already on June 23 in the course of German air raids. Judging by the report of the commander of the 10th TD, from June 22 to August 1, the division irrevocably lost 11 KV tanks in battle, another 11 were knocked out, abandoned due to the impossibility of evacuation - 22, destroyed by its own crews - 7, stuck on obstacles - 3, remained in the rear due to lack of fuel and spare parts - 2. That is, out of 56 tanks, only 22 were lost directly in combat conditions.

One of the most powerful units before the war was the 4th MK with headquarters in Lvov. This corps had 101 KV tanks of various modifications, 50 of which belonged to the 8th TD and 49 to the 32nd TD. On the first day of the war, heavy tanks were just moving towards combat positions, while two medium T-28 battalions and a motorized infantry battalion were striking in order to knock out parts of the German 15th Motorized Corps, which had broken through to Radekhov. Success was achieved only partial, and on the morning of June 23, the army command set the task of the 32nd TD to finally defeat the enemy. However, while on the march, the division received a new order - to destroy the German units in the area of ​​Great Bridges. Having established interaction with the 3rd Cavalry Division, the tankers began to carry out a combat mission, but in the evening the 2nd TD was thrown into the elimination of another enemy grouping located in the Kamenka area. As a result, the forces of the division were divided. Two tank battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lysenko remained under Radekhov and, in the course of an uninterrupted battle, which lasted from 7 to 20 hours, destroyed 18 tanks and 16 guns with their own losses of 11 tanks.

On the morning of June 24, the 8th TD was withdrawn from the corps, and the 32nd TD was ordered to concentrate at Nemirov, where the next morning the division entered the battle with the German 9th Panzer Division. Since by that time most of the tanks were on the verge of full depletion of the motor resource, the command acted very wisely, sending KV tanks in the first echelon, and concentrating T-34 and T-26 on the flanks. This tactic brought success - the enemy immediately lost 37 tanks, several armored vehicles and anti-tank equipment. The losses of the 32nd TD turned out to be much less and amounted to 9 tanks and 3 BA. However, the achieved success was not consolidated due to the lack of support from the infantry units.

In the evening of the same day, the division was forced to leave the encirclement with the remaining forces, destroying 16 tanks in a counterattack and losing 15 of its own.
During this time, power in Lviv actually passed into the hands of nationalists, who sowed panic not only among the civilian population, but also in the rear units. Soviet troops began to gradually leave the city, on the outskirts of which the 32nd TD and the 81st MD were still fighting, and by July 1 Lvov was occupied by German troops.

Subsequently, units of the 8th and 32nd Panzer Divisions fought defensive battles, inflicting significant damage on the enemy. For example, on June 9, near the village of Zherebka, tanks of the 32nd TD, with the support of aviation from the Southwestern Front, destroyed more than 30 enemy tanks in several battles. However, the 63rd TP, the most combat-ready by that time, itself had 30 tanks (out of 149 at the beginning of the war), which forced the command to withdraw the division to the rear. On the afternoon of July 12, the remaining tanks entered Kiev, taking up defenses in the UR, and the personnel left for the Vladimir region.

By the beginning of the war, the 43rd Panzer Division of the 18th Mechanized Corps had only 5 KV-1s. Its individual units began to fight the very next day, but the full division went into battle only on June 26, inflicting a surprise attack on the flank and rear of the 11th division of the 48th motorized corps of the Germans. Only two heavy tanks took part in this attack, however, this was enough for the mixed tank group of Colonel Tsibin (it also included 75 light T-26 and HT-130 \ 133 and 2 medium T-34) threw the enemy back 30 km and went out to Dubno. In this battle, eleven T-26s, 4 flamethrower tanks and both KV-1s were lost. The report of the division commander on its actions from June 22 to August 10, 1941 indicated the following:

“... Pursuing enemy infantry, our tanks were met by enemy tank fire from ambushes from the spot, but (the ambush) was attacked by KV and T-34 tanks that rushed forward, followed by T-26 tanks ... KV and T-34 tanks, not having a sufficient number of armor-piercing shells, they fired with fragmentation shells and, with their mass, crushed and destroyed enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, moving from one line to another ... "

Soon, the number of heavy tanks dropped to zero, since due to technical problems, the rest of the vehicles had to be left on enemy territory. The 8th Mechanized Corps was interesting in that, in addition to light tanks, it had 51 heavy five-turret T-35 tanks. There were also plenty of new types of machines - on June 22, the hull included 100 T-34, 69 KV-1 and 8 (according to other sources - 2) KV-2.
On the morning of June 22, the 8th MK was ordered to go to Sambor, and in the evening the corps was redirected to Kurovitsa, where the appearance of advanced German forces was expected. Having reached the designated area, the tanks were again turned to the west, with the task of reaching Lvov. Here they met with the retreating units of the 32nd TD and were stopped by the command on the Western Bug River. Part of the forces was forced to engage in battle with Ukrainian nationalists, while the rest went to the region of Srebno, Baldury, Stanislavchik, Razhnyuv. By the evening of June 24, practically without meeting the Germans, the losses were calculated. After passing 495 km, the corps lost almost 50% of its original composition on the march. The most annoying loss was not only new technology, but also a large number of tractors, tractors and vehicles with ammunition. Being in such an unfavorable situation, the corps was forced to obey the next order and move in the direction of Brody, Berestechko, Boremel, where during the next three they fought fierce battles. Since the situation in other sectors of the front was rapidly changing for the worse, part of the forces of the 12th TD, which was then on the march from Brody to Podkamen, was thrown at Dubno and Kozin. 25 T-34 and KV tanks were tasked with covering the advance of the hull from the southwestern direction, while the rest of the forces were replenished with fuel and ammunition. They took only a few hours for everything, after which the division launched an offensive on Dubno, liberating several settlements and overturning the German barriers. One of the main tasks was to connect with units of the 7th motorized division, but this was never done. On June 28, the Germans themselves switched to attacking actions, reaching the rear of the Soviet formations. However, it was not possible to achieve an easy victory here. Dedicated to eliminate the German breakthrough, two groups of tanks (six KV and four T-34) literally shot enemy vehicles in a head-on collision without suffering their own losses.

On the same day, the corps was prudently taken to the front reserve. Out of 899 tanks in combat conditions, only 96 were lost - a good indicator, given the difficult situation in which units of the 8th MK were operating. The largest losses fell on the heavy T-35 tanks, which by July 1 did not remain at all. The KV and T-34 tanks lost the least - 3 and 18 vehicles, respectively.

Left with 207 combat-ready tanks (43 KV, 31 T-34, 69 BT-7, 57 T-26 and 7 T-40), the corps left on July 2 to Proskurov, from where 134 vehicles were sent to Kharkov for repairs. Then the remnants of the 8th MK were transferred to Nizhyn, where in mid-July the corps management was disbanded.

The 15th Mechanized Corps under the command of Major General I.I. Karpezo took an active part in the battle at Brody. At the disposal were 64 (according to other sources - 60) KV, 51 T-28, 69 (according to other sources - 71) T-34, 418 BT-7 and 45 T-26 of various production series, as well as 116 armored vehicles BA-10 and 46 BA-20. The bulk of the heavy tanks were in the 10th TD, and only one KV-1 was in the 37th TD, which was basically equipped with BT tanks.

The first battle of the vanguard detachment of the 10th TD, consisting of the 3rd battalion of the 20th TP (T-34 and BA-10), was held on the morning of June 23 near Radekhov. Soviet tankers managed to knock out 20 tanks here and destroy 16 anti-tank guns, losing 6 thirty-fours and 20 armored vehicles. The detachment was forced to leave positions only when the ammunition and fuel came to an end, leaving the city to the Germans. The rest of the division acted at odds and could not provide support to their comrades. For example, on the night of June 23-24, two battalions of the German Pz.Kpfw.III attacked a column of BT-7 tanks, knocking out 46 of them with minimal losses of their own.

Lacking information about the enemy, the 37th division entered the Adama area, where there were no enemy tanks at all. At the same time, the 19th TP of the 10th TD was stuck in a marshy area between Sokolówka and Konty. Its first battalion consisted of 31 KV-1 and 5 BT-7 tanks, the second was fully equipped with T-34s, and the third had only light tanks - as we can see, this unit was very powerful and posed a serious threat in the event of a competent use of the materiel. As soon as they got out of the swamp, the regiment received an order to advance on Brody on 25 June. The tanks had to cover about 60 km in the heat and in conditions of severe dusty roads. According to the report of the commander of a heavy tank battalion, Captain Z.K. Slyusarenko, half of the vehicles got stuck due to numerous breakdowns, and no enemy tanks were found near Brody. Immediately followed by an order from the command to return to the former area, but at dawn on June 26, another order was received - to move to Radekhov, where the 10th mechanized and 20th tank regiments entered the battle. Of the 31 KVs, 18 vehicles took part in the attack, which went head-on against the German anti-tank batteries. The battalion managed to advance only 2 km, losing 16 tanks in this attack. Subsequently, Captain Slyusarenko recalled:

“Enemy shells cannot penetrate our armor, but they break tracks, demolish towers. KB lights up to my left. A plume of smoke with a fiery core, thin as a sting, shot up into the sky above him. "Kovalchuk is on fire!" - the heart skipped a beat. I can't help this crew in any way: twelve cars are rushing ahead with me. Another KB stopped: a shell tore the turret off him. KB tanks were very strong machines, but they clearly lacked speed and agility. "

A day earlier, the 20th Tank Regiment got into a similar situation, which, when attacking enemy positions, irrevocably lost 4 heavy vehicles. The rest of the KV divisions were used separately and did not bring much benefit.

In order to save the remaining tanks on June 28, permission was obtained to retreat. The division, which still possessed about 30 heavy tanks, moved to Toporuv, where the capital bridge allowed the KV to be transported to the other side of the river. From June 30 to July 2, tankers fought several battles in Buska, Krasny, Koltuv and Tarnopol, losing several more vehicles, until the order was given to retreat to Podvolochissk. On the road to the new location, the division commander, Major General Ogurtsov, ordered to equip defensive positions in order to delay the breakthrough German tank column. At about 8 pm, a German tank unit was ambushed, losing 6 tanks and 2 guns. The next morning, the 19th TD went to the Zbruch River, the bridge over which was blown up. Unable to transport heavier vehicles, Ogurtsov sent 6 KV-1 and two T-34s south to the Tarnorud area, where this group was tasked with delaying the German advance as much as possible. On July 8, the main forces received a new combat mission - to capture the city of Berdichev and at the same time organize the defense of the crossings across the Gnilopyat River and near Plekhovaya.

On July 10, the 15th and 16th mechanized corps launched a counteroffensive, delivering powerful blows south of Berdichev against units of the German 11th Panzer Division, which had mainly Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV medium tanks. battles for the city lasted two days, and Soviet tanks twice rushed into the streets of Berdichev, but without the support of the infantry were forced to retreat. The combined tank detachment of the 10th TD, in which almost all the surviving KV tanks, was particularly distinguished in these battles. They had to act in conditions of a strong anti-tank defense system, and the Germans themselves tried to counterattack as soon as they were given a suitable opportunity. Twelve PzIIIs took part in one of these attacks against eight BT-7s, but two KV-1s (recently received from the factory) came to the aid of the comrades in time, one of which was commanded by the commander of the 16th mechanized corps A.D. Sokolov ... The Germans, seeing the further futility of this attack, preferred to retreat, which made it possible for the infantry to occupy the previously captured airfield and move a couple of kilometers forward. On the morning of July 11, a flamethrower battalion HT-130 and HT -133 under the command of Captain Krepchuk from the 44th TD entered Berdichev, and the KV and T-34s from the 10th TD left the southern outskirts. They managed to temporarily knock the Germans out of Berdichev, but a few hours later the enemy rapidly counterattacked, forcing our units to withdraw. The flamethrower battalion suffered the most, with 5 vehicles remaining. Sokolov reinforced it with two KV-1s and one T-34, but by the end of the day only 4 tanks survived. The division command did not manage to organize a withdrawal - by July 13, all KVs and most of the "thirty-fours" were lost. Attempts to deliver unblocking strikes using BT tanks were unsuccessful. By the end of July 17, the 10th Panzer Division, being completely surrounded, practically ceased to exist as a combat unit.

