Where was the USSR in economics. The main features of the economic system in the USSR

Did you know that in the 1930s and 1940s, Soviet society offered the world a socio-economic innovation, on the basis of which almost 85% of the Western economy has been operating for 50 years? Are you aware that it was this Soviet innovation that ensured the West victory over the USSR in the Cold War and scientific and economic leadership in modern world? And by the way, do you know that the leadership of the USSR abandoned this innovation in the 60s?

When discussing the Soviet economy, the majority of people come up with images of queues, shortages of goods, senile at the helm of the country and the military-industrial complex "devouring" all budget money. And if we take into account how this whole epic ended for the USSR, many a priori consider planned economy ineffective, and the socialist mode of production is delusional. Someone immediately pays attention to the West and not understanding how the local economy really works, insists that we need a market, private property and other benefits of the "civilized" world. However, there are some very interesting nuances here that I want to tell you about.

Unfortunately, I didn't manage to fit everything into one post, so first I propose to consider those basic (and little-known) economic postulates on which this very innovation of the “Stalinist economy” was built (1928-1958)

By tradition, I give some conclusions at the very beginning:

The Soviet economy cannot be viewed as a whole. Chronologically and logically, it is divided into several stages: a) war communism; b) NEP; c) Stalinist economy; d) the Kosygin-Lieberman reforms; e) acceleration and restructuring.

The Stalinist economy (in addition to the socialization of property and a systemic measure in the form of labor) was based on the law of vertical integration, socialization of added value and an increase in the welfare of citizens.

The main goal of the socialist mode of production is to improve the welfare of citizens. Capitalist - maximizing profits per unit of time.

Under socialism, value added is socialized. Under capitalism, it is appropriated by individuals or groups of people.

It's worth starting with the fact that the Soviet period in the history of our country's economy breaks down into several stages... And these were such different stages that we should not speak in general about the Soviet economy, but about the models of the economy of individual periods. This fact is very important to understand. After all, many people here believe that everything that happened after the NEP was a continuation of Stalin's industrialization and collectivization. And this is fundamentally wrong, because the Stalinist economy is only part of the Soviet economy. Acceleration and perestroika under Gorbachev were also part of the Soviet economy. And equating the economy of Stalin and the economy of Gorbachev is at least reckless.

Initially (and not from a good life), the Bolsheviks had to go for the direct distribution of products without using money, which marked the transition to the policy of War Communism. This period lasted from January 1918 to March 1921. Since war communism did not meet the tasks of economic development in peaceful conditions, and the Civil War was on its way to its logical conclusion, a new phase began on March 14, 1921, which was called the NEP. I will not disassemble it, like the previous stage, but only indicate that the NEP was actually completed by 1928.

We will dwell in more detail on the next phase - the Stalinist economy, which covers the period from 1928 to 1958. I want to consider this period in detail for several reasons.

First, in the public view, it is the most controversial. Someone is infinitely in love with the world-famous effective manager, without going into the specifics of what he did and how he did it. Well, someone complains about “millions shot by Stalin personally”, points to the free labor of “50 million prisoners of the GULAG” and claims that it is this mustachioed bastard (Gazzayev) who is to blame for all the problems modern Russia since turned off the NEP.

Secondly ... but by the way, look at the tables.

As we can see, by 1928, after WWI, the Civil War, the intervention of the Entente and the NEP, the Russian economy lagged behind the economies of Western countries more than in 1913. Yosya described the situation very clearly and clearly in February 1931: “We are lagging behind from advanced countries for 50-100 years. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they will crush us. "

As a result of industrialization in 1927-1940. about 9000 new factories were built in the country, the total volume industrial products grew by 8 times, and according to this indicator, the USSR came second in the world after the United States. In 1941, the Great Patriotic War began, which we ended in Berlin and ... reached the pre-war level of production by 1948, simultaneously crediting and rebuilding the economy of future ATS partners (all of Eastern Europe). Let me remind you that in the next 10 years, in addition to the atomic bomb, we built the world's first nuclear power plant, five hydroelectric power plants, detonated a hydrogen bomb, launched the first satellite, built more than 600 enterprises in the CMEA countries, dug several canals, and so on.

I repeat, after WWII we reached the pre-war level of industrial production in less than 3 years. And this is after almost 3 years of the most severe occupation. And without outside help. I don't know who and how, but personally, I always had a question, how did we manage it? If the economy established in the 30s and 40s was unsustainable and ineffective, how did we achieve these indicators?

Forerunner of vertical integration

The socialist economy, as we know, is based on the principle of socializing the means of production. A plus relations of production are based on cooperation and mutual assistance (at least that's what they say). We will not talk about this, because there is a lot of philosophy. Let us dwell on the fact that the socialist economy, incl. is built on the basis of the law of vertical integration, according to which profit is derived only from the final product.

What other law is this, you ask? Let me give you an example. We have a furniture production. In order to assemble a cabinet, you need processed raw materials (MDF, glass), fittings, assembly, delivery. In modern Russian economy all these things are usually handled by different firms that are not related to each other in any way. Firm X supplies glass with its own mark-up of 10-15% (+ taxes), Firm X2 - MDF with a mark-up of 10-15% (+ taxes), Firm X3 - accessories with a mark-up (+ taxes), etc. As a result, the cost of the cabinet that Firm P assembles and sells is slowly but surely growing. After all, Firm P has to buy all these materials, in which a couple of "ends" have already been laid.

However, this is not all. Our wardrobe needs to be sold, and for this it is exhibited on the podium in the store, which belongs to another Firm G. Taking into account the Russian specifics, the store winds another 80-100% on the wardrobe. As a result, we have a wardrobe with a price of 50,000 rubles at a real cost of 20,000 - 25,000 rubles. For a capitalist economy, this is a normal situation, since in it, each link of production seeks to extract the maximum profit per unit of time.

What we have? Firstly, we have a brazen parasite at the end of the chain, because of which the price of the cabinet doubles. He makes no effort. It doesn't produce anything. He stupidly has excess profits, due to which there is a significant rise in the cost of production. Secondly, our products become uncompetitive in comparison with, for example, Belarusian products, where rental rates and salaries are lower, and materials are cheaper. Thirdly, the price of a wardrobe hits the pocket of ordinary citizens and reduces their well-being. It is clear that this problem concerns not only the closet, but everything and everyone in our economy.

But as this production could be organized in a vertically integrated complex? We would still have all Firms X, X2, X3, etc. But they would be united under a single holding, in which all intermediate links would transfer their products to Firm P at cost. And Firm P would already be selling its products with the added value it needs. No one would profit from intermediate and raw materials. All profits would come from the final product. Can you imagine how much the efficiency of an enterprise and the economy as a whole would increase?

You ask, what then will all firms in this chain live on? They don't make a profit. It's simple. Having the minimum rental rates, which are transferred in favor of the state, and cheap raw materials, the added value from the final product will be redistributed throughout the holding.

You say that the profit may simply not be enough. This is not true. Let me explain with a simple example. 1000 lettuce seeds cost 5 rubles. 75-80% of these seeds will germinate into a healthy plant, for which it will be possible to gain from 60 to 150 rubles in retail. 1 seed can bring in revenue 12,000 times more than its cost. Do you feel the difference? Think for yourself, which is better for the country's economy - to sell 100 tons of aluminum at 60 rubles per kilogram or to make 1 Il-78 out of it for 3.5 billion rubles? Where will you earn more?

So, it is much more profitable to produce high value added products than to trade in raw materials... After all, its added value is tens, and sometimes hundreds of times more. Plus, when you create it, a cartoon effect is launched. After all, about 90-100 related enterprises are working to build one aircraft. And these are jobs. And this is the demand for qualified personnel, which inevitably entails investment in science and education.

For a better understanding of what vertical integration means for the economy, science and state defense capabilities, I will give you an example. V market economy there are activities that are "extremely ineffective." For example, the production of spacecraft. (And in general, space itself does not bring much money, unless you send communication and navigation satellites there). To simplify everything as much as possible, then it can be divided into 3 parts: 1st, 2nd and 3rd engines, launch vehicles, orbital ships. Separately, as practice has shown, only engines survive.