In fairness, it should be noted that the 1st German Panzer Group, advancing on Kiev, lost 40% of its tanks in 13 days, some of which could not be restored. Although the Soviet armies did not succeed in destroying the German troops in this area, they significantly delayed the enemy's advance deep into the right-bank Ukraine, although almost all T-34 and KV tanks were lost. In the 37th Panzer Division, the situation was much worse - by June 15, only 6 tanks remained in it (one T-34 and five BT-7) and 11 BA-10, while the command reported on the destruction of “24 tanks and 8 tankettes ... "

In the report on the actions of the 15th Mechanized Corps, submitted on August 2, 1941, it was indicated that the KV tanks had shown themselves to be good. At the same time, their main disadvantages were emphasized: when a projectile and large-caliber bullets hit, the turret jammed, the engine resource was extremely small, the main and side clutches often fail, only another KV could evacuate the damaged KV. Below is the statistics of losses and the presence of KV on the Southwestern Front, compiled on August 1, 1941:

- sent for repair to industrial plants - 2 (4th mechanized corps);

- left at the place of quartering of units - 10 (2 in the 4th mechanized corps, 6 in the 8th mechanized corps, 2 in the 19th mechanized corps);

- fell behind on the way and went missing - 24 (8 in the 4th mechanized corps, 10 in the 8th mechanized corps, 5 in the 15th mechanized corps, 1 in the 19th mechanized corps);

- transferred to other parts - 1 (4th mechanized corps);

- Irretrievable losses - 177 (73 in the 4th mechanized corps, 28 in the 8th mechanized corps, 52 in the 15th mechanized corps, 2 in the 19th mechanized corps, 22 in the 22nd mechanized corps).

- in total, as of August 1, units of the Southwestern Front had 7 combat-ready KB - 1 in the 22nd mechanized corps and 6 in the 8th mechanized corps.

Thus, in the battles in Ukraine, the troops of the Southwestern Front lost 94% of all KV-1s available on June 22, 1941. By the way, on the Western Front, over the same period of time, this figure was 100% ...

As already mentioned, unsuccessful actions in Belarus and the Baltic led to the fact that on July 16, the advanced German units were on the close approaches to Orsha and Shklov, pinching the remnants of the armies of the Western Front. The 7th Panzer Division, which rushed forward, with the support of a parachute landing, cut the Minsk-Moscow highway, blocking the Soviet armies' escape route. A day later, in the region of Duhovschina, a major battle took place, during which the 69th Panzer and 110th Infantry Divisions inflicted several counterattacks on the Germans, but having suffered heavy losses they were forced to retreat to their original lines. During this time, in the area of ​​Orsha and Smolensk, the 16th Army, which had recently arrived from the Far East, was almost completely surrounded, in which there were 1,300 tanks.

By July 19, the 10th Panzer Division of the Germans captured Yelnya, forming a large ledge protruding to the east. Here the Soviet command had a real opportunity to create its own cauldron, and while the offensive of the enemy forces in this sector of the front, the 38th Infantry and 101st Panzer Divisions (80 BT-7 and 7 KV-1) under the command of General Rokossovsky tried to delay. First, they were assigned the standard offensive mission to strike at Duhovschina and Yartsevo, then developing an offensive on Smolensk. In the battle for Yartsevo, this group managed to stop the 7th Panzer Division, and the city repeatedly passed from hand to hand. Heavy tanks showed themselves in the best way here, especially since the basis of the German forces was made up of light Pz. 38 (t) and medium Pz.Kpfw.III, the armor of which could not withstand shelling from the 76-mm KV gun.

At the end of July, Rokossovsky's group was taken to a new line, but by this time the tank division had lost most of its BTs, and only two T-34s and three armored vehicles arrived from the replenishment. This, however, did not greatly affect the decision of the Headquarters to strike again at Smolensk. From 25 to 27 July, the troops of the 28th and 30th armies managed to break through the German positions and advance several tens of kilometers along the Smolensk highway. In parallel, the 101st TD again launched an offensive on Yartsevo, capturing the city and gaining a foothold on the opposite bank of the Vop River. Over the next two days, the tankers continuously attacked the Germans in the Yelnya area, but did not achieve success. On June 30 alone, Soviet tanks struck 13 (!) Times on the positions of the SS "Reich" division and the 10th tank division. All this led to the fact that on September 10 the remnants of the Rokossovsky group had to be withdrawn to the rear for reorganization, due to large losses in the material part.

In parallel with it, the 28th Army of General V.Ya. Kachalov was advancing. In the period from 18 to 27 July, its formations advanced along the Smolensk highway, inflicting, according to them, “critical losses” on the Germans. However, on August 1, having regrouped his forces, Guderian sent two army corps and one motorized corps to eliminate this breakthrough. Near Roslavl, the remnants of the 28th Army were almost completely destroyed. About 250 tanks, 359 guns, 38,000 personnel were lost, including the army commander. The total losses in tanks in the battles near Smolensk are estimated at 2,000 units.

Having defeated the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts by the end of August, the Germans received an actually open road to Moscow, where there was no continuous line and long-term fortifications. However, in the southern direction, the army group of the Southwestern Front continued to stubbornly defend, covering the approaches to Kiev. The front commander, General Kirponos, had 69 divisions and 3 brigades at his disposal. Of these, 6 tank and 3 mechanized divisions of the 5th Army under the general command of General Potapov operated in the Korostenets direction, with a length of about 200 km. The striking force in this sector was the units of the former 9th, 19th and 20th microns, where the bulk of the tanks still consisted of T-26 and BT. By the end of July, after a month of continuous fighting, about 140 tanks remained in the mechanized corps, but at the same time the Germans did not have them at all (!). Until August 10, having received about a hundred KV-1 and T-34 reinforcements, Potapov's group launched counter-attacks, forcing the Germans to deploy additional divisions to the north, instead of delivering a concentrated attack on Kiev.

At the same time, a major battle took place in the Uman direction, in which the remnants of the 15th, 16th and 24th mechanized corps took part. Many divisions had no more than 30% of the full-time staff, and only a few new tanks remained in them. Trying to prevent a new encirclement, the command of the Southwestern Front, with the forces of the 6th and 26th armies, launched several counterattacks on the flank of the German 1st Panzer Group, temporarily halting its advance to the south. At the same time, the 2nd Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from the Southern Front, where on July 20 there were 468 tanks and 155 armored vehicles. The lion's share of the tanks in it still consisted of BT-7 and T-26, but the 11th TD also had several KV-1 and T-34 units - at the beginning of the war, there were 50 and 10 of them, respectively. During the battles on the Dniester River, which took place from June 23 to July 9, the division did not lose a single heavy tank and only four "thirty-fours", while the main losses fell on light BT (about 20 units). Having occupied the line on the Reut River, the 2nd MK was soon withdrawn to the reserve. At this time, it included 10 KV-1, 46 T-34, 275 BT-7, 38 T-26, 9 HT-130 \ HT-133, as well as 13 amphibious tanks T-37 and T-38. By the forces of field brigades, heavy tanks were repaired in a timely manner, which made it possible to avoid losses among KV outside combat conditions.

Near Uman, the corps received the task of holding the city and routing the enemy grouping. All day on July 22, tanks attacked the enemy, forcing him to withdraw to the Berestovets area, irrevocably losing only five BT-7s and five T-34s. However, further the Germans put up very fierce resistance. On 23 July, the 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were able to advance several kilometers, reaching Yarovatka and the stations Potash and Podobnaya, where they had to conduct defensive battles, covering the withdrawal of units of the 6th and 12th armies ... During this time, the number of tanks in the hull was reduced to 147 units (KV-1, T-34 - 18, BT - 68, T-26 - 26, HT - 7, T-37 - 27), but more armored vehicles remained - 90 BA -10 and 64 BA-20. Rolling back, the 2nd MK over the next two weeks was left practically without material, and on August 6, the commander of the 6th Army followed the order to destroy all the equipment left without ammunition and fuel ... The remnants of the 11th TD was withdrawn from the encirclement by Colonel Kuzmin, which allowed 27 August to form the 132nd tank brigade on its basis.

Following the tank divisions of the 2nd MK, their fate was repeated by the 12th TD, assembled from the remnants of the 8th corps and supplemented with new KV-1 and T-34 that came directly from the factory. On the morning of August 7, General Kostenko's troops, with the support of tank groups, reached the Ros River southeast of Boguslav. The next day, the combined mobile group, consisting of units of the 12th TD and the 5th cavalry corps, received the task of breaking through to the Dnieper through Rzhishchev by striking the enemy's flank. Stubborn battles continued here until August 12, bringing only new losses in tanks. This made it possible by August 24 to completely eliminate the Soviet grouping near Uman and defeat the troops in the “Gomel cauldron”.

Having crossed the Dnieper, the front command prepared to defend Kiev, having previously pulled up reserves. In particular, the 10th and 11th tank brigades, formed on the basis of the “horseless” 43rd division, arrived at the front from near Kharkov. Each of them had about 100 KV-1, T-34 and T-60 tanks, two artillery battalions, and a motorized rifle battalion. The 12th, 129th and 130th brigades, equipped in the same way, went after Kiev.

However, the command was unable to make good use of these forces. The units were transferred to the front quickly enough, but they were brought into battle separately. As a result, the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist, which did not receive reinforcements from Germany for a month and had only 190 tanks, defeated the troops of the Southwestern Front. After the end of the Kiev battle, on September 20, 1941, 884 Soviet tanks became trophies of the Germans, some of which were in good condition.

In the course of repelling the next German offensive on Moscow, carried out as part of Operation Typhoon, the 4th tank brigade, formed from the crews of the broken 15th tank division, was especially successful. The brigade had 49 tanks (a T-34 and KV-1 battalion and a T-60 light tank battalion). The brigade was commanded by Colonel Katukov, who at the end of June 1941 took part in a tank battle in western Ukraine. Then under his leadership was the 20th TD, equipped with BT tanks of various modifications. In the battle at Klevan, the division lost almost all its materiel and was reorganized into a rifle, but Katukov drew the correct conclusions from this. He later wrote in his memoirs:

"... The experience of battles in Ukraine for the first time made me think about the widespread use of tank ambushes ..."

On October 4, 1941, the tanks of the 4th tank brigade moved onto the Orel-Tula road, along which the 4th tank division of Langerman was advancing. Without becoming in vain to waste energy on a head-on collision, Katukov decided to act more carefully. When the Germans moved towards Tula on October 6, Soviet tanks launched a sudden flank attack, destroying more than 30 tanks. Then Katukov withdrew to prepared positions and met the enemy at the village of Pervy Voin south of Mtsensk. In a battle that lasted 12 hours, the Germans lost 43 more tanks, 16 anti-tank guns and up to 500 soldiers, while the 4th tank brigade had minimal losses in equipment. By the end of the battle, it turned out that the brigade had lost only 6 tanks, of which 2 were completely burned out, and 4 were able to be evacuated to the rear for repairs. KV tanks in this battle were used as reinforcement vehicles, spending part of the time in reserve.
The final defeat of Langerman's division took place on October 11. Having entered the outskirts of Mtsensk, abandoned by Soviet troops, the column of the 4th Panzer Division stretched for almost 12 km, so that the artillery and infantry units attached to it were out of the radio communication zone. At that moment, the Germans were attacked by Soviet tanks, which cut the column into several parts. A few hours later, the battle was over - according to the Germans themselves, in the battles near Mtsensk, the 4th Panzer Division lost 242 tanks, practically ceasing to exist. Of this number, 133 tanks were destroyed by the Katukites, earning the title of 1st Guards for their brigade.

However, in most cases, the KV-1 was used in the old fashioned way. For example, at the end of October 1941, the newly formed 29th Tank Brigade under the command of Colonel K.A. Malygin was transferred to the 16th Army. The brigade had two tank battalions (one with 4 KV-1 and 11 T-34, the second was equipped with 20 T-60 tanks), a battalion of machine gunners, artillery and mortar batteries. In the first battle on October 29, defending the village of Rozhdestvenno, 24 tanks and two armored personnel carriers were destroyed and destroyed. However, the very next day, the brigade was tasked with capturing the village of Skirmanovo, which the Germans turned into a well-defended stronghold. Malygin was well aware that a frontal attack would, at best, lead to heavy losses, but he could not contradict the order. Here is how the commissar of the 29th brigade V.G. Gulyaev described this scene:

“Colonel Myakunin came to us from the front headquarters to coordinate the efforts of the two brigades. Malygin proposed to bypass Skirmanovo on the left and strike at the flank and rear. But a representative of the front strongly rejected this option. He believed that there would be neither time nor energy for a roundabout maneuver.

- But to attack here head-on means to send people to death, - Malygin stood his ground.

- And what do you want to do without losses in the war? - Myakukhin objected with a sarcastic grin ... "

In the first attack, the brigade lost six T-34s. Then, trying to break through the defenses from the south, the Germans knocked out five T-60s, one T-34 and one KV. As a result, by the end of the day on October 30, 19 tanks remained in the 29th tank brigade. By the way, in the famous 1st Guards Tank Brigade by the same time there were only 2 KVs, 7 T-34s and 6 BT-7s, the subsequent disastrous defensive operation of the 16th Army operating in the Volokolamsk-Istra area turned into a new disaster. and allowed the Germans on November 22 to go to Klin. The task of protecting the city was assigned to the 25th and 31st brigades, but the tanks were still inept, and by the end of November 24, both brigades, in which there were no more than 10 tanks, were to leave the city. By December 5, Soviet troops left Naro-Fominsk and nearby settlements. According to Zhukov, then “the most threatening moment” was created in the battle for Moscow. Trying to drive back the enemy, the command planned several spontaneous counterattacks, although in most tank subunits from 10 to 30% of the original composition remained.

Until the enemy pulled up the reserves, the headquarters launched a new counteroffensive, this time more prepared. By the forces of the 16th and 20th armies, the enemy was thrown back almost 100 km by December 25, 1941, having lost about 150 tanks, which were out of order due to technical problems, and it was not possible to evacuate them due to the rapid advance of Soviet troops ...

In 1941, in connection with the transition of industry to "military rails", the design of the KV-1 tank underwent a number of changes. In the fall of 1941, increasing the cruising range, 3-5 additional fuel tanks began to be installed on the side fenders (they were not connected to the power system), and stamped tracks were replaced with cast ones. Since December 1941, the 71TK-3 radio station was replaced by 10-R. After the transfer of KV-1 production to ChKZ, some of the tanks were equipped with cast turrets, which differed from the welded ones by the rounded shape of the stern niche. The thickness of the armor was increased to 82 mm.

Instead of the F-32 cannon, the supply of which ended at the end of 1941, the ZIS-5 was installed. This weapon was created on the basis of the F-34, differing from it in the design of the cradle and armored mask elements. Externally, tanks with a new cannon could be distinguished by the barrel length, which was 41.5 caliber. Due to the improvements made, the initial speed of the armor-piercing projectile increased to 680 m / s, although this was no longer enough to fight the German Pz.IV equipped with long-barreled 75-mm guns. The vertical guidance angles remained the same as in the F-32, but the recoil length decreased to 390 mm.

The installation of the new gun entailed the replacement of the TOD-8 telescopic sight with the TMFD-7 and the PT-6 periscopic sight with the PT-4-7. Due to the lack of TMFD-7, some of the tanks could be equipped with alternative sights 9T-7, 10T-7 or 10T-13. Instead of the PT-4-7, the installation of the PT-4-3 was envisaged. To combat the new German tanks, the BR-353A armor-piercing projectile with a BM fuse was introduced into the ammunition load since 1942, which, at an initial speed of 352 m / s, can penetrate armor up to 75 mm thick at a distance of up to 1000 meters. In addition to the armor-piercing ammunition, the BR-350P and BR-350PS subcaliber ammunition arrived, with an initial speed of 965 m / s. Their armor penetration at a distance of 500 meters was 92 mm, and at a distance of 1000 m - 60 mm. Since October 1943, the BR-345A subcaliber armor-piercing tracer shells have appeared. The total stock of shells increased to 114 pieces. Nevertheless, all of the above measures did not lead to a significant improvement in the design of the KV-1 and for the most part were “wartime measures”.

After receiving the first information from the front about the combat use of heavy tanks at the LKZ, work began to strengthen the KV's armor. The only weapon that could penetrate the frontal armor of a Soviet tank was the 8.8 Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun. Anti-aircraft shells, even without an armor-piercing steel core, had an initial velocity of 810 m / s and could penetrate a sheet of 80-mm armor set at an angle of 30 degrees. distance 1000 mm. At shorter distances, this figure increased to 87-97 mm. As a rule, it was possible to disable the KV-1 after 2-3 hits in the turret and hull. In this regard, it is interesting to mention that the leadership of the Red Army was well aware of the reports on the use of Flak 18 in France, where this gun was used to combat French heavy tanks B-1bis, the armor of which was not inferior to the KV-1, but timely conclusions in 1940. were not made.

Since the only plant that produced KV-1 in large quantities was only LKZ, its specialists developed a simple but effective scheme for enhancing the reservation, previously used on the T-28 medium tank. An additional 25 mm armor plates were welded onto the turret of the tank, bringing the total armor thickness to 100 mm. At the same time, a small gap remained between the tower and the hinged armor, which improved the protection of the tank when fired by cumulative (then they were called "armor-piercing") shells.

The tanks modified in this way could be distinguished by the huge rivets through which the hinged armor plates were attached. In Soviet and some Russian sources, they were sometimes called KV-1e("Shielded"). According to some reports, the Leningrad Metal Plant also carried out work to strengthen the reservation in the fall of 1941.

The bulk of the "shielded" tanks were sent to the Leningrad Front, however, the positional nature of the hostilities did not allow to fully reveal all the capabilities of the KV. In addition, the tank units constantly received complaints about the overweight of the tank, which entailed not only technical problems. After the march of even several KV units, the road along which they passed became impassable for other types of equipment, including tracked ones. About bridges that could withstand a 47-48-ton vehicle were mentioned earlier - there were frequent cases when HF was carried into the river along with a structure that was clearly not designed for such loads. As for the cross-country ability of a heavy tank on loose soil or swampy terrain, in this regard, the KV was much inferior to the T-34, in which this indicator also did not differ for the better.

All these factors led to the fact that in the spring of 1942 work was launched to lighten the heavy tank, in order to increase its mobility and speed performance. The design of the new modification was carried out by ChTZ specialists, who were given a difficult task.
Based on the experience of battles, which showed that even 100-mm armor does not save from concentrated fire from 75-mm anti-tank guns or 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, it was decided to partially weaken the armor protection of the turret and hull. Now the thickness of its frontal part was 82 mm, sides and roof - 40 mm, stern - 75 mm. The turret was cast and had a completely new, streamlined shape with a single hatch. According to the experience of German tank builders, a commander's cupola with five glass blocks was introduced, which allowed the tank commander to conduct a circular observation of the battlefield without using optical instruments. The armor thickness of the frontal part of the hull corresponded to the usual KV-1 and was 75 mm, but the sides were covered with 40 mm armor. To reduce the mass of the tank, lightweight road wheels were used, and the width of the cast track links was reduced to 608 mm. In addition, the individual components of the power plant were lightened, in which the lubrication and cooling system was improved.

One of the most important moments was the installation of a new checkpoint designed by engineer N.F. Shashmurin. She had 10 gears (eight forward and two reverse) and was equipped with a range. In addition, a new main clutch and final drives were installed on the tank. The composition of the armament did not change, although due to the lack of ZiS-5 guns, the F-34 was installed on serial tanks - in this case, the ammunition increased from 90 to 114 shells. On the modified tank, the commander's seat was moved from the right forward corner to the left rear corner, behind the gunner's back. The responsibility of the loader was transferred to the arrow of the aft machine gun, and the machine gun itself was moved to the left, which allowed the tank commander to shoot from it.

In total, these measures made it possible to bring the mass of the modified KV-1 to 42,500 kg and to increase its mobility. On state tests, which took place from July 28 to August 20, 1942, the new heavy tank showed the best speed characteristics with virtually the same level of armor protection. On the last day of testing, he was accepted into service under the designation KV-1s("High-speed") and from the end of the same month it began to replace the usual KV-1 on the conveyor. In September 1942 alone, the Chelyabinsk plant produced 180 serial tanks, but by the end of the year, the production of KV-1s began to decline. The reason for this step was quite understandable - apart from the more powerful armor, the heavy tank had no advantages over the medium T-34.

In September 1942, Major General of the tank forces Katukov, who was summoned to the Headquarters of the Main Command, to Stalin's question about tanks, answered that KV-1s often fail, break bridges, are too slow and do not differ in armament from “thirty-fours ”. The problem of the HF was to equip them with more powerful weapons, then the question of their effectiveness would be posed in a completely different way ...

Although Katukov's opinion was subjective and did not fully reflect the opinion of all tankers, in many ways a combat general who had gone through more than one tank battle was absolutely right. The main problem of the KV-1 was at that time precisely in the armament, since the 76.2-mm cannon ZiS-5 by the beginning of 1943 was practically powerless against the armor of the new German tanks Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther”, Pz.Kpfw.VI “Tiger ”And new modifications of the Pz.Kpfw.IV medium tank (with hinged armored screens). But back in 1940, an order was given to build and then launch mass production of tanks KV-3 equipped with a 107 mm ZiS-6 cannon, and ( T-220) with the 85 mm F-39 gun. In terms of armor and armament power, these combat vehicles were much better than the serial KV-1, but in the summer of 1941, due to the outbreak of the war, work on them was suspended and then completely stopped. As a result, the tank armies of the Red Army until the fall of 1943 were forced to be content with the existing fleet of heavy tanks, inferior to new German vehicles of a similar class. As a result, from August 1942, the production of the KV-1s began to be phased out and completely stopped in December, temporarily replacing it with an “intermediate” heavy tank.

Such a large number on the designation of the next modification of the KV indicated the caliber of the gun with which the tank was equipped. As has already been pointed out many times, one of the most significant shortcomings of the KV-1 was its short-barreled 76.2-mm cannon, which by the fall of 1942 could not successfully fight the enemy's heavy armored vehicles. When selecting a new gun, the emphasis was placed on the defeat of the 100-mm frontal armor of the German heavy tanks "Panther" and "Tiger". The most effective in this regard were the 122-mm A-19 cannon, the 152-mm ML-20 cannon-howitzer, and the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun 52-K arr. 1939. It was the latter that became the prototype of the D-5T tank gun, the development of which was completed in May 1943. To speed up testing and subsequent serial production, the hull, chassis and turret were almost unchanged from the KV-1s. The assembly of the KV-85 tanks began in August, but it was produced in small numbers, since in the spring of 1944 the more advanced IS-2 tank was put into mass production. For the same reason, GBTU did not accept the version with the 122-mm D-25T gun for serial construction.

During the war, attempts were made to strengthen the armament by installing a 122 mm U-11 howitzer in a new turret. This variant, which received the designation, was tested in March 1942 and was recommended for mass production as a fire support tank (essentially an ACS).
A more radical option provided for the installation of three guns (two 45 mm 20K and one 76.2 mm F-34) in a fixed wheelhouse. A heavy tank with similar armament was tested at the end of 1941, after which the armament was reduced to two F-34 cannons. As you might expect, this upgrade did not find support and remained at the experimental level.