NPO Energomash is actively pushing RD-180 and NK-33 to any Lockheeds with Martins and Boeings, and due to this it lives well. RSC Energia, which developed the Soyuz, Progress and Buran spacecraft, bends smoothly, since the bourgeoisie did not resist the delivery vehicles. Not better story and with TsSKB-Progress. Analogies can be drawn with our civil and military aviation. The same song was in 2008-2009 in Pikalevo at the cement factories. Knowing the result, I think you will be able to answer the question of how complete the theory of the market sanitizing function is, due to which “ineffective” companies die off.

And if it were a vertically integrated complex, then there is a high probability that everything would be fine. The low profitability of some industries would be compensated by synergy with others, since at the end of the chain there would be a quality product with high added value. As a result: the country would have a full-fledged space program and new production facilities; science has an incentive to development; people have work. Or do you think we don't fucking need a space program?

I will make a small remark. In the 30-50s, the law of vertical integration had not yet been fully implemented. The intermediate chains still had the opportunity to receive a minimum profit (3-4%), and all the added value was immediately appropriated by the society. Moreover, then there was no such thing as vertical integration. The discovery and scientific substantiation of it was made by a team of scientists headed by professor of Moscow State University S.S. Gubanov in the 90s, while studying the Soviet economy of that time.

Well, the leadership of the USSR, back in the 60s, decided to abandon this path of development. First, we split the production chains, allowing them to extract the maximum profit at each redistribution. Then, in the 90s, they set a course for complete decentralization with total privatization. That is, we put at the forefront not the efficiency of the country's economy as a whole, but the efficiency of individual enterprises.

Do you know what structure Samsung, Cisco, Melkosoft, Toyota, Volkswagen, Apple, General Electric, Shell, Boeing, etc. have? Do you know what you owe the current economic leadership of the United States, Germany, Japan, China? In 1970, large Western vertically integrated corporations owned 48.8% of total capital, 51.9% - profits; in 2005, their share rose to 83.2 and 86%, respectively. Their share in exports, savings, R&D and R&D, and innovation is also comparable. This is not surprising, because they concentrate the best production, technological, research and management resources. Unlimited lines of credit, the lobby in governments.

V developed countries the economy of the corporations is completely dominated, not the small businesses that they successfully impose on us. All of them largest companies operate on the basis of the law of vertical integration, on which the Stalinist economy was built and which we have abandoned.

Added value

However, back to Stalinist USSR... In addition to the law of vertical integration in the USSR (and this is very important) socialized ... added value... Yes, added value is the holy of holies of capitalism, for which it exists, socialized. If in a capitalist economy all profit was appropriated by an individual capitalist or a group of them, and society received horseradish all over its face, then in the USSR it was socialized and went to reduce the cost of production, capital investment, free public goods (free medicine, education, sports, culture, compensation for air travel). That is, it was aimed at improving the welfare of citizens. After all, the goal of a socialist economy is to improve the welfare of citizens, and not to maximize profits.

How did it work? Let's go back to our furniture factory. The relevant ministry, together with sectoral committees and specific enterprises, formed a plan, which determined a number of target indicators (about 30), incl. volume of products and their price. Then the production process was launched.

The whole pricing process looked like this. Enterprise-1 (P-1) sold intermediate products (for example, MDF) to Enterprise-2 (P-2) at a price that consisted of the cost price + 3-4% of profit P-1 (p1). P-1 used this profit to reward employees, pay for their vacations, and improve their financial situation. The state also levied a tax on this profit.

P-2, after the necessary manipulations with the goods (made a cabinet from MDF), gave it for sale through the state trade system at the price p1 + cost price + 3-4%. This price was called the enterprise's wholesale price (p2). Further, the state imposed the so-called turnover tax on this p2. Turnover tax was the very value added that was appropriated for the benefit of the whole society. The result was the wholesale price of the industry (p3). Well, on top of this price was imposed 0.5-1%, of which the activities of the state trade system were financed. As a result, p3 + 0.5-1% was called the retail price.

For example, we made a refrigerator. Its cost + our profit of 3% - 10 rubles. The state imposed on him a turnover tax of 25 rubles + 50 kopecks was spent on ensuring the trading system. Total retail price refrigerator - 35.5 rubles. And these 25 rubles of turnover tax went not to someone's pocket, but to the whole society.

Thus, the household cells received a minimum of profit, which was used to provide material incentives for the cell's employees. The main part of the added value through the turnover tax was socialized and went to free education, housing, medicine, sports, recreation, compensation for railway and air transportation. And also for the modernization of fixed assets and means of production, the construction of new enterprises and the implementation of infrastructure projects. Let me remind you that machines, land, buildings, etc. did not belong to separate enterprises, but were owned by the people. As you can see, no private planes, dozens of personal cars, castles and elite prostitutes. All to people.

Improving the well-being of citizens

Since the goal of the socialist economy was to increase the welfare of citizens, the priority for the state and enterprises was to provide people with everything they needed. At first, it was work and food. Next - clothing and housing. Then - medicine, education, household appliances. The system was not interested in profit, but in the number of products.

For example, refrigerators have appeared. It was decided to include refrigerators in the list of goods provided to the population. This meant that plans were being placed to develop models of refrigerators and build factories to manufacture them. At the stage of production development - quite naturally - there were not enough refrigerators. There was a shortage. But as the development progressed, production reached the planned level and the deficit disappeared. But a new product appeared - televisions and the cycle was repeated.

However, the well-being of citizens increased not only due to an increase in gross indicators. Reducing the cost of production played an important role. For example, a cabinet has a cost price of 10,000 rubles and an enterprise's wholesale price of 10,500 rubles. How to increase the profit of the enterprise when planned prices? There are 2 ways: a) to reduce the cost; b) increase the amount of products produced.

That is, if in the first year the profit from one cabinet was 500 rubles, then, for example, in the second year the team was able to reduce the cost to 9000 rubles and produced several more cabinets in excess of the plan. As a result, the profit of the enterprise increased by at least 1,500 rubles. However, so that the staff of the enterprise does not get too hungry, the state annually revised prices downward. As a result, the products were gradually becoming cheaper, which means that the costs of citizens for its purchase decreased. In fact, there was competition for reducing production costs and for introducing methods to improve production efficiency.

The main goal of the Stalinist economy was to improve the welfare of the population, which consisted of: a) constant and planned reduction in production costs; b) expansion of free public goods; c) reducing the working time of citizens. And this goal was achieved by increasing the overall efficiency of the national economy, and not its individual enterprises.

The Soviet economy reached its pre-war level of production by 1948-1949. However, it was obvious that it was impossible to endlessly engage in the production of means of production (category A). Moreover, it contradicted the very idea of ​​socialism. After all, the maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of the entire society required the production of category B goods (consumer goods). This problem had to be addressed. Moreover, it should be decided taking into account the beginning of a new round of scientific and technological progress. All this required improving the work of the socialist economy and changing the priorities of its development.

So how did the Soviet economy change after Stalin's death? What decisions did the Soviet leaders make? And how did they see the future of the USSR?

And again the conclusions:

Since the 60s, the economy of the USSR has purposefully moved away from planning system to a planless one, which led it first to capitalist cost accounting, and then to complete disorganization.

The socialist economy (1928-1953) prioritizes the efficiency of the national economy of the entire country. "Revisionist" economics is the efficiency of an individual enterprise.

The key reason for the collapse of the USSR was the growth of an uncontrolled bureaucracy and its desire to preserve and expand its privileges.

Khrushchev: MTS, virgin lands, state farms

The starting point for fundamental changes in the socialist structure of the Soviet Union was the 20th Party Congress on February 25, 1956. In it, Khrushchev slandered Stalin and the fundamental ideas of socialism. This congress is the starting point for criticism of the Soviet system. This congress is the beginning of the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. This congress is the beginning of the undermining of the USSR from within. This congress is still a source of dirt for the struggle against the ideas of socialism and communism, and simply for criticizing our country.

Because the topic of the post concerns only economics and industrial relations, we will not consider on specific examples how the XX Congress influenced the ideology, internal party struggle, foreign policy, attitude towards political prisoners, etc., but let's go straight to Khrushchev's initiatives.

Khrushchev's main activities were focused on agriculture... Reason: he considered himself a great specialist in this matter. What decisions did our agronomist make? First of all, worth mentioning about the MTS reform(1957-1959 years). MTS are machine and tractor stations that cultivated land and reaped crops on collective farms.