The last attempt to seriously improve the characteristics of the KV was made in the middle of 1942 and led to the emergence of a “medium heavy armor tank”. Since it was possible to reduce the huge mass of the tank only by reworking its chassis on the KV-13, it was shortened by one road roller, as a result of which the hull length was reduced to 6650 mm, and the width - to 2800 mm. In terms of armament and equipment, the medium tank did not differ from the KV-1.
On tests carried out in the fall of 1942, the KV-13 showed itself not in the best way - the car constantly broke down, and in terms of the sum of its characteristics, it turned out to be worse than the T-34. However, the path chosen by the designers turned out to be correct and subsequently led to the emergence of much more successful IS-1 and IS-2 tanks.

With flamethrower modifications, things were much better. The first heavy tank of this type was created by the LKZ forces to replace the light OT-130 and OT-133, most of which were lost in the summer battles of 1941. Compared with the usual KV-1, its flamethrower modification KV-6 had a minimum of differences, since the ATO-41 flamethrower was mounted in the frontal sheet of the hull instead of a course machine gun. No information has been preserved about the number of vehicles built, but in September 1941, four tanks were sent to the 124th tank brigade operating on the Leningrad front.
Work in this direction was continued in Chelyabinsk, where, in January 1942, the release of the modification began, and then KV-8s... On these tanks, a flamethrower was installed in the turret, which increased the sector of destruction. However, due to the cramped conditions in the fighting compartment, the ZiS-5 gun had to be replaced with a more compact 20K 45 mm caliber. To hide this disadvantage from the enemy, the barrel of the cannon was equipped with an additional casing. The total production of the KV-8 of all modifications was 137 copies.
During the combat use of the KV-8, it quickly became clear that without the support of tanks with more powerful weapons, as a rule, these were serial KV or T-34 \ 76, flamethrower units suffered heavy losses. The engineers of factory # 100 tried to correct this deficiency, who in the spring of 1942 proposed a modification with a 76.2-mm cannon and an ATO-41 flamethrower, essentially returning to the KV-6 version. They refused its serial production, believing that the existing "eights" would be enough for the front.

As the tank forces were saturated with new equipment, heavy KV tanks were gradually converted into ARVs, removing the turret with the main armament from them and installing the equipment necessary for such vehicles. The exact number of such tractor tanks, designated as KV-T, no information has survived.

However, work on the design of a heavy tractor-transporter was started shortly before the war. The need for such a machine was felt not only in the BTV of the Red Army, but also in other branches of the military. In theory, a heavily armored transporter could follow an infantry or tank unit, towing a field gun behind it. After the appearance of the KV and repeated demands from the Soviet-Finnish front, the LKZ began to create a similar machine. The transporter was developed since January 1940 by a team under the leadership of the leading engineer N. Khalkiopov and bore a design designation. True, then his main task was to evacuate the destroyed tanks from the battlefield.

Compared to the KV tank, the transporter tractor received a completely new layout. The transmission compartment was located in the front, behind it was the control compartment and space for technicians, the engine was installed in the middle of the hull, and the aft part of the hull was reserved for the transport compartment. The machine used most of the elements from the KV-1 undercarriage, including track rollers and suspension, but the drive and idler wheels (the location of which were changed) were redesigned. In addition, the three supporting wheels were replaced with four.

Work on the Object 212 tractor progressed quickly and by February 1940 a full-sized wooden model was ready. Representatives of ABTU spoke positively about the new armored vehicle, however, further work could not be advanced. No permission was even received to build a prototype. A possible reason for this step was the high workload of the LKZ with the production of serial KV-1s, so that there was simply no human resources or production capacity left to fine-tune Object 212.

During the war, they remembered another method of using tanks. In the mid-1930s. several experiments were carried out to install missile weapons on light tanks BT-5. The system turned out to be unfinished, although it showed good destructive characteristics. Several years later, in May 1942, the plant # 100 began designing a similar installation for the KV-1 tank. The most effective seemed to be the use of 132-mm rockets from BM-8. On the sides of the tank were attached two armored boxes with two guides for the RS, which were controlled from the driver's seat. This system, which received the designation KRAST-1 (short rocket artillery tank system), was tested at the Research Range of Small Arms near the station of Chebakul and earned a good assessment from the military. With the advent of the KV-1S modification, the system was transferred to new sample tank. According to the test results, the director of ChKZ Zh.Ya. Kotin considered it necessary to contact NKTP with a proposal for the serial production of KRAST-1. In his appeal, it was indicated that this system is easy to use, does not require large material costs and can be installed by field repair teams. However, the People's Commissariat did not give permission for the release of KRAST-1.

As can be seen from the above material, heavy tanks KV-1, for a number of reasons, could not make a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, it was an epoch-making and no less legendary machine than the well-known T-34.

Interestingly, before the war, German intelligence was well aware of the presence of completely new tanks with anti-cannon armor in the Soviet troops, which are capable of withstanding long-term shelling from 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns. The first information about the combat use of these vehicles came from Finland back in 1940, but Hitler stubbornly did not want to believe in the existence of KV tanks in mass quantities. On December 5, at a regular meeting, the Fuhrer said literally the following:

“The Russians are inferior to us in armament ... Our Pz.III tank with a 50-mm cannon is clearly superior to the Russian tank. The bulk of Russian tanks have poor armor ... "

The German General Staff of the Ground Forces had about the same information:

“Scant data on Soviet tanks: inferior to ours in armor and speed. The maximum booking is 30 mm ... The optical instruments are very bad: dull glasses, small angle of view. "

All of this was more likely related to the light tanks T-26 and BT, although these vehicles, in terms of the sum of their characteristics, were no worse than the German Pz.II and Pz.III. German tankers were able to verify this even during the civil war in Spain, and in the fall of 1939, on the territory of defeated Poland, the Soviet and German sides arranged a kind of exchange of experience, demonstrating their main tanks. The general impression of the Soviet light tanks from the Germans remained positive - they concluded that the Pz.II and Pz.III were superior in terms of protection and equipping with optical equipment. However, at that time none of them knew about the work on the KV and T-34 tanks ...

In the first days of the war, the appearance of the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks was a very unpleasant surprise for the Germans. The bulk of anti-tank artillery and tank guns could not cope with them, but the most unpleasant fact was that the German tank industry did not have the opportunity to supply anything of equal value at that time. It was possible to disable the KV only by destroying its chassis, but not all crews were able to do this in combat conditions. Particularly hard hit were divisions equipped with Czech light tanks Pz. 35 (t) and Pz. 38 (t), whose guns were only suitable for fighting lightly armored vehicles.
There is one more interesting fact- in the summer of 1941, the KVs had a much greater effect on the Germans than the thirty-fours. In contrast, heavy tanks were manned by crews of officers who had much better combat training. Here are some examples of the combat use of the KV-1, which took place in June-August 1941. The Thuringian 1st Panzer Division, which was advancing in the Baltic States, was one of the first to come under a massive attack from Soviet heavy tanks. In the report of the battle, the following was recorded:

“The KV-1 and KV-2, which we met here for the first time, were something unprecedented! Our companies opened fire from about 800 meters, but to no avail. The distance was shrinking, while the enemy approached us without showing any concern. Soon we were separated by 50 to 100 meters. The fierce artillery duel did not bring the Germans any success. Russian tanks continued to advance as if nothing had happened, and armor-piercing shells simply bounced off them. Thus, an alarming situation arose when Russian tanks went straight through the positions of the 1st tank regiment to our infantry and to our rear. Our tank regiment, having made a full turn, hurried after the KV-1 and KV-2, following almost in the same formation with them. During the battle, using special ammunition, we managed to disable some of them from a very short distance - from 30 to 60 meters. Then a counterattack was organized and the Russians were driven back. A defensive line was created in the Vosiliskis area. The fighting continued. "

He describes the meeting with KV more dramatically in his book “The Eastern Front. Hitler goes to the East ”Paul Karel - an eyewitness to one of the battles near Senno, which took place on July 8, 1941. Soviet tanks, most likely, belonged to the 5th mechanized corps, and their opponent was the 17th Panzer Division.

“At dawn, the advance regiment of the 17th Panzer Division entered into action. He walked through tall sprouts of grain wheat, through potato fields and scrubland. Shortly before 11.00 a platoon of Lieutenant von Ziegler entered combat contact with the enemy. Letting the Germans get closer, the Russians opened fire from well-camouflaged positions. After the first shots, three battalions of the 39th Panzer Regiment fanned out on a wide front. Anti-tank artillery hastened to the flanks. A tank battle began, which took a prominent place in military history - the Battle of Senno.

The fierce battle raged from 11:00 until nightfall. The Russians acted very skillfully and tried to get into the flank or rear of the Germans. The hot sun was blazing in the sky. On the vast battlefield, tanks, German and Russian, blazed here and there.

At 17.00, the German tankers received a signal via the radio:

- Protect ammunition.

At that moment, the radio operator Westphal heard the commander's voice in his tank:

- Heavy enemy tank! The tower is at ten o'clock. Armor-piercing. Fire!

“Direct hit,” the non-commissioned officer reported to Zarge. But the Russian monster did not seem to notice the projectile. He just walked forward. Two, three, then four tanks from the 9th company hit the Soviet vehicle from a distance of 800 - 1000 m. There was no sense. And suddenly he stopped. The tower turned. The blazing fire of the shot burst out. A fountain of mud shot up 40 meters in front of the tank of NCO Gornbogen from the 7th company. Gornbogen hastened to get out of the line of fire. The Russian tank continued to advance along the lane. There was a 37mm anti-tank gun.

- Fire! “But the giant didn't seem to care. Grass and straw of crushed ears adhered to its wide caterpillars. The driver was in last gear - no easy task given the size of the car. Almost every driver had a sledgehammer at hand, which he used to hit the gearshift lever if the gearbox started to go awry. An example of the Soviet approach. One way or another, their tanks, even heavy ones, ran briskly. This lane is right on the anti-tank gun. The gunners fired like hell. There are twenty meters left. Then ten, then five. And now the colossus ran right into them. The soldiers of the calculation sprang to the sides with shouts. The huge monster crushed the weapon and, as if nothing had happened, rolled on. Then the tank took a little to the right and headed for the field artillery positions in the rear. He completed his journey fifteen kilometers from the front line, when he got stuck on a swampy meadow, where he was finished off by a 100-mm long-barreled gun of divisional artillery ”.

The commander of the 41st Motorized Army Corps of the Germans, Reinhardt, later recalled the battles with the 2nd Panzer Division:

“About a hundred of our tanks, of which about a third were Pz.Kpfw.IV, took up their initial positions for a counterattack. Part of our forces was supposed to advance along the front, but most of the tanks had to bypass the enemy and strike from the flanks. From three sides we fired at the Russian iron monsters, but it was all in vain. The Russians, on the other hand, fired efficiently. After a long battle, we had to retreat to avoid complete defeat. Echeloned along the front and in depth, the Russian giants approached closer and closer. One of them approached our tank, hopelessly stuck in a swampy pond. Without any hesitation, the black monster rode over the tank and pressed it into the mud with its tracks. At that moment, a 150 mm howitzer arrived. While the artillery commander warned about the approach of enemy tanks, the gun opened fire, but again to no avail. "

The famous German commander Heinz Guderian was forced to appreciate the new Soviet tanks. For the first time he was able to get acquainted with the KV in July 1941 - in one of the battles, the forces of the 18th Panzer Division captured several of these vehicles, which they managed to knock out with the help of an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. The next meeting with the KV took place only in October near Bryansk and Tula, when the units of the 4th Panzer Division were practically powerless against the tanks of the Soviet 1st Tank Brigade and suffered heavy losses.