Under Stalin, collective and state farms did not have their own heavy equipment: tractors, combines, reapers, cars, etc. And Stalin insisted that in no case should they be transferred to collective farms. Here's what he wrote in 1952: “... offering the sale of MTS to collective farms, comrades. Sanina and Venzher are taking a step backward towards backwardness and are trying to turn back the wheel of history ... This means driving into large losses and ruining collective farms, undermining the mechanization of agriculture, and slowing down the rates of collective farm production "... A similar experience took place at the beginning of 1930, when, at the suggestion of a group of collective farmer shock workers, the equipment was transferred to them. However, the very first check showed the inexpediency of this decision, and at the end of 1930 the decision was canceled.

Why can't MTS be transferred into the ownership of collective farms? There are several reasons for this. At first, efficient use technicians ... Let us assume that one combine is enough for an average collective farm to have time to harvest. But no collective farm will dare to limit itself to one combine, because in the event of a breakdown nothing good will happen. The crop will die. And someone will have to answer for the breakdown of the restroom. Therefore, such a collective farm will buy 2 harvesters for insurance. Thus, if the Stalinist MTS served 100 collective farms, then after the transfer of equipment it will be necessary to have a total of 200 combines. The Stalinist MTS, with a reserve of 10-15%, could have only 110-115 combines and cope with harvesting in all 100 collective farms.

What does it mean? Formally, we will see an unprecedented growth in the production of tractors. All this will be reflected in the figures of the official statistics. Far-reaching conclusions will be drawn about the growth and effectiveness of everyone and everything. But in fact, this is an ineffective spending of funds that could go, for example, to the construction of schools and hospitals. Plus, you need to understand that Khrushchev forced the collective farms of MTS to buy out, and this is not only serious one-time costs, but also an item in the budget (after all, equipment needs to be maintained and modernized). How can the collective farms cover such losses? Only by raising prices for final products.

Previously, the state could force MTS to reduce the cost of land cultivation by means of prices. The growth in the number of equipment at MTS and the unjustified increase in the cost of this equipment affected the costs of MTS and their profits. They could only increase it by increasing their efficiency and the effectiveness of their technique. That is, they were the economic controller of agricultural machinery factories: they did not allow them to produce ineffective equipment, and to produce more equipment than necessary. And with the liquidation of the MTS, the production of agricultural machinery in the USSR began to senselessly increase, increasing the cost of food.

Second and much more important point – with the transfer of ownership of MTS, the collective farm actually becomes an independent producer ... This is a violation of one of fundamental principles socialist economy. Indeed, in this scenario, the collective farms become the owners of the means of production. Those. they would find themselves in an exceptional position, which no other enterprise in the country had. This would further alienate collective farm property from public property and would lead not to an approach to socialism, but, on the contrary, to a distance from it. The collective farm became an independent producer. What is the motivation of an independent manufacturer? Only profit. And it is logical to assume that such a collective farm will begin to dictate its conditions on the prices of products and on their volume.

In a letter to Sanina and Venzher, Stalin pointed out that it is necessary to gradually exclude the surplus of collective farm production from the system of commodity circulation and include them in the system of product exchange between state industry and collective farms. In the end, everything was done the other way around.

The next initiative of Khrushchev, put forward in December 1958, was the cutback of personal subsidiary plots ... Formally, almost the entire rural population of the country was united in collective farms. But in fact, only 20% of the income of the peasants comes from working on the collective farm, and the rest of the profit comes from the "gray" sector - from the trade in unaccounted products produced by collective farmers on personal subsidiary plots, and its sale to state procurers. As a result, Khrushchev accused Malenkov of sympathizing with the petty-bourgeois tendencies in agriculture, got him removed and carried out another reform.

What is the logic of this reform? In Anti-Dühring, Engels wrote that in the course of the proletarian revolution all means of production must be socialized. This must be done in order to eliminate commodity production. In principle, this is the right decision, but there is one caveat. Engels, speaking of the liquidation of commodity production, has in mind those countries where capitalism and the concentration of production are sufficiently developed not only in industry, but also in agriculture. Such a country, at the time of writing of Anti-Duhring, was only Great Britain.

There was nothing like it in France, Holland, or Germany. Yes, capitalism developed in the countryside, but it was represented by a class of small and medium-sized producers in the countryside. There is no need to talk about our country. The course towards "farming" was taken only under Stolypin, a couple of years before the First World War. You yourself know what happened next.

In September 1952, in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," Stalin wrote: “The opinion of other would-be Marxists, who think that one should, perhaps, take power and go to the expropriation of small and medium-sized producers in the countryside and socialize their means of production, cannot be considered an answer either. The Marxists also cannot take this senseless and criminal path, for such a path would undermine any possibility of the victory of the proletarian revolution, would throw the peasantry for a long time into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat " ... Lenin wrote about this in his cooperative plan.

The data presented in the analytical note of the agrarian economist N.Ya. Itskov from April 1962 are also interesting. It indicates that the personal household plots of collective farmers at the end of 1959 produced from 50 to 80% of the gross output of milk, meat, potatoes and vegetables, eggs of the collective farm sector. He argued that the state was not ready to take over the supply of the population, which made up half of the country's inhabitants. Why did Khrushchev ignore all this? What was he guided by while carrying out the reform?

The grain problem was not resolved either. The development of virgin lands contradicted the decisions of the September 1953 plenum. Because decisions were made on it to intensify agricultural production, and plowing virgin lands was an extensive method of farming. However, it should be admitted that the average annual grain harvest in 1954-1958 still increased and amounted to 113.2 million tons against 80.9 million in 1949-1953. They continued to grow in the 60s. But the "development of virgin lands" was superimposed on a host of other decisions (enlargement of collective farms, cutting back of subsidiary farms, certification, transfer of MTS, voluntaristic decisions about what and where to plant), which did not fully resolve the grain issue. The situation was aggravated by the growth of urbanization: during the period from 60 to 64, almost 7 million people moved to cities. In this situation, virgin lands not only did not strengthen the country's grain balance, but also led (along with other factors) to a decrease in production and the need to purchase grain abroad.

Revisionist coup: the Kosygin-Lieberman reform.

Voluntaristic decisions in the agrarian sphere led to the fact that within two or three years agriculture became a commodity. Its cost price rose sharply, which forced in 1962 for the first time in post-war years raise prices for all of its products. And in 1963, the crisis of commercial agricultural production led to the fact that for the first time after 1934 the USSR was forced to start purchasing grain abroad. However, the matter was not limited to agriculture. The next "goal" of the reformers was industry and the system of managing the national economy.

The destabilization of economic processes in industry began with the economic reform of 1957-1959. Its essence can be reduced to replacing a centralized management system with a geographically distributed system ... A number of all-Union and Union-republican sectoral industrial ministries were abolished, their enterprises were transferred to the direct subordination of economic councils. The planning function was also destabilized: long-term planning was transferred to the State Economic Council, and the current one - to the State Planning Committee.

For a better understanding of what all this meant, I will explain the following thing. For example, you need to automate all workplaces in the industry. Make your production more capital intensive and more efficient. On the scale of the economy of the entire country, this will have a colossal effect: the labor force will be freed up, it will be possible to reduce the working day while maintaining current salaries, more people will strive to get a quality education, this will stimulate the development of science and technology, etc. Obviously, this is not a one-day job. To implement all this, you will need a development strategy for 8-10 years, as well as the ability to act by order for the benefit of the entire national economy.

Such a task will require the involvement of both capital and the labor of a large number of enterprises. At the same time, enterprises are not always interested in the implementation of such initiatives. The reasons can be very diverse: there is no capital, no personnel, no time, not interested, etc. As a result, you are faced with a dilemma: either the development of the economy of the whole country depends on the plans of individual economic units (enterprises), or the development of economic units will be coordinated with the interests of the entire economy .

In the capitalist system (i.e., in modern economy) it all depends on the specific enterprises. It is understandable, since in this system, the main priority is to maximize profits, and the main indicator is the growth of companies' capitalization. The good of individual companies is an axiom and a sacred law. In the Soviet system until 1957, the priority was the growth of the well-being of citizens, which was impossible without the development of the entire national economy.

In 1957, introducing the system of economic councils, Khrushchev actually made the development of the economy of the entire country dependent on the plans of individual business entities ... Now plans came down not from the all-Union central ministries, but, on the contrary, went to them. In fact, the development of the plan began to begin at enterprises, to continue in the Council of National Economy and in the State Planning Committee of a particular republic, and only then did it get into the State Planning Committee of the USSR. And regional barriers were added to the intersectoral barriers.

Could the USSR have been able to develop and implement the GOELRO plan in the 1920s, had it awaited electrification plans from each enterprise? Would industrialization have been carried out if the country's leadership had been waiting for plans from individual economic entities? How quickly would the mechanization of agriculture be introduced if the USSR had been waiting for the initiative of private traders? I think the answer is obvious.

The development of the country's economy, the growth of the well-being of its citizens and scientific progress are possible only with the centralized (state, sectoral and inter-sectoral corporations) accumulation and redistribution of resources. Neither an individual enterprise nor a separate economic council can provide anything of the kind. Reform 1957-1959 took planning away from the dominance of national economic interests into the dominance of the interests of enterprises and the interests of regional elites.

The reform of 1957-1959. the question of what interests will dominate in economic policy state - a system or element, whole or private, national economy or individual enterprise. The final answer in favor of private interest was given in 1965 by Kosygin.

Kosygin was well aware that the country was developing successfully only on paper. In fact, the plans were fulfilled only on a “shaft” basis, while the cost of the product was growing and its quality was decreasing. Manufacturers were chasing improvements in their departmental performance. End consumer and volumes products sold they were of little interest.

As a result, a solution was found - the enterprises were transferred to self-financing. The main criteria for the efficiency of the enterprise were the indicators of profit and profitability of production. Planned indicators were reduced from 30 to 9. Enterprises were allowed to determine the number of their employees, wholesale prices, average wages, to attract for the development of production own funds and loans, create incentive funds. In general, it turned out to be a typical capitalist enterprise, but in a socialist system.

Stalin is involuntarily recalled again: “If we take profitability not from the point of view of individual enterprises or industries and not in the context of one year, but from the point of view of the entire national economy and in the context of, say, 10-15 years, which would be the only correct approach to the issue, then temporary and the fragile profitability of individual enterprises or branches of production cannot be compared with the highest form of durable and permanent profitability that the actions of the law give us systematic development of the national economy and planning of the national economy, saving us from periodic economic crises that destroy the national economy and inflicting colossal material damage to society, and providing us with continuous growth of the national economy at its high rates " .

As a result of the new reform, the short-term interest of individual enterprises was placed at the forefront. And they were motivated only by extracting profit in all possible ways and increasing the material incentive fund. This inevitably led to inflation, since profit could only be used to increase wages. Wages were growing, and its supply of commodities lagged significantly behind. Already in the mid-60s, a “monetary overhang” began to form, which would turn into galloping inflation and denomination in the 90s.

The transfer of enterprises to cost accounting meant the subordination of the entire national economy to the interests of individual economic units. We rolled back to 1921-1928, when there was NEP in the country, when self-financing of trusts and syndicates operated in industry and agriculture. That is, the "innovative" reform of 1965-1967 was essentially a return to the management practice of 30 years ago.

The system of price reduction was also covered with a "copper basin". Last time we gave an example with a cabinet worth 10,000 rubles. In the Stalinist economy, in order to increase the profits of an enterprise, it was necessary either to produce more cabinets or to reduce the cost per unit of output. "Kosyginskaya reform" has turned everything upside down - now it has become unprofitable to reduce the cost of the cabinet. After all, the profit was formed as a share of the cost. That is, the higher the cost, the greater the profit. 10% of 10,000 rubles - 1,000 rubles of profit. And 10% of 15,000 rubles - 1,500 rubles of profit. This means that we must strive not to reduce, but to increase the cost of production. Any cost reduction is a blow to the company's pocket. From here went, and then covered the entire economy of the USSR, the practice of speculative overpricing and falsification of products.

Self-supporting prices have gotten out of control and government controlled, they destroyed the manageability and balance of the Soviet economy, made any planning impossible, distorted ideas about the priorities and prospects for the country's development, led to an increase in the commodity deficit and difficulties in consumer market. The economy of the entire country became subordinated to the interests of short-term profit, which inevitably led to its disorganization. .

More importantly, it has dealt a blow to industrial democracy. Now it doesn't matter how competent you are. It doesn't matter what your productivity is. It doesn't matter what innovations you can and are ready to bring to production. "Yes, no one gives a shit." By killing the price-cutting mechanism, there was no motivation to work better and harder. The motivation to create is gone. The majority began to care about stable and quiet work with planned increases in positions and salaries.

But the clan-like isolation of the “red directors” and “bureaucracy”, interested in preserving the status quo, began to appear. They were the social base that stood for the further decentralization of the economy, the subordination of the state plan to contracts of self-supporting enterprises, the abolition of the turnover tax and the planned procedure for the withdrawal of enterprise profits to the state budget. In 20-25 years, these people and their children will initiate “acceleration” and “restructuring”. And in the 90s they will become today's oligarchs, effective managers and managers.

The next 15 years before the "acceleration" were marked by an oil rally. After the Yom Kippur War, hydrocarbon prices skyrocketed. This contributed to an even greater stagnation of the Soviet economy. The rise in oil revenues has masked real problems for almost 15 years. However, in the 80s, prices collapsed, and along with them, a few years later, the Soviet Union broke down.

Since the 1960s, the restoration of capitalism has been in full swing in the USSR. The "reformers" were able to replace the formula of development with the formula of a rollback to "market" foundations, presenting it as innovation and a path to a great tomorrow. It was from the 60s that the period of inefficiency and stagnation of the Soviet economy began. But the reason for the stagnation was not the "socialist mode of production", which has been so actively vilified over the past 25 years. The reason was the disorganization of the national economy for the sake of market forces. It was the incipient decentralization, the transition to cost accounting and the maximization of cost accounting profit that brought us to the 90s. And the final point of this whole epic was the privatization of enterprises of the national economy, and the subsequent legalization of private ownership of the means of production, land, enterprises and infrastructure.

Sources:

Industrial production in the USSR (1913, 1928-1952) - http://istmat.info/files/uploads/36 634 / rgae_1562.33.1185_22-33.pdf;

Foreign trade of the USSR for 20 years 1918-1937 Statistical collection - http://istmat.info/node/22114;

Brief statistical collection - http://istmat.info/files/uploads/36 699 / narodnoe_hozyaystvo_sssr_za_1913-195 5_gg.pdf;

Chebolization of the country (about Samsung) - http://malchish.org/index.php?option=co m_content & task = view & id = 128 & Itemid = 31.

Antonov M.F. Capitalism will never happen in Russia! M., 2005.

Bachurin A.V. Profit and turnover tax in the USSR. M., 1955.

Dikkut V. Restoration of capitalism in the USSR. 1988.

Grandberg Z. Neo-industrial paradigm and the law of vertical integration.

Gubanov S.S. Sovereign breakthrough. M., 2012.

Gubanov S.S. Kosygin reform - http://institutiones.com/personalit ies / 672-kosiginskaya-reforma.html;

Gubanov S.S. Lenin's course towards state capitalism - http://behaviorist-socialist-ru.blogspo t.ru/2013/09/blog-post_2203.html;

Zverev A.G. National income and finance of the USSR. M, 1961.

Katasonov V.Yu. Stalin's economy in the history of the USSR - http://ruskline.ru/video/2014/02/10/eko nomika_stalina_v_istorii_sssr;

Larin Yu. Private capital in the USSR. M., 1927.

Molyakov D.S. Profit and profitability industrial enterprise... M., 1967. - http://www.library.fa.ru/files/Moly akov / Molyakov33.pdf;

Naimushin V. “Post-industrial” illusions or systemic neo-industrialization: the choice of modern Russia.

Since the 90s, a myth has been wandering around Russia that the main reason for the collapse of the USSR was an ineffective socialist economy. They built, built, built and built something so wretched that it was impossible to reform, but it was easier to destroy at the root and create a new progressive market economy.

I will not "load" you with numbers, although there will be numbers. But these numbers will be very few. Let's just speculate first.

Well-known facts, which no one disputes today, relate to the period from the formation of the USSR to the death of Stalin. The growth was absolutely fantastic. But after the death of the leader of the peoples, as the liberal legend says, the economy began to slow down, during Brezhnev's time there was stagnation, and Gorbachev took over a country with an almost destroyed unprofitable economy. And Mikhail Sergeevich had no other choice but to start perestroika, which ended you know how. The absolutely inevitable happened - the USSR collapsed, first of all, under the weight of insoluble economic problems.

Let's remember what the USSR was like during the "stagnation". Socialist country, the second economy in the world. What else? The USSR headed the entire world socialist movement. And what is "headed"?