Thanks to their perseverance and the ability to use trusted equipment, a number of crews showed fantastically high efficiency. Just what is the battle, carried out by a single KV-1 tank under the command of Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov on August 18, 1941. This battle was repeatedly described in various publications (for example, in the article "A Hero Who Did Not Become a Hero" on the site "Courage"), so let's dwell on its main points.
To cover the Leningrad direction in the Krasnogvardeysk area, the 3rd tank company of the 1st tank battalion of the 1st Red Banner tank division, consisting of 5 KV-1, was allocated. Having stood at the fork of three roads, Kolobanov sent two tanks to the side branches, and he himself prepared to meet the enemy on the Tallinn highway. Having dug out the caponier and carefully camouflaging the tank, Kolobanov waited for the morning of August 19, when a German column of 22 tanks appeared on the horizon. The enemy, unaware of an ambush, went at an extremely close distance, which made it possible for Soviet tankers to knock out the lead and trailing vehicles during the first minute of the battle, and then the KV crew set fire to the rest of the enemy tanks.

An equally striking fact of the skillful use of the KV-1 can be the battle near the villages of Nefedyevo and Kuzino, where units under the command of Colonel M.A. Sukhanov stubbornly defended for several days. The enemy captured both settlements on December 3, and on the night of December 5, Sukhanov had to prepare an offensive in order to dislodge the Germans from their positions. Of the reinforcements, he was assigned a battalion of the 17th brigade, consisting of one (!) KV-1 tank. However, even one heavy tank was enough to break through the German defense - this KV was commanded by Lieutenant Pavel Gudz, who already had 10 enemy vehicles on his account. Earlier, in the summer of 1941, this young lieutenant distinguished himself, acting as part of the 63rd TP of the 32nd TD near Lvov. On the morning of June 22, his platoon, consisting of five KV-1s, two T-34s and two BA-10s, entered into battle with the advance detachment of the Germans, completely defeating it. The share of the crew of Gudzia had 5 knocked out German tanks. In this case, the oncoming battle was completely contraindicated, so the KV crew, using the darkness and artillery support, was able to covertly approach the forward positions near the village of Nefedvo. As it turned out, the enemy's forces were very significant - more than 10 tanks were counted alone. However, the Germans' numerical superiority did not save at all - the battle began with the fact that at dawn the KV almost point-blank shot two German tanks and, wedging into their defensive order, knocked out 8 more cars. The remaining 8 were forced to leave the village ...

On November 8, 1941, the KV-1 crew commanded by Lieutenant A. Martynov from the 16th tank brigade of the Volkhov front distinguished themselves. Taking a battle with 14 German tanks near the village of Zhupkino, Soviet tankers knocked out five of them and captured three more as trophies. Then these tanks were repaired and soon included in the brigade.

And here is another example of the resilience of a single heavy tank that was surrounded, but until the last resisted the German units that were trying to destroy it. Despite the fact that this episode is taken from a foreign source and the period of action dates back to 1943, there are a number of inconsistencies in it, which does not allow us to be fully convinced of its authenticity.

“One of the KV-1 tanks managed to break through to the only road along which the German shock group of forces was supplied at the northern bridgehead, and block it for several days. The first unsuspecting trucks delivering the equipment were immediately shot and burned by a Russian tank. There was practically no way to destroy this monster. Due to the swampy terrain, it was impossible to get around it. The supply of food and ammunition has ceased. The badly wounded soldiers could not be evacuated to the hospital for the operation, and they died. An attempt to disable the tank using a battery of 50-mm anti-tank guns firing from a distance of 450 meters ended in heavy losses for the crew and guns.

The Soviet tank remained unharmed, despite, as it was later established, 14 direct hits. The shells left only bluish dents on his armor. When they pulled up a camouflaged 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, Soviet tank crews coolly allowed it to be installed 600 meters from the tank, and then destroyed it along with the crew before it had time to fire the first shell. An attempt by sappers to blow up a tank at night also turned out to be unsuccessful.

True, the sappers managed to sneak up on the tank shortly after midnight and plant explosives under the tracks of the tank. But the wide tracks suffered little from the explosion. The blast wave tore off several pieces of metal from them, but the tank remained mobile and continued to damage the rear units and block the delivery of equipment. Initially, Russian tankers received food at night from scattered groups of Soviet soldiers and civilians, but then the Germans cut off this source of supply, cordoning off the entire surrounding area.

However, even this isolation did not force the Soviet tank crews to abandon their advantageous position. In the end, the Germans were able to deal with this tank, resorting to the following maneuver. Fifty tanks attacked the KV from three sides and opened fire on it in order to attract the attention of the crew. Under cover of this diversionary maneuver, it was possible to install and camouflage another 88-mm anti-aircraft gun behind the Soviet tank, so that this time it was able to open fire. Out of 12 direct hits, three shells pierced the armor and destroyed the tank ... "

However, there were other comments about the meetings with the KV-1. For example, Franz Kurowski's book "500 Tank Attacks" describes a number of battles involving Soviet heavy vehicles, which were opposed by German tank aces. Already in the first chapter, dedicated to the combat path of Michael Wittmann (132 wrecked tanks and self-propelled guns and 138 anti-tank guns), you can read the following:

“… In the telescopic sight there is a gap between the trees. Then he saw the barrel of the KV gun, behind it - the front plate, and, finally, the mighty turret. He hesitated a little, slightly adjusting the sight. Then Clink pressed the firing button. The echo of the powerful weapon's shot and the crushing impact of the shell on the armor almost merged. The shell hit the joint between the hull and the turret, ripping the turret off the tank. The heavy turret fell to the ground with a crash, and the muzzle of the long-barreled gun burrowed into the soft ground. A few seconds later, two surviving crew members jumped out of the tank ... "

It should be noted that the author “slightly” embellished most of the moments of this fight. The action took place at the end of June 1941 in the area of ​​the cities of Rivne, Lutsk, Brody, where the largest tank battle in the entire history of wars took place. In this battle at the height of 56.9 against the only self-propelled gun Vitman (and he fought on the StuG III Ausf.C with the short-barreled StuK 37 L / 24 gun), 18 Soviet tanks entered at once, three of which Vitman himself identified as KV-1. But the fact is that in June 1941 the Germans did not yet know the names of the new Soviet tanks and therefore referred to them as “26 tonnes” (T-34) or “50 tonnes” (KV-1). But these are trifles - the main doubts are caused by the terrifying efficiency of the German short-barreled 75-mm cannon, which the Germans themselves called “stump”. This weapon was originally created for fire support of infantry and tanks, so the task of combating enemy armored vehicles was not assigned to it. However, provided that an armor-piercing projectile of the Gr38 H1 type was used with an initial speed of about 450 m / s, it was really possible to pierce a 75-mm vertical sheet of armor, only this could be done from a distance of no more than 100 meters. Of course, in the case of Wittmann, there was no question of any "breakdown of the tower" - the 4.4 kg projectile simply did not have the necessary weight and impact power for this. It would be another matter if the projectile had pierced the side armor and caused the detonation of the ammunition load, but in this case no one from the crew survived.
Similar descriptions in foreign literature on German tankers can be found huge multitude... As a rule, the winners in them are certainly the Germans, and the “breakdowns of towers” ​​and “torn-off hulls” of Soviet tanks (mainly T-34) are found there too often at times.

Nevertheless, after the appearance of the Wehrmacht medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" and Pz.VI "Tiger", the situation for the KV-1 became much more complicated. The same Vitman, in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, on his "tiger" successfully shot Soviet heavy tanks dug into the ground on his "tiger" from a distance of about 500 meters, while the shells of the 76.2-mm cannon could not penetrate his frontal armor.

Somewhat earlier, in February 1943, in a battle near Lake Ladoga, a squad of "tigers" from the 502nd tank battalion collided with a KV-1 group and, knocking out two Soviet vehicles, forced the rest to retreat. A year later, on June 25, 1944, in the battle of Shapkovo, the same "tigers" from the 2nd company of the 502nd battalion under the command of Captain Leonhardt successfully repelled the attack of Soviet infantry and tanks, knocking out three KV-1s without their own losses.

After the end of the Moscow operation, major offensives in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, similar to this, were not carried out until the end of 1942. This made it possible to saturate, to some extent, new equipment, tank units battered in battles. Although the release of KV at the Chelyabinsk plant had already gained the required speed, many tanks entering the front had a lot of technological defects. In this regard, Stalin proposed to the GBTU to reduce the production of heavy tanks and to recruit tank brigades according to the new staff - 5 KV-1 and 22 T-34. The proposal was accepted almost immediately, and on February 14, 1942, the formation of the 78th tank brigade with 27 tanks was completed, and a few weeks later several more brigades of a similar composition left for the front.

Although the mass scale of the KV-1 was much inferior to the "thirty-four", the presence of heavy tanks in the units, up to the appearance of new vehicles with more powerful weapons by the Germans, played an important role. In May 1942 alone, the Chelyabinsk plant sent 128 tanks to the front: 28 fell to the Bryansk front, 20 to the Kalinin front, 30 to the Crimean front, and another 40 went to the Don and the Caucasus.

The KV-1 was most useful in the southern and northern directions. The new KV-1s that entered service by that time (November-December 1942) were transferred to the Guards tank regiments, which were to have 214 personnel and 21 KV-1s or “Churchill” tanks. These units were attached as reinforcements to rifle and tank formations and were essentially assault units. For the first time they went into battle on the Don and Voronezh fronts in December 1942, taking part in the defeat of the encircled units of the Paulus group at Stalingrad. The most significant number of heavy tanks at that time was at the disposal of the Don Front, which had at its disposal five guards tank regiments on the KV-1s and two on the "Churchill". They were used very intensively, which led to huge losses incurred by the guards units during this period. By the beginning of January, some of the regiments had only 3-4 tanks, which they continued to use to break through the enemy defense together with the infantry.

In the midst of the Battle of Stalingrad, in October-November 1942, no less heavy battles were fought near Vladikavkaz and Nalchik. The main striking force here was made up of medium tanks T-34 and light T-60 and T-70, while there were no more than two dozen heavy tanks. The 37th Army, which was defending here, had no tanks at all, and in order to strengthen it, the 52nd brigade, 75th brigade and 266th brigade were put forward to help. There were 54 vehicles in total, of which only 8 were KV-1 (they all belonged to the 266th battalion). The forces were clearly not equal - against them the Germans fielded the 13th Panzer Division of the III Panzer Corps, which had modified PzIV Ausf.F2 medium tanks equipped with 75-mm long-barreled 7.5 KwK 40 L / 43 guns, the shell of which pierced armor plate 98 mm thick from a distance of 100 meters and 82-mm plate from a distance of 1000 meters. Thus, it became possible to successfully hit any Soviet tank at distances beyond its limits. The defensive operation, which began on October 26, mainly involved T-34s and light T-70s, while the 266th Tank Battalion remained in reserve. The battles to contain the enemy lasted a little over a week, and on November 6, a battalion, as part of a mixed group, launched a counteroffensive near the settlement of Gizel. The Germans skillfully defended themselves, burying their own vehicles in the ground, and for the whole day they were able to knock out 32 tanks and destroy 29 more. Nevertheless, with the help of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, which arrived in time, the tankers managed to surround the enemy, leaving him only a narrow 3-km passage. The final defeat of the German tank grouping ended on November 11 at the cost of heavy losses, however, the Soviet troops also managed to capture 140 tanks and self-propelled guns, mostly in disrepair.