Several years ago, after some of the former republics of the USSR began to make material claims against Russia, a huge number of posts appeared on the Internet with tables “who fed whom to whom”. I will not reproduce these tables, since they have nothing to do with my topic.

The system of world socialism included 25 countries. Another 30 countries were listed as “embarking on the path of socialism”.

How did the USSR trade with the socialist countries? On June 2, 1982, the Polish newspaper "Tribuna lyudu" published an interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission under the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland, the Government Commissioner for Coordination economic relations with the Soviet Union S. Vylupek.

Here's one snippet:

We pay 115 rubles for one ton of oil purchased in the USSR. We have to pay $ 250 for one ton in a capitalist country. Thus, we will pay about 1.5 billion rubles for 13 million tons of oil this year. In the case of imports from Western countries, this would cost us $ 3.2 billion.

So not only oil was sold to the socialist countries. Only for deliveries to Poland - this is a whole book with a list of goods that were sold "at fraternal prices."

And there was also “brotherly help”. It's generally free. Aid from the USSR and Lend-Lease aid from the United States are two different types of aid. It is not clear why Lend-Lease is called help.

How much the Soviet economy cost such fraternal trade and fraternal aid, today it is impossible to calculate - it is hundreds of billions of dollars annually. In general, the amounts are clearly astronomical. And at the same time, the USSR remained the second economy in the world.

Another interesting figure is external debt THE USSR. In 1985, it was $ 29 billion. The US debt (for comparison) for the same year is $ 1,823 billion. The United States traded with its allies at world prices. AND gratuitous aid He didn’t show his own people - only commodity-money relations.

Now let's talk about the growth of GNP (in the USSR there was not GDP, but GNP). I wanted to draw a graph, but the graph will look more like a very tall bar. Look at the numbers - you yourself will understand everything.

Economy of the USSR in tables

In the table, the GNP in 1928 is taken as 100%. And then the change in GNP over the years.

These data are from official statistical reference books. There is this data in the book of the American economist and leading foreign expert on the economy of the USSR Alex Nouve.

And now about the "problem" years, in more detail:

Indeed, "slowing down". For the USSR, growth of 4% was considered a slowdown in economic growth. Remind me, by what percentage is Russia growing today? The USA in 2017 “grew” by about three percent... And they rejoice at the really powerful economic growth.

Of course, the Soviet economy had problems. The problems are serious, but not fatal.

Imagine that you are a farmer. Your farm has 100 cows and 25 chickens. Note that cows are not superfluous at all - they provide milk, meat and profit to the farm. But there are not enough chickens. Skew. It would be necessary to have, for harmony, a ratio of 1: 4 in favor of birds. And you, in order to modernize, take and ... butcher all the cattle and all the poultry. You give the meat to your neighbor not even for money, but for, say, a voucher.

And then you are surprised ... And the cunning neighbor begins to prove to you that the farm was ineffective, everything was done correctly, especially regarding the exchange of meat for vouchers. Have you received a different value instead of one value? Proving that the values ​​of "meat" and "voucher" are the same is very problematic. So you need to prove that the whole farm was rubbish.

So it happened with the Soviet economy. We were robbed because in the USSR ... there was an “ineffective economy”.

Share the entry

Discussion: 4 comments

What did Putin say about the production of goods in the USSR? Have you sold galoshes to Africa? Have you read about postscripts in the USSR? It will be interesting ... I promise.

To answer

1. Do you think that only galoshes were produced in the USSR? I not only read about the postscripts, I identified them. Not everything in the USSR was cloudless. But, this was not a reason to take and destroy everything.

   To answer

Unfortunately, both "reds" and "whites" suffer from one common drawback - a lack of objectivity.
Yes, there was an increase in production, but production was NOT NECESSARY.
Almost everything that was produced was unnecessary.
Unnecessary footwear - having fulfilled the plan of a shoe factory, bulldozers its products into the ground, and bought the "Salamander".
Unwanted clothes - everyone tried to buy ADIDAS.
Unnecessary open-hearth furnaces - low-grade steel was melted in them and the last of them was just closed.
Unnecessary agricultural machinery - the combine worked on average 18 days a year and after three years fell apart.
And so on and so forth.
But the main thing is not even this - having won the Second World War, the USSR buried in mass graves at the same time the RUSSIAN MENTALITY for which the main thing is "First think about the Motherland, and then about yourself."
And there were “patriots” for whom “Motherland may be UGLY”.
And this is precisely what caused the collapse of the USSR.

To answer

1. Let's, for objectivity, separate flies from cutlets. Was practically everything that was produced unnecessary? Oh really? Did all the citizens of the USSR go to "Salamander" or to "Adidas"? Yes, God be with you, if you pretend to be objective. How much was this adidas salamander? And the rest lived barefoot and naked? Well, write nonsense. What are unnecessary open-hearth furnaces? How many open-hearth furnaces were there in the USSR? And were there other methods of steel production in the USSR? Where did the USSR get high-grade steel for the same tanks that they made in huge quantities? Did they make spaceships of low-grade steel? Again some kind of stupidity. All steel was made in the USSR. And I know this for sure, because in my younger years I did not work at a metallurgical plant. A set of cliches that are very far from objectivity. And so on and so forth.
   As for “think about your Motherland earlier”, then I agree with you 100%. The fish was rotten from the head and very quickly almost everything was rotten. As the unforgettable professor Preobrazhensky used to say: “The devastation is not in the closets. Devastation - it begins in the minds. "

   To answer

The command and control system of the USSR was based on the socialist doctrine. The attractiveness of socialism as a theory and practice is due to the fact that it undertakes to solve two problems that have worried mankind from time immemorial: the eradication of inequality, the conscious regulation of the life of society and each person individually by some supreme organs of society. The main ideological forerunners of socialism in European culture are considered to be two famous scientists of the late Middle Ages - the English philosopher and statesman T. More and the Italian philosopher, Dominican monk T. Campanella, who were the authors of social utopias about harmonious and happy societies that do not know private property.

The socialist doctrine found its most consistent embodiment in the political and socio-economic structure of the USSR.

Soviet ideologists made great efforts to prove that the economic system of the USSR is based on public property and serves to raise the material and spiritual well-being of every citizen. But in fact, the fundamental principle of the organization of the Soviet economy, which directly followed from the socialist doctrine in its Marxist-Leninist version, consisted in the complete, total nationalization of the national economy.

This means that only the state was the owner of production resources and only the state could make economic decisions. All economic life was subject to the administrative orders of the authorities. Throughout Soviet history, the state sought to establish an all-encompassing and all-pervading control over the economy, and deviations from this trend occurred only when the vices of over-bureaucratization began to undermine the stability of the government itself. In this system, there was no place for a person as an independent maximizing economic subject; workers were completely alienated from the ownership and control of the means of production.

Soviet state socialism did not recognize private property, the market, and market self-regulation. Soviet ideologists associated only exploitation, crises and the "decay of capitalism" with the market organization of economic activity. However, the most cruel oppression of man was the lot of the Soviet system, in which material and social benefits were redistributed using non-economic methods in favor of the party-bureaucratic elite, the “nomenklatura”.

The omnipotence of the state in the economy and other spheres of life and management exclusively with the help of bureaucratic methods make it possible to define the Soviet system as command-administrative and totalitarian and distinguish it from numerous authoritarian countries of the modern world, where state control is limited to the political sphere.

The totalitarian nature of the Soviet economy and the denial of the market logically resulted in the second principle of organizing the national economy - planning. It occupied a particularly "honorable" place in Soviet ideology, since it was declared an instrument of crisis-free, balanced and dynamic economic development capable of ensuring the historical victory of socialism over capitalism. It is not difficult to see that the planning principle was the practical embodiment of the socialist idea of ​​economic management from a single center.

The state plan was a set of mandatory orders of government bodies addressed to specific enterprises and organizations of the national economy and regulating the range and volume of production, prices and other aspects of their economic activities.

Socialist planning was as follows. On the basis of party attitudes and an analysis of the economic situation, the central state bodies made economic decisions that were binding on the executor and monitored the implementation of decisions. The main planning document was a five-year plan containing a list of tasks for the production and sale of products in the sectoral and regional sections. In compiling this document, the state proceeded not only from objective economic needs and criteria, but also from political and socio-economic tasks set by the top leadership. Based on the five-year plan, the economic management bodies worked out tasks for all hierarchical levels down to the individual enterprise.

This determined the fundamental feature of economic activity within the framework of the Soviet system: decision-makers were obliged to be guided by state planning targets, and not by economic considerations of maximizing profits. Prices for raw materials and finished products, wages of employees, terms of sale and all other economic criteria, as a rule, did not influence the decisions of directors of enterprises and other business leaders. Their the main task consisted in the implementation of the plan.

For example, prices did not fulfill any informational or balancing functions inherent in them in market economy, and served mainly for measuring and accounting for products produced, because many planned targets were given in value terms. In the consumer market, prices were also strictly set by the state, and manufacturers or sellers had no right to change them even if there was a sharp discrepancy between supply and demand. Retail prices were constant and applied generally throughout the country. Therefore, they were often indicated directly on the product - they were printed, embossed on metal, etc.

There was no place or competition in the Soviet system. It was declared one of the main vices of capitalism, leading to the waste of material resources, and was purposefully eradicated - for example, by combating "duplication" production facilities, i.e. the release of the same products at different enterprises. In addition, the concentration of production was encouraged - the creation large enterprises- to save specific costs. All this turned into an unusually high degree of monopolization of the Soviet economy and the dictate of the producer over the consumer, completely deprived of the right to choose.

Socialist planning responded to the Soviet post-revolutionary Marxist idea of ​​organizing the economy as a single factory. If all mines, factories and shops belong to the state, then why do we need money and prices in settlements between them? Does the owner of a capitalist enterprise allow the relationship of purchase and sale between the shops of his plant? The Soviet leadership was unable to implement the idea of ​​the economy as a single factory simply due to the technical difficulties of managing a huge economy, but it is fully consistent with the spirit Marxist theory, and in the years of the most severe political and economic dictatorship of the national economy of the USSR, it was noticeably approaching this ideal.

Three features characterized planning as a method of managing a socialist economy. Firstly, this is centralization, that is, the distribution of tasks by the central state body - the State Planning Committee - or other authorized bodies, secondly, the directiveness, or obligation to fulfill, and thirdly, targeting, that is, bringing the task to a specific enterprise- performer. In addition, Soviet theorists attributed to socialist planning “scientificness” as a fundamental feature opposing the socialist economy to the anarchy of the capitalist market, although in reality the plan was an instrument for implementing the political and economic directives of state power and, as a rule, did not take into account objective economic proportions and trends.

Attempts to give planning a "scientific" character constantly ran into insoluble methodological problems of drawing up a plan and monitoring its implementation. How should plan assignments be given, in in kind or in terms of value? Do you need to schedule tasks in detail, or can you allow aggregated indicators that give enterprises some freedom to maneuver? Do you need special assignments to implement the achievements of scientific and technological progress? These and similar questions were the main subject of socialist political economy, and until the end of the Soviet economy they did not find an unambiguous solution, and the planning methodology changed frequently.

Total state ownership and compulsory planning, combined with an equalizing ideology, gave rise to the non-economic nature of the distribution of material wealth. The material wealth and social status of a person depended on his position in the state hierarchy and belonging to a particular professional group, this reproduced the principles of the feudal structure of society, and was a huge step back in the mainstream of human civilization towards freedom and autonomy of the individual.

Thus, the command-administrative system can be defined as a special form of organization of economic activity, based on the absolute domination of the state in the economy, forced planning and equalizing non-economic distribution of material benefits.

Of course, the actual practice of the functioning of the Soviet system was more complex and varied. For example, after Stalin's death, some forms of non-state economic activity in the form of "individual labor activity" or work on one's own began to be allowed. land plot but this was officially viewed as a temporary concession and indeed violated the purity of the "socialist idea." In the 60-80s, before the beginning of perestroika, attempts were made to expand the economic independence of enterprises and to strengthen the so-called "economic incentives" for workers. During the same period, economic approaches began to penetrate business practice and informally.

During the historically short period of the existence of the USSR, various forms of organizing the state economy were tried and even attempts were made to combine socialism with the market. The path that the Soviet economy traveled before the beginning of perestroika is an instructive experience for economic theory, demonstrating the historically limited possibilities of command-and-control management of the national economy.

In the economic history of the USSR until 1985, four stages can be distinguished. At the first stage (1918-1921), an attempt was made to directly implement the Marxist doctrine. The economic policy, later called "war communism", was aimed at the immediate and compulsory liquidation of private property and commodity - monetary relations... In their place came the relationship of natural exchange between enterprises and the free provision of many goods and services to the population. Most banks and other financial institutions were closed. Agricultural products were confiscated from the peasants. They received in exchange low-quality manufactured goods from the city. "War communism" combined with the Civil War endangered Soviet power. In these conditions, on the initiative of Lenin in 1921, the "New Economic Policy" was proclaimed, which was the beginning of the second stage.

By introducing the NEP, the Soviet leadership postponed the implementation of socialist principles until a certain stabilization of the economy was achieved. Therefore, trade, hiring workers, small and medium private production, stock exchanges, banks, market pricing and other institutions and mechanisms of the market were allowed. At the same time, the state retained "command heights", that is, complete control over heavy industry. The NEP contributed to the revival of the economy, the development of industry, the growth of agriculture and the rise in the living standards of the people. However, the NEP did not last long. It was curtailed because it objectively undermined the party's monopoly on power, and also because the country's leadership took a course towards accelerated industrialization and militarization.

The third period is the period of the Stalinist dictatorship (1920s - 1953). The Stalinist system fully embodied the essential features of socialism as a special economic model. During this period, economic activity was carried out exclusively on the basis of planning targets, which proceeded from politically determined party requirements and attitudes. The main task was to create a powerful army. Therefore, during the Stalinist period, the war industry became the basis of the Soviet economy. Agriculture has undergone forced collectivization. Market relations did not find a place in the Stalinist system. Money did not perform the functions that are inherent in them in a market economy. Throughout the entire Stalinist period, the Soviet economy maintained very high growth rates. The economy has undergone tremendous structural shifts. Stalinism caused such an overstrain of the forces of the entire society that immediately after the death of the dictator, the new leadership was forced to "loosen the screws."

In 1953, the Soviet economy entered the fourth stage - stage mature socialism and relative stability. This period was characterized by the departure of the Soviet leadership from the manifestations of Stalinism - mass repressions, harsh exploitation of the population and isolation from the outside world. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, during the reign of NS Khrushchev, new industries associated with scientific and technological progress, as well as industries of the consumer sector, grew rapidly. But already at this time the national economy of the USSR was faced with the depletion of the resource base and the need for a transition to an intensive type of development. Therefore, at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s. in the scientific press, a discussion appeared "on improving the methods of socialist planning", at the center of which was the question of how to combine the observance of national interests with the initiative and relative independence of enterprises. After the change of the Soviet leadership in 1964, these discussions formed the ideological basis for the economic reform. The reform was intended to give impetus to the socialist economy by expanding the economic independence of enterprises and introducing certain elements of the market mechanism. The work of the enterprises was based on “self-financing”. Self-financing is a management system that provided for self-sufficiency and self-financing of socialist enterprises. In other words, the enterprise had to independently recoup its costs and earn funds for planned capital investments through the production and sale of products in accordance with the consolidated tasks of the state plan. For the first time, such changes in the planning methodology allowed an enterprise not only to make decisions about the range of products it produces, but also to look for suppliers and consumers that are profitable for itself.

In December 1991, the USSR, and with it the Soviet economic system, ceased to exist. In the last years of the existence of the USSR, state power lost its ability to collect taxes, control the money supply, and lost controllability.

The fatigue of society and its desire for stabilization helped the new Soviet leaders to come to power, but seriously impeded the implementation of the overdue reforms. In the previous decade, due to endless dubious transformations, the Soviet country lost a lot of time, lost the pace of its development. Has intensified lagging behind the USSR from the West, which now has a qualitative, stadial character. The actual stake on extensive development did not allow the Soviet Union to respond in time to the challenge of the time and join the scientific and technological revolution.

In recent years, there has been a serious decline in the growth rate economic indicators, the country has lost food independence. All this required immediate decisions, but the inertia of the previous decade did not allow a return to the accelerated development of the country. All this led to the development of a special conservative type of reforms, when the new was introduced with an eye on the old and was of a cosmetic nature. In subsequent years, this style of leadership will be defined from a scientific point of view by the not entirely correct, but emotionally accurate concept of "stagnation." And when, finally, the majority of the citizens of the USSR again feel the need for radical transformations, the elderly party leaders of the country will no longer dare to carry out them.