In the history of the KV tank there was also such, not the most famous, combat episode. In November 1942, when the German offensive on the Don was successfully developing, the advanced units of the enemy motorized infantry easily reached the Novocherkassk direction and by July 21 reached the Mokryi Log farm. The forces to repel an attack from the Soviet side in this sector of the front were very modest - the units of the 25th Cahul border regiment and the militia divisions of the NKVD troops. Heavy artillery was completely absent at their disposal, but the 37th Army helped with armored vehicles, which allocated several tanks from the 15th brigade.
The Germans moved in two columns, and in the second they counted up to 100 units of heavy equipment. It was reckless to engage in open combat with them, and the command of the 15th brigade decided to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, placing tanks in ambush. For this, a group of two KV-1 and one T-34 was allocated. Tank commanders: junior lieutenants Mikhail Ivanovich Bozhko and Grigory Dmitrievich Krivosheev and senior lieutenant Nikolai Fedorovich Gauzov.
They decided to set up an ambush between the farmsteads Mokryi Log and Mokryi Kerchik, the distance between which was 15 km. The exact chronology of this battle was not preserved, since only two of the 14 crew members managed to survive: Senior Lieutenant Gauzov (died in battle in 1944) and Sergeant Major N.A. Rekun (commander of the second KV gun). This is how this battle is described as described by the commander of the 15th tank brigade, Major Savchenko, and the commander of the 1st tank battalion, senior lieutenant Vasilkov, who told about it only on November 21, 1942:

“On July 21, 1942, near the village of Mokryi Log, the KV tank of Senior Lieutenant Gauzov was tasked with two other tanks to prevent the enemy's motor-tank column from breaking through to the town of Shakhty and to ensure the withdrawal of units of the 37th Army and its rear services. Having chosen a convenient position and carefully camouflaging the tank, Senior Lieutenant Gauzov waited for the appearance of a German fascist column. Despite the fact that the convoy had up to 96 tanks comrade. Gauzov opened fire from a cannon and both machine guns at a distance of 500-600 meters, forcing the enemy column to turn around and take an unequal battle. The battle lasted 3.5 hours. Being in the ring of fire, Senior Lieutenant Gauzov showed composure, Bolshevik restraint and heroism. On his tank, from the enemy's artillery fire, optical instruments and an aiming device were removed. Comrade Gauzov got out of the tank and, being on it, continued to accurately adjust the fire of his cannon. The tank caught fire, but, nevertheless, Gauzov did not give up the fight. Commanding: “Direct fire. “For beloved Stalin. For the Motherland. Fire". “For the deceased brother. “For the company commander who fell in battle. Fire ", he continued to repulse the attack of the advancing enemy."

According to Soviet data, the KV crew destroyed 16 German tanks, 2 armored vehicles, 1 anti-tank gun and 10 vehicles with enemy soldiers and officers. Gauzov himself was seriously wounded in his right leg, but managed to get out to his own. Later, for the heroism shown, he deserves the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. Even if we assume that the number of destroyed German equipment was smaller (the battlefield remained with the Germans), this does not diminish the feat of Soviet tankers, who entered into an obviously unequal battle. Delaying the advance by 3-3.5 hours is a very difficult task and the battle on July 21, 1942, in this respect, is quite comparable to the feat of the KV-2 tank crew near the Dubisa river and the battle of the KV-1 crew under the command of Kolobanov in 1941.

Events in the Middle Don developed more dramatically. As part of the operation "Little Saturn", the troops of the Southwestern Front had to break through the defenses on the weakest sector of the front, where the Romanian and Italian troops were located. As before, most of the available tanks were T-34 and T-70, although the 1st mechanized corps had 114 British infantry tanks "Matilda" and 77 "Valentine". Heavy tanks KV-1 were then part of the 1st and 2nd tank corps, where, respectively, there were 5 and 38 vehicles of this type. Little is known about the fate of these tanks. Apparently, the 2nd tank destroyer in the January battles of 1943 lost most of the KV, transferring the surviving vehicles to the 1st tank.

Heavy tanks played a significant role in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshan operation, which was carried out from January 13 to January 27, 1943. Of the 896 tanks of the Voronezh Front, KVs of various modifications accounted for 112 vehicles. Most of them were transferred for direct support of the infantry of the front's three shock groupings. For example, in the 40th army, the 116th and 86th tank battalions had 23 and 6 KV-1s, respectively, and the 262nd TP with 21 KV-1s tanks operated as part of the 18th rifle corps. Thanks to tactical flexibility, this time it was possible to avoid large losses, breaking through the enemy's defenses in all three directions and destroying its main forces.

Building on the success achieved at Stalingrad, the command of the Voronezh Front in mid-January developed a plan for a new offensive, called the "Star". The main striking element was the 3rd Panzer Army, which was the most powerful unit of the Red Army. It consisted of two tank corps, a separate tank brigade, two rifle divisions, a mortar and anti-tank regiments. There were no more than a dozen KV tanks, and most of the time they were kept as an operational reserve. The operation, whose task was to liberate Kharkov, ended in partial success, while the 3rd Army lost in the period from January 20 to February 18, 1943, only one KV, 33 T-34, 5 T-70 and 6 T-60. By the time the operation was completed, only one KV-1 remained in the 12th military corps and the 179th detachment. At the same time, in the report of the army headquarters it was emphasized that heavy tanks have severe wear of engines that have worked in severe winter conditions for 50-70 engine hours, and require repair.

The 2nd Panzer Army operating nearby had no less strength. It was formed at the beginning of 1943 and placed near the town of Yelets, where it was gradually replenished with materiel and personnel. In February, it was decided to use the army in an offensive operation near Dmitriev-Lgovsky and Sevsk. The tanks had to cover 250-270 km to the place of their new deployment, so it is not surprising that out of 408 vehicles, only 182 reached the date set for February 15th. It took another week to fully concentrate forces and by February 24, army units reached the starting line on the river Swap. The composition of the 2nd ta is interesting in that it was one of the few formations where there were separate units equipped only with KV-1 tanks. We are talking about the 29th separate guards tank regiment, which included 15 heavy vehicles. In addition, 11 KV-1, 1 T-34, 41 light tanks T-60 and T-70, as well as 49 British tanks were part of the 16th tank. The offensive was, on the whole, successful and no combat losses among the KV were reported.

The Battle of Kursk was the last major battle where heavy KV-1 tanks were used in large numbers. The 203rd separate heavy tank regiment of the 18th Panzer Corps (it had the usual KV-1s, but there are allegations that there were assault KV-2s), which was at the disposal of the Voronezh Front, was used only sporadically and had a significant impact on the course of the battle did not. At the same time, the neighboring 15th and 36th Guards tank destroyers, which were armed with the British infantry tanks "Churchill", took an active part in the famous battle at Prokhorovka, although they lost almost all of their vehicles. As a result, the 15th regiment was transferred to the KV-1s, and the 36th regiment was again replenished with British tanks. In total, the Central Front had 70 tanks of this type, and there were 105 of them on the Voronezh Front.

Even before the end of the Battle of Kursk, heavy tanks were involved in the breakthrough of the so-called "Mius Front" in July-August 1943. As part of the 1st Guards Tank Regiment, the KV-1s participated in the storming of enemy strongholds, resulting in operation, 10 tanks were lost (2 burned down, 2 were knocked out and 6 were blown up by mines).

The last guards tank regiment on the KV-1s was formed in January 1944, but in the fall the obsolete tanks were transferred to secondary sectors of the front, and the "guards" were transferred to more powerful IS-2s. Nevertheless, the KV-1s fought until the very end of the war. As part of the 1452th glanders (self-propelled artillery regiment), they took part in the liberation of the Crimea, but due to heavy battles out of five tanks of this type, none of them reached the final stage of the operation. The surviving KV-1s of other tank units then fought in Poland and Germany, where they took their last battle in the spring of 1945.

The largest number of KV tanks, as expected, was in the Leningrad direction. The close proximity to the manufacturing plant made it possible to repair broken vehicles in a short time, while most of the tanks deployed in the western and southern OVOs were idle waiting for spare parts.

Already during the war, in July 1941, a tank training center was created at the Kirov plant, in which classes were held directly in the shops with the involvement of cadets in the assembly of tanks. From the first training team on August 6, a tank company of 10 vehicles was formed, which was then transferred to the 86th Detachment.
By August, the Leningrad Front became the undisputed leader in the number of heavy tanks, since its units received almost all KV produced by LKZ.

It was here that the first meeting of heavy tanks of different generations took place. Of course, we are talking about the appearance of the Pz.Kpfw.VI “Tiger” tanks, which in the fall of 1942 arrived at the disposal of the 502nd heavy tank battalion. In one of the battles, which took place on February 12, 1943, three “tigers” knocked out and burned ten KV-1s without their own losses. Perhaps it was difficult to find a more effective proof of the inadequacy of the KV to the requirements for a heavy tank.

On the Leningrad front, the KV was used for the last time in the summer of 1944. By the beginning of the Vyborg operation (June 10), the front had the 26th separate guards breakthrough tank regiment, equipped with both Soviet heavy tanks and British Churchill tanks. By the way, the KV-1s tanks were transferred to this unit from other regiments, re-equipped with IS-2s, were listed above the staff. This regiment fought heavy battles for Vyborg from 18 to 20 June, retaining 32 KV-1 and 6 “Churchill” by the time the city was liberated. It should be noted that the 26th Guards Detachment had a chance to fight against captured T-26 and T-34, which were the main tanks of the Finnish army.

In September 1944, the 82nd division (11 KV-1s and 10 “Churchill”), which was part of the 8th Army, participated in the liberation of Talin and the islands of the Moonsund archipelago, where the Red Army completed the use of British heavy tanks.

Much less known are the exploits of Soviet tanks that fought surrounded on the Crimean peninsula. For example, on February 27, 1942, on one of the sections of the Crimean Front, the infantry, supported by several KVs that remained in service in the 229th separate tank battalion, once again tried to recapture the 69.4 high-rise that dominated the terrain from the Germans. During the next attack, only one KV of the company commander, Lieutenant Timofeev, managed to reach the German trenches. The close burst of the shell damaged the tank's track, but the crew decided not to leave the damaged vehicle. Over the next five days, the gunner-radio operator Chirkov made his way to his own several times and brought back provisions and ammunition. The infantry tried to break through to the besieged "fortress", which the Germans were never able to completely destroy, but each time Soviet soldiers had to retreat under heavy enemy fire. In turn, the Germans, realizing the futility of attempts to throw grenades at the tank, decided to take a desperate step - to pour gasoline on the KV and set it on fire. However, this "operation" ended in failure. Meanwhile, after receiving reinforcements and regrouping forces, the Soviet troops managed to take the height on March 16. A significant role in this was played by the reports of the KV crew, who managed to reveal the location of most of the enemy's firing points. Among other things, the stationary tank successfully supported the infantry with fire, destroying three bunkers, two machine-gun nests and incapacitating up to 60 German soldiers. In total, the tankers spent a little less than 17 days in the besieged KV.

In addition to the supply of military equipment to the USSR, the Allies were actively interested in the use of Soviet equipment in battles on the Eastern Front. Particular attention was paid to the T-34 medium tank and the KV-1 heavy tank, but in the first months of the war it was not possible to obtain at least one sample of each type. Only in the middle of 1942, the Soviet side, within the framework of international cooperation, provided the Americans with one KV-1 and T-34 sample of 1941. In a document drawn up by the deputy commander of BT and MV, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Korobkov and Deputy Head of the GBTU RKAA General- Lieutenant of the Engineering Tank Service Lebedev, the following was reported.

In essence, the report of the engineer of the tank department of the Soviet procurement commission in the United States, Comrade Prischepenko, about his conversation with Robert Pollack, I report:

1. One sample of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks was sent to the United States through Arkhangelsk at the end of August 1942.

2. The KV-1 tank was manufactured at the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk, and the T-34 tank was manufactured at the factory # 183 in Nizhny Tagil.

3. Tanks have been assembled under special supervision and have been more extensively and thoroughly tested than is usually done for serial tanks.

4. By their design, the tanks did not differ in any way from the serial tanks produced in 1942.

5. In July 1942, before the tanks were dispatched to the United States, the armored control of the GBTU SC sent to Comrade Krutikov for transferring to General Faymoyville, drawings of tanks, instructions and manuals for tanks and engines, as well as lists of the main design changes made to the design of tanks produced in 1942. . compared to the types described in the instructions and manuals.