Stabilization of the Soviet system coincided with the implementation of plans for the eighth (1966-1970), ninth (1971-1975), tenth (1976-1980) and eleventh (1981-1985) five-year plans. The most successful of them turned out to be the Eighth Five-Year Plan, while the style of conservative reform was just taking shape and did not have time to show all its negative features. The first measures of the Soviet leadership after the removal of Khrushchev were aimed at overcoming the most odious consequences of his voluntarist rule.

Already in November 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU restored the unity of the party, state, and all other bodies, divided in 1962 into industrial and rural. A year later, the system of economic councils, which had not justified itself, was abolished and sectoral ministries were returned. Other measures were taken to normalize the situation in the economy, to increase its manageability.

Realizing the insufficiency of purely administrative measures, the Soviet leadership decided to carry out broader reforms in the economy. However, the main parameters of the reform of the mid-1960s. were laid down in previous years and did not promise major economic achievements in the long term. Nevertheless, the planned measures were supposed to revive the Soviet economy for some time and give an impetus to its development.

Reform of the mid-1960s. was carried out by the leadership of the new chairman of the government, A. N. Kosygin. Kosygin was one of the few leaders of the military generation who did not fall under the rink of repression in the "Leningrad case". He had the authority of a proactive and pragmatic business executive, an adherent of a new leadership style. Like no one else, Kosygin responded to the spirit of that critical time. Many historians and publicists will call the reforms carried out by him the "Kosygin reform".

The main principles of the reform consisted in granting greater autonomy to individual enterprises, increasing the role of profit in assessing the economic efficiency of their activities. It was assumed that enterprises would be freed from the petty tutelage of the governing bodies, and only the most general parameters of their development would be prescribed to them.

Remaining within the framework of general requirements, the enterprise itself could conduct its own economic activity, independently dispose of a part of the profit received. It was divided into three funds: a fund for the development of production, a fund for material incentives and a fund for social, cultural and domestic development (from which funds went to housing for workers, construction of rest homes, children's and medical institutions). Economic initiative coming from below was encouraged.

The planning principles have changed. These changes also went along the line of increasing the independence of enterprises. Similar changes were envisaged in agriculture. In March 1965, even before the beginning of the general economic reform, Leonid Brezhnev himself came out with their substantiation. The stake was placed on expanding the rights of collective and state farms, the policy regarding personal livestock and household plots... In order to strengthen economic incentives, a 50% mark-up was introduced to the base price for products delivered in excess of the plan. Old debts were written off to collective farms, capital investments increased, and equipment and fertilizers increased.

As expected, the economic reform and the new style of leadership were able to temporarily reverse the tendency of the decline in the rate of development of the Soviet economy that had emerged in the previous decade. Over the years of the eighth five-year plan, which is the peak of the "Kosygin reform", there has been an improvement in all the most important national economic indicators. The volume of industrial production increased by one and a half times. About 1900 large enterprises were commissioned. Agriculture has also made progress, with production increasing by 21% against 12% over the previous five years. In general, the volume of national income by the end of the 1960s. increased by 41%, and labor productivity - by 37% against 29% in the previous five years.

but positive effect reforms quickly exhausted themselves. During the ninth five-year plan, the volume of industrial output increased by only 43%, and agriculture by 13%. In the tenth five-year period, the downward trend in production growth continued. Industrial products in 1976-1980 increased by 24%, while agricultural by only 9% (about a third less than planned). Difficulties in the economy continued to increase in the eleventh five-year plan: the volume of industrial production amounted to 20%, while for the first time in Soviet history after the start of industrialization, the increase in the production of consumer goods began to steadily overtake the production of means of production. Agricultural production during the same period increased by only 6%.

Of course, in comparison with the United States and other Western countries, the USSR continued to develop dynamically, at an outstripping pace. If in 1960 the national income of the USSR was 58% of the US level, then in 1980 it was already 67%. And this despite the fact that the USSR developed solely on its own own resources and helped many foreign countries, while the prosperity of the United States was based on unequal exchange with other, primarily developing states. And yet, if we compare it with the pace of pre-war development, in the Soviet economic system in the 1970s. there were dangerous crisis tendencies.

The Brezhnev leadership tried not to notice what was happening. The propaganda continued to inform the population about grandiose achievements, but the difficulties experienced managed to manifest themselves even at the everyday level. Many historians and economists point out that the reason for the crisis in the economy was the inconsistency of reforms. Having begun transformations, the country's leadership met with deep discontent on the part of the bureaucracy that had grown after the end of Stalin's repressions. Therefore, the reforms had to be curtailed, and in some ways, and returned to the previous methods of leadership.

At the same time, many authors believe that the reasons for the difficulties that arose in Soviet society were deeper. They hid in the impossibility of combining market and directive levers of management at the level of economic development at which the USSR was located. The transformation of profit into the main indicator for assessing the efficiency of enterprises fundamentally changed the goals of their activities, the goals of the functioning of the economy as a whole. Previously, production efficiency was determined in physical terms, by the amount produced. Enterprises pledged to produce not only profitable for them, but also products necessary for the population.

With the beginning of the reforms, the situation changed. Cheap goods disappeared from the range of manufactured products, since it was profitable for the enterprise to produce expensive ones. In addition, having acquired the right to independently dispose of the profits received, enterprises have lost the incentive to invest in the development of production. The additional funds received were used to unjustifiably increase wages, which further undermined the balance of trade and increased the deficit. At the same time, businesses continued to receive government aid, used a centralized supply. The directors' corps got the opportunity to exploit simultaneously the advantages of a planned economy and market freedom, albeit relative. The pursuit of profit at any cost is becoming an end in itself for many "red directors".

The main danger of the existing costly mechanism in the economy was that it was insensitive to the demands of the scientific and technological revolution unfolding all over the world. The staged lag of the USSR in science-intensive technologies that has emerged in recent years has intensified. While all over the world, especially in the USA, the massive use of computers began, the transition to an informational, post-industrial society, in the USSR, up to 40% of those working in industry and up to 60% of workers in agriculture were still engaged in manual labor. For a while, negative trends in the Soviet economy were not very noticeable due to the rise in world prices for oil and gas.

During these years, the government of the USSR constantly increased the sale of natural resources abroad. The share of supplies abroad of irreplaceable resources from the total volume of exports to the USSR was about 4 times less than in present-day Russia, but even then it was impressive, reaching, according to some estimates, 17%. The oil and gas trade generated colossal profits. However, these funds were often wasted, they went to the purchase of consumer goods, and not to the development of scientific and technological revolution. Such a policy helped to stabilize the internal political situation, but promised serious costs in the future.

Another obvious consequence of the reforms is the development of the shadow economy in the USSR. An interesting analysis of this phenomenon is contained in the study of the Italian historian J. Boff. He notes that, despite Stalin's desire to nationalize everything and everyone, there has always been room for private initiative in the economy. The shadow economy existed both during the NEP years, and then, during the Stalinist five-year plans.

A noticeable revival of the shadow economy falls on the period of the war with Nazi Germany. But the matter was, as the Italian historian emphasizes, on a scale. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, the scale of the economy, which has gone into the shadows, becomes comparable to the legal one. Dealers of the shadow economy, "tsehoviks", established the production and sale of clothing and luxury items. Profiteering, postscripting, and embezzlement flourished. The shadow economy has become an important factor in the emergence of dangerous crisis moments in the Soviet economy.

It cannot be argued that the Soviet leadership did nothing to overcome the crisis processes. At the turn of the 1970s-1980s. he made several attempts at new large-scale reforms. The first of them, begun in 1979, was aimed at strengthening the planning principles in the economy. The reforms were initiated by the joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers "On improving planning and enhancing the impact of the economic mechanism on increasing production efficiency and quality of work" of July 12, 1979.

The decree oriented the national economy towards improving the quality of planning, and introduced a new main indicator of the efficiency of enterprises. Instead of profit, they became so-called pure products, for the manufacture of which the enterprise spent its own materials, energy, and labor. At the same time, they began to reanimate moral incentives for work, they started talking about their priority over material incentives. More attention was again paid to socialist competition. Such slogans as “the economy should be economical” have come into use.

In 1982, the reform affected the agricultural sector. The food program, adopted this year, was the last grandiose economic project for the development of the Soviet economy. Its implementation promised not only the growth of agricultural production, but also the restoration of the country's food independence, which had been lost in the previous period. However, these and other reformist impulses were drowned in paperwork, red tape, and apparatus confusion.