6. Since General Faymonville proposed to send all these materials to America by plane, then, consequently, they should have been received there before the arrival of the tanks.
Since then, we have never received any requests to send additional instructions and clarifications.

7. Our instructions are much more complete than the American and English instructions. At the same time, our manuals provide all the information on the adjustment of individual mechanisms and on the maintenance of tanks.

8. Therefore, the claims of the Americans, which Robert Pollack expressed in an interview with Cde changes.

9. The fact that the KV and T-34 tanks were equipped with R-9 radios, and not 71TK-3 (obsolete, discontinued radios) was also reported to the Americans in the lists of changes.

10. Unlike the Americans and the British, we provided tanks with a significant amount of spare parts and assemblies.
At their request, an additional main friction clutch of the KV tank was sent to them.

11. How they managed to spoil the side clutches of the KV tank is not clear to us. These are very strong parts of the machine and very rarely fail. They probably violated their regulation in the most flagrant way.

All these unfounded claims occur because the American command refused to provide technical assistance from our tank engineers who are in America and, moreover, has not yet asked us about the maintenance of our tanks. "

We must pay tribute to the Americans - they tested the technology "with special passion", trying to "squeeze" literally everything possible from the tank. This, in part, justifies their attitude towards Soviet cars, which were considered completely unsuitable for use in the American army, which was especially true for such quality as comfort. On the other hand, when testing their own tanks, the attitude towards technology was more “humane”. The Soviet side drew its own conclusions from the report received from the United States. At a meeting held on October 25, 1943, dedicated to the Americans' assessment of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks, the following was noted about the first:

- the indication of the insufficient initial speed of the ZiS-5 cannon is considered correct, as a result - the armor penetration is worse than that of American guns of a similar caliber;

- the DT machine gun requires replacement for a more durable and rapid-fire one;

- there is no anti-aircraft armament (all American tanks have it);

- the KV suspension is much better than the T-34 torsion bar suspension, the design of which is outdated and practically unsuitable for use on a tank weighing almost 30 tons;

- the V-2 motor is not a tank engine, both in terms of its dimensions and the reliability of its individual mechanisms (water pump) and service life as a whole;

- the assessment of transmissions of the Soviet design is correct, the lag in this area is most striking;

- an indication of the difficulty of operating the machine correctly;

- side clutches, as a mechanism for turning tanks, are outdated;

- an indication of a large number of adjustments is correct and requires attention from the NKTP and BTU.

In accordance with these comments, the commission made conclusions about the need to improve the quality of Soviet tanks, but something else was more interesting. As it turned out, the Americans liked the Soviet TMF and TP-4 sights, and this despite the fact that their optics required improvement. In terms of armor thickness, the KV-1 surpassed all serial American tanks, therefore, its protection was noticeably better. In particular, the description of the KV-1, prepared by the training department of the US Army, indicated the following:

“… The very strong armor of the tank allows it to withstand any enemy artillery fire, except for direct hits from large-caliber guns, and this tank is very difficult to disable.

Even when disabled, this tank can sustain heavy fire until the reinforcements drive the Germans back ... ”

The overall assessment of the KV-1 among American specialists was satisfactory, but do not forget that this tank was created according to terms of reference issued in 1938, and tests in the United States were carried out at the end of 1942, when "tigers" and "panthers" appeared at the front and the requirements for heavy tanks were completely different.

There is no reliable information about the use of the KV-1 on the enemy side. As expected, the Germans got the most of the heavy tanks. Basically, these were technically faulty or damaged vehicles, but part of the KV was in a fully operational state and was abandoned due to lack of fuel and ammunition. No separate units were recruited from them, and all the captured KVs that were put into operation were initially transferred to combat units, sending several tanks to Germany for comprehensive tests. In the German army, they received the designation Pz.Kpfw.KV I 753 (r).
Some of the KV-1s were later modernized, with German optics and commander's turrets installed on them. At least one tank was experimentally equipped with a 75mm 7.5cm KwK 40 cannon.

Captured tanks were used not only in training units. Judging by the German photographs, the former Soviet KV-1s took a very active part in the battles from the fall of 1941 to the winter of 1942. damage or serious technical malfunctions. Although most of the KV-1 was still used in the rear for training tank crews and as a means of security.

According to the OKN documents, the number of captured KVs was reduced to 2 units by March 1, 1943, and by December 30, 1944, not a single tank of this type remained officially. In reality, there were only a few dozen of them left, since the documents took into account vehicles in a “on the move” state.

The only Finnish armored brigade also had several KVs. Two of them were captured in the summer-autumn battles of 1941, repaired and put back into operation. By June 9, 1944, when the brigade was thrown into battle on the Karelian Isthmus, it consisted of only one heavy tank with additional armor. It has not yet been possible to find information about its combat operation, but this vehicle continued to be used in the Finnish army until 1954.

Several more KV-1s became trophies of the Hungarian and Slovak armies, but there is still no information about their further fate.

Sources:
VN Shunkov "Red Army". AST \ Harvest. 2003
M. Baryatinsky "Soviet tanks in battle". Yauza \ EKSMO. Moscow. 2007
A. Isaev, V. Goncharov, I. Koshkin, S. Fedoseev and others. “Tank strike. Soviet tanks in battles 1942-1943 ". Yauza \ EKSMO. Moscow. 2007
V. Beshanov "Tank pogrom of 1941". AST \ Harvest. Moscow \ Minsk. 2000.
MV Kolomiets "History of KV tanks" (part 1)
MV Kolomiets "History of KV tanks" (part 2)
tankarchives.blogspot.com.by: More on tank bunkers
The history of one KV tank
Kolomiets M., Moshchanskiy I. "KV-1S" (M-Hobby, No. 5 for 1999)
Tank battle near the farm Mokry Log
Mechanized corps of the Red Army

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEAVY TANKS
KV-1 and KV-1s

The concept and types of state insurance

Definition 1

State insurance is a system of measures carried out by the state in order to organize compensation for damage caused to state and non-profit enterprises, property and health of individuals, as well as to compensate for losses incurred as a result of natural disasters, fires, catastrophes, etc.

Payments are made from the funds of specially created insurance funds, formed both from the state budget and from the contributions of participants.

Insurance companies that have an appropriate license to conduct state insurance, as well as specialized state organizations, have the right to make these payments.

The role of policyholders can be both the state and federal authorities, and organizations, and individuals(with social insurance).

Compulsory state insurance can be distinguished:

• social insurance;
• insurance of military personnel and persons equated to them.

In the case of compulsory state insurance, the amount and procedure for paying insurance premiums and insurance payments are approved by legislative acts.

In the case when the state, federal authorities or ministries act as the insured, the company with which the insurance contracts will be concluded should be selected on the basis of a tender or auction. In this case, the insured persons will be military personnel, certain categories of civil servants (judges, bailiffs etc.) and other persons subject to compulsory state insurance.

In this case, the insured persons must be familiar with the conditions of insurance, the procedure for actions upon the occurrence of an insured event, and methods of making insurance payments.

Compulsory social insurance

State social insurance in Russia is a system designed to provide social protection of working citizens from the adverse consequences of the occurrence of insured events that may affect their material and social situation, as well as their health.

State social insurance includes:

• medical insurance, including sick leave payment;
• pension insurance (upon the onset of retirement age, disability or loss of a breadwinner);
• insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases, including the payment of benefits to dependents of persons who died at work;
• unemployment insurance (unemployment benefits, retraining, employment), etc.

Insurance payments are made at the expense of the funds of specialized insurance funds created by the state: the Social Insurance Fund (FSS), the Mandatory Medical Insurance Fund (MHIF) and The Pension Fund RF.

These insurance funds form their own budgets, which are not part of the state budget. Funds in these budgets come from mandatory contributions paid by policyholders (employers).

The legislation defines the following sizes of insurance premiums: in the Social Insurance Fund - 2.9%, in the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation - 22%, in the MHIF - 5.1%. Payment of contributions is made from the fund wages employees, as well as from other remuneration (bonuses) and payments.

For individual entrepreneurs, notaries and lawyers set different amounts of insurance premiums.

At the expense of the Social Insurance Fund, payments are made on sick leave in case of temporary disability, all payments and benefits in connection with motherhood (one-time payments for early registration and at the birth of a child, as well as monthly benefits), payment for treatment and rehabilitation when accident at work, compensation for treatment in a sanatorium specific categories citizens, as well as providing disabled people with the necessary technical means and prostheses.

The Pension Fund of the Russian Federation is engaged in the accrual and payment of pensions, as well as the issuance of certificates for receiving maternity capital in connection with the birth of a child.

A special account (SNILS) should be opened for each citizen in the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation, which is necessary not only for retirement benefits, but also when applying for a job and drawing up some documents.

The Mandatory Health Insurance Fund is a non-profit organization that was created to implement the state health insurance program. This Fund monitors the targeted use of funds received as insurance premiums for compulsory medical insurance.

Compulsory insurance of military personnel

Remark 1

Compulsory state insurance of military personnel was introduced in order to protect the material and personal interests of persons undergoing military service or called up for military training, as well as their immediate family. The need for this type of insurance is due to the fact that the official activities of military personnel, as well as persons equated to them, are associated with an increased risk of threats to life and health.

The insured is the state and federal government bodies. Insurance contributions are paid from budgetary funds.

According to the law, the state insurance of the military is carried out by an insurance company selected based on the results of an annual competition (auction).

The insurance contract comes into force from the moment a citizen enters military service and lasts until 12 months after dismissal from service.

The life and health of the military and persons equated to them are subject to insurance. The recipients of insurance payments can be both the insured persons themselves and the beneficiaries who are the closest relatives of the insured person.

Insured events are considered to be the receipt of injury, mutilation or other injury, disability, as well as the death of a soldier during the performance of his official duties, as well as the assignment of a disability group to him or his death within 12 months from the date of dismissal from service due to various injuries and injuries received during service or during military training.

The amount and procedure for making insurance payments are determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

The insurance company has the right to refuse payment if the insured person intentionally harmed his health, was injured, injured or injured under the influence of alcohol, drugs or toxic substances, as well as if these injuries were received when the insured person committed socially dangerous actions.

If the leadership of the military unit, in which the insured person served, refuses, without justified reasons, to provide the documents required to receive insurance payments, then it will bear prescribed by law a responsibility.

If a disputable situation arises, the issue can be resolved in court.

State insurance - insurance in which a state organization acts as the insurer.

State insurance is a system of measures to create a special monetary (insurance) fund at the expense of its participants' contributions, from which a specialized state organization makes compensation for material damage, as well as payments of monetary amounts in connection with natural disasters, fires, accidents or other circumstances. Within the framework of state insurance, material damage caused to state, public, cooperative organizations, as well as health and property of citizens is compensated. Compulsory insurance covers the property of state farms, other state agricultural enterprises, collective farms and inter-collective farm organizations (for example, agricultural crops, farm animals, poultry, buildings, structures, vehicles, etc.), as well as citizens (for example, residential buildings, garden houses, summer cottages, outbuildings, cattle, horses). In the order of compulsory personal insurance, passengers are insured against accidents on railway, air and water transport. All passengers are considered insured from the moment the boarding is announced. The corresponding insurance fee is charged for the sale of tickets, travel tickets and other documents.

For young families, voluntary property and personal insurance arising on the basis of a contract is of interest. Voluntary personal insurance provides material assistance both by the insured themselves in case of loss of general working capacity as a result of injury or other reason stipulated by the contract, and by the relatives and friends of the insured in the event of his death. It also allows you to create certain savings for a pre-selected date or event, for example, to the age of majority of a son or daughter, to the day of marriage, etc. The types of voluntary personal insurance are mixed life insurance, child insurance, insurance for schoolchildren, marriage insurance (wedding ), accident insurance.

Under the contract on personal insurance, the insurance company undertakes to pay the insured or another person in favor of whom the contract was concluded, the insurance amount stipulated under the contract upon the occurrence of an event (insured event) specified in the contract. The insured event is determined by the rules of certain types of insurance.

One of the most common types of personal insurance, which provides a wide range of life and health insurance coverage, is mixed life insurance. Contracts can be concluded on the basis of the payment of a single, double or triple sum insured in the event of a permanent loss of general working capacity by the insured. The insured events for this type of insurance include: the end of the insurance period; permanent (complete or partial) loss by the insured of general working capacity as a result of injury (bruise, injury, bone fracture, with the exception of pathological, burns, frostbite, electric shock, compression, dislocation), accidental acute poisoning, tick-borne encephalitis, poliomyelitis; death of the policyholder.

Insurance contracts for children concluded by their parents or other relatives have also become widespread. At the time of the conclusion of the contract, the age of the child must not exceed 15 years. The term of the contract is determined as the difference between the age of 18 and the age of the child on the day of the conclusion of the contract. After graduation insurance term specified in the insurance certificate, the amount is paid to the boy or girl in whose favor the contract has been concluded. In case of persistent health disorder in the insured child as a result of an accident, tick-borne encephalitis or poliomyelitis sum insured paid in an amount corresponding to the percentage of persistent health disorder. In the event of the death of the child during the validity period of the contract, the policyholder is paid the insurance benefit in the established amount and the paid insurance premiums are fully refunded.

For schoolchildren insurance, the sum insured is paid in the event of a health disorder of the insured child from an accident, as well as in the event of the death of a schoolchild for a number of reasons. The contract is concluded with the parents or other relatives of the student with whom he lives. Insurance contracts are drawn up through the school from September 1st to September 30th annually. Insurance premium in the amount of 2 rubles. per year, policyholders pay a part-time insurance agent from among the school's employees. A schoolchild is considered insured for a year (from September 1 to August 31) in the event of a health disorder in the amount of 1,000 rubles. The total amount of payments in connection with the consequences of several injuries sustained by a student cannot exceed the sum insured. In the event of the death of a student, one of the parents or a relative with whom he lived is paid 500 rubles. The amount of the benefit does not depend on the amount previously received for a persistent health disorder. The student remains insured when moving to another school, to another district or city during the year.

Marriage (wedding) insurance is concluded with parents, adoptive parents and other relatives (insured) in favor of a child under 15 years of age. Insurance premiums are paid from the date of the conclusion of the contract until the child reaches 18 years of age. The insured events include the entry of the insured into a registered marriage after the end of the insurance period or reaching the age of 21, as well as a number of reasons specified in the insurance rules. If the boy or girl, in whose favor the contract was concluded, marries between the ages of 18 and 21, the sum insured is paid with interest (0.25 percent for each full month that has elapsed since the end of the insurance period).

Accident insurance contracts are concluded for a period of 1 to 5 years with citizens aged from 16 to 75 years at the time of the end of the contract (except for disabled people of I and II groups), in case of disability as a result of injury or death from drowning, shock , hypothermia of the body and a number of other reasons.

Voluntary property insurance is carried out in the form of insurance of household property, means of transport, buildings, animals.

Voluntary property insurance can be in addition to compulsory insurance, which will provide compensation to a citizen for damage in a more complete amount in the event of an insured event. Voluntary insurance of household property of citizens is widespread.

Furniture, clothing, household appliances, televisions, radios, photographic and film equipment are accepted for insurance. Also subject to insurance are household and sports and tourist equipment, Food, agricultural products obtained from a personal personal plot. A specific inventory of items is not made when concluding an insurance contract. Various documents, copyright manuscripts, banknotes, government bonds, letters of credit are not subject to insurance, and collections of any homogeneous items of scientific, historical or artistic interest, including antiques, as well as items made of precious metals, are not accepted for insurance. and various stones (precious, semi-precious and semi-precious).

The amount of the sum insured is determined by the policyholder himself. In addition, during the validity period of the contract, the insured amount can be increased by concluding an additional contract for the period remaining until the end of the main one. In all cases, the sum insured cannot exceed the value of the property.

Insurance contracts are drawn up by insurance agents or inspectors both with and without inspection of the property. Without inspection contracts property insurance can be concluded for an amount of up to 5000 rubles; large-value contracts are concluded with an inspection to make sure that the insured amount declared by the owner corresponds to the value of the property to be insured. The insurance period is established at the request of the policyholder from 2 to 11 months and from 1 to 5 years.

Household property is considered insured at the place of permanent residence of the policyholder in all residential and utility rooms, as well as in the personal plot. Under a separate agreement, insurance of summer cottage property is allowed. The insurance indemnity is paid in the event of loss of or damage to household property as a result of fire, explosion, natural disasters, rainstorm, hail, collapse, landslide, sudden release of underground waters, floods, prolonged rains and heavy snowfalls, which are unusual for the area, mudflows, lightning strikes, earthquakes , failure of the heating system, water supply and sewerage networks, as well as in the event of his abduction.

Vehicle insurance covers passenger cars (including those with trailers industrial production), motorcycles, motonarts, snowmobiles (snowmobiles), motor scooters, motorized carriages, mopeds, motor, rowing, sailing boats (except inflatable), boats, motor, sailing and motor-sailing yachts.

Insurance of means of transport is provided in case of their destruction or damage as a result of an accident, fire, explosion, lightning strike, storm, storm, hurricane, downpour, hail, heavy snowfall, earthquake, mudflow, landslide, landslide, flood, flood, failure under the ice, damage to the water supply or heating system, as well as the theft of a means of transport or an outboard motor and their destruction in connection with theft or theft, destruction or damage to a means of transport as a result of a road (water) transport accident: collision with another means of transport, collision (impact) on moving or stationary objects (structures, obstacles, animals, etc.), falling means of transport or any object on it, overturning, flooding, short-circuiting of current, as well as breaking glass with stones and other objects flying off from under the wheels other means of transport. The insurance indemnity is paid for the indicated reasons on the territory of the USSR.

The insurance contract is concluded at the request of the owner after the inspection of the vehicle by an employee of the State Insurance Inspection for a period of 2 to 11 months inclusive and for a year. The insured of a vehicle can be a person to whom it belongs on the basis of personal property rights, or a person who received it from a social security body in accordance with the established procedure, or a person to whom the owner issued a notarized power of attorney for the right to use (dispose) it.

When the insured means of transport passes into the ownership of another person (during the sale, donation, as well as the division of property), the policyholder has the right to transfer insurance certificate to the new owner or to renew the contract for another means of transport purchased instead of the previous one. If the policyholder handed over the insurance certificate to the new owner, this vehicle is considered insured until the end of the specified period.

From 1.1.1986, a new type of insurance for passenger cars of citizens was introduced - "auto-combi", according to which the car, luggage and the life of the driver (policyholder) of the car in case of death are insured. The sums insured for each object of combined insurance are established: for car insurance in the amount of its actual value; the life of the driver (policyholder) of the car in case of death is considered insured for 1000 rubles; luggage insurance under the "auto-combi" agreement is made in the amount of 500 rubles. Luggage is cultural and household items, household items and personal belongings. The list of property considered luggage under the insurance contract also includes various additional equipment and car accessories: radios, tape recorders, refrigerators, televisions, seat covers, lighting and signaling devices. The auto-combi insurance contract provides for the payment of insurance indemnity in the event of a fire, explosion, lightning strike, storm, storm, hurricane, downpour, hail, heavy snowfall, earthquake, mudflow, landslide, landslide, flood, flood, ice failure, damage plumbing or heating system, as well as the theft (theft) of a car or its individual parts: parts, accessories and luggage.

An auto-combi insurance contract can be drawn up in one of two ways. At tariff rate payment of 2% of the actual value of the car, damage is reimbursed in any amount. At a tariff rate of payment of 1% of the value of the car, damage caused to the policyholder in the amount of up to 150 rubles is not reimbursed. The insurance period for each of the options is 1 year.

The insurance indemnity is paid in the amount of the damage caused, but not in excess of the corresponding sum insured: for a car, this amount is equal to its actual value, for luggage - 500 rubles.

When insuring buildings, residential, garden and country houses belonging to citizens, as well as outbuildings (sheds, barns, baths, garages, etc.) are accepted for insurance. Residential and utility buildings are insured against damage or destruction as a result of fire, lightning strike, explosion (also if the explosion and lightning strike did not cause a fire), flood, earthquake, storm, hurricane, tsunami, rainstorm, hail, collapse, landslide, flood , mudflows, outflow of underground waters, long rains and heavy snowfall, unusual for the area, failure of the heating system, water supply and sewerage networks.

The policyholder can conclude an insurance contract for all residential and commercial buildings located on the designated land plot, individual buildings (for example, a residential building) or a share of the building belonging to it.

In the event of destruction or damage to the structure, compensation is paid by the State Insurance Inspectorate, which has concluded the contract. Payment for compulsory and voluntary insurance is made simultaneously. The basis for the payment is an act drawn up by the State Insurance Inspectorate with the participation of the insured or an adult member of his family.

Animal insurance contracts are concluded upon oral or written application of the policyholder for a period of one year. All existing animals of the same type that have reached the insurance age are subject to insurance. Under the state compulsory insurance, cattle and horses are insured for 40% of their value at state purchase prices. Voluntary insurance can be concluded for the same amount. Sheep, goats, pigs can be insured for up to 80% of their value at government procurement prices. Insurance is provided in case of death of an animal as a result of illness, freezing, strangulation, attack by animals, poisoning with poisonous herbs or substances, bite of snakes and poisonous insects, death from traumatic injuries. Animals of the same type and age are subject to insurance in the same amount. If, during the validity of the contract, another animal of the given type arrives instead of the one that was left, or the animal that was on the farm reaches the insurance age, then it is considered insured in the same amount as the one that left, without re-signing the contract.

Voluntary property and personal insurance contracts are concluded in writing, are drawn up by a certificate issued by the insurance organization to the policyholder and come into force after the first insurance premium is paid. In this case, the policyholder undertakes to pay insurance premiums to the insurance company, and she, in turn, undertakes, upon the occurrence of an insured event, to pay the policyholder or another person specified by him insurance compensation (in case of property insurance) or the sum insured (in case of personal insurance) provided for by the contract. In case of partial loss of property insured not in full value, the amount of compensation for damage depends on the liability system established for this type of property insurance: proportional or first risk. Under the proportional system used for most types of insurance, the amount of insurance compensation relates to the amount of damage as the sum insured to the actual value of the insured property. Under the system of the first risk, which is usually applied when insuring household property and means of transport belonging to citizens, insurance compensation is made in the full amount of the damage caused, but within the limits of the insured amount.

Compulsory state insurance for certain categories of citizens is provided for by the norm of paragraph 1 of Art. 969 of the Civil Code, according to which, in order to ensure the social interests of citizens and the interests of the state, the law may establish compulsory state insurance of life, health and property of civil servants of certain categories.
Despite the fact that the law determines the possibility of compulsory state insurance of certain categories of civil servants, the legislation of the Russian Federation provides for the use of this type of insurance to ensure the social interests of citizens who do not belong to civil servants (the list of public positions is determined by the Register of public positions in the Russian Federation).
Thus, the object of compulsory state insurance can be recognized as persons employed in state organizations (that is, not belonging to the category of civil servants), if this is provided for by law. For example, the Law of the Russian Federation "On psychiatric care and guarantees of the rights of citizens in its provision" provides for compulsory state personal insurance of psychiatrists and other personnel involved in the provision of psychiatric care.
According to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Art. 969 of the Civil Code, compulsory state insurance is carried out at the expense of funds allocated for these purposes from the relevant budget to ministries and other federal executive bodies (insurers). Thus, those federal executive authorities are recognized as the insured for this type of insurance, to which these responsibilities are imposed by the relevant laws and to which the necessary funds are allocated from the relevant budgets to pay insurance premiums.