Certain economic shifts were achieved during the reign of Yu. V. Andropov, but their depth and radicalism can also hardly be recognized as sufficient. The stake during these years was not made on improvement economic mechanism, but to improve planning and labor discipline, which could only have a short-term effect.

Did you know that in the 1930s and 1940s, Soviet society offered the world a socio-economic innovation, on the basis of which almost 85% of the Western economy has been operating for 50 years? Are you aware that it was this Soviet innovation that ensured the West's victory over the USSR in the Cold War and scientific and economic leadership in the modern world? And by the way, do you know that the leadership of the USSR abandoned this innovation in the 60s?

When discussing the Soviet economy, the majority of people come up with images of queues, shortages of goods, senile at the helm of the country and the military-industrial complex "devouring" all budget money. And if we take into account how this whole epic ended for the USSR, many a priori consider the planned economy ineffective, and the socialist mode of production delusional. Someone immediately pays attention to the West and not understanding how the local economy really works, insists that we need a market, private property and other benefits of the "civilized" world. However, there are some very interesting nuances here that I want to tell you about.

Unfortunately, I didn't manage to fit everything into one post, so first I propose to consider those basic (and little-known) economic postulates on which this very innovation of the “Stalinist economy” was built (1928-1958)

By tradition, I give some conclusions at the very beginning:

The Soviet economy cannot be viewed as a whole. Chronologically and logically, it is divided into several stages: a) war communism; b) NEP; c) Stalinist economy; d) the Kosygin-Lieberman reforms; e) acceleration and restructuring.

The Stalinist economy (in addition to the socialization of property and a systemic measure in the form of labor) was based on the law of vertical integration, socialization of added value and an increase in the welfare of citizens.

The main goal of the socialist mode of production is to improve the welfare of citizens. Capitalist - maximizing profits per unit of time.

Under socialism, value added is socialized. Under capitalism, it is appropriated by individuals or groups of people.

Soviet economic miracle

It's worth starting with the fact that the Soviet period in the history of our country's economy breaks down into several stages... And these were such different stages that we should not speak in general about the Soviet economy, but about the models of the economy of individual periods. This fact is very important to understand. After all, many people here believe that everything that happened after the NEP was a continuation of Stalin's industrialization and collectivization. And this is fundamentally wrong, because the Stalinist economy is only part of the Soviet economy. Acceleration and perestroika under Gorbachev were also part of the Soviet economy. And equating the economy of Stalin and the economy of Gorbachev is at least reckless.

Initially (and not from a good life), the Bolsheviks had to go for the direct distribution of products without using money, which marked the transition to the policy of War Communism. This period lasted from January 1918 to March 1921. Since war communism did not meet the tasks of economic development in peaceful conditions, and the Civil War was on its way to its logical conclusion, a new phase began on March 14, 1921, which was called the NEP. I will not disassemble it, like the previous stage, but only indicate that the NEP was actually completed by 1928.

We will dwell in more detail on the next phase - the Stalinist economy, which covers the period from 1928 to 1958. I want to consider this period in detail for several reasons.

First, in the public view, it is the most controversial. Someone is infinitely in love with the world-famous effective manager, without going into the specifics of what he did and how he did it. Well, someone complains about "millions shot personally by Stalin", points to the free labor of "50 million prisoners of the GULAG" and claims that it is this mustachioed bastard (Gazzaev) who is to blame for all the problems of modern Russia, tk. turned off the NEP.

Secondly ... but by the way, look at the tables.

As we can see, by 1928, after WWI, the Civil War, the intervention of the Entente and the NEP, the Russian economy lagged behind the economies of Western countries more than in 1913. Yosya described the situation very clearly and clearly in February 1931: “We are lagging behind from advanced countries for 50-100 years. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they will crush us. "

As a result of industrialization in 1927-1940. about 9000 new factories were built in the country, the total volume of industrial production increased 8 times, and according to this indicator, the USSR came second in the world after the United States. In 1941, the Great Patriotic War began, which we ended in Berlin and * ... reached the pre-war level of production by 1948, simultaneously crediting and rebuilding the economy of future ATS partners (all of Eastern Europe). Let me remind you that in the next 10 years, in addition to the atomic bomb, we built the world's first nuclear power plant, five hydroelectric power plants, detonated a hydrogen bomb, launched the first satellite, built more than 600 enterprises in the CMEA countries, dug several canals, and so on.

I repeat, after WWII we reached the pre-war level of industrial production in less than 3 years. And this is after almost 3 years of the most severe occupation. And without outside help. I don't know who and how, but personally, I always had a question, how did we manage it? If the economy established in the 30s and 40s was unsustainable and ineffective, how did we achieve these indicators?

Forerunner of vertical integration

The socialist economy, as we know, is based on the principle of socializing the means of production. Plus, industrial relations are based on cooperation and mutual assistance (at least that's what they say). We will not talk about this, because there is a lot of philosophy. Let us dwell on the fact that the socialist economy, incl. is built on the basis of the law of vertical integration, according to which profit is derived only from the final product.

What other law is this, you ask? Let me give you an example. We have a furniture production. In order to assemble a cabinet, you need processed raw materials (MDF, glass), fittings, assembly, delivery. In the modern Russian economy, all these things are usually handled by different firms that are not related to each other in any way. Firm X supplies glass with its own mark-up of 10-15% (+ taxes), Firm X2 - MDF with a mark-up of 10-15% (+ taxes), Firm X3 - accessories with a mark-up (+ taxes), etc. As a result, the cost of the cabinet that Firm P assembles and sells is slowly but surely growing. After all, Firm P has to buy all these materials, in which a couple of "ends" have already been laid.

However, this is not all. Our wardrobe needs to be sold, and for this it is exhibited on the podium in the store, which belongs to another Firm G. Taking into account the Russian specifics, the store winds another 80-100% on the wardrobe. As a result, we have a wardrobe with a price of 50,000 rubles at a real cost of 20,000 - 25,000 rubles. For a capitalist economy, this is a normal situation, since in it, each link of production seeks to extract the maximum profit per unit of time.

What we have? Firstly, we have a brazen parasite at the end of the chain, because of which the price of the cabinet doubles. He makes no effort. It doesn't produce anything. He stupidly has excess profits, due to which there is a significant rise in the cost of production. Secondly, our products become uncompetitive in comparison with, for example, Belarusian products, where rental rates and salaries are lower, and materials are cheaper. Thirdly, the price of the cabinet is affordable. ordinary citizens and reduces their well-being. It is clear that this problem concerns not only the closet, but everything and everyone in our economy.

How could this production be organized in a vertically integrated complex? We would still have all Firms X, X2, X3, etc. But they would be united under a single holding, in which all intermediate links would transfer their products to Firm P at cost. And Firm P would already be selling its products with the added value it needs. No one would profit from intermediate and raw materials. All profits would come from the final product. Can you imagine how much the efficiency of an enterprise and the economy as a whole would increase?

You ask, what then will all firms in this chain live on? They don't make a profit. It's simple. Having the minimum rental rates, which are transferred in favor of the state, and cheap raw materials, the added value from the final product will be redistributed throughout the holding.

You say that the profit may simply not be enough. This is not true. I will explain on simple example... 1000 lettuce seeds cost 5 rubles. 75-80% of these seeds will germinate into a healthy plant, for which it will be possible to gain from 60 to 150 rubles in retail. 1 seed can bring in revenue 12,000 times more than its cost. Do you feel the difference? Think for yourself, which is better for the country's economy - to sell 100 tons of aluminum at 60 rubles per kilogram or to make 1 Il-78 out of it for 3.5 billion rubles? Where will you earn more?

So, it is much more profitable to produce high value added products than to trade in raw materials... After all, its added value is tens, and sometimes hundreds of times more. Plus, when you create it, a cartoon effect is launched. After all, about 90-100 related enterprises are working to build one aircraft. And these are jobs. And this is the demand for qualified personnel, which inevitably entails investment in science and education.

For a better understanding of what vertical integration means for the economy, science and state defense capabilities, I will give you an example. In a market economy, there are activities that are "extremely ineffective". For example, the production of spacecraft. (And in general, space itself does not bring much money, unless you send communication and navigation satellites there). To simplify everything as much as possible, then it can be divided into 3 parts: 1st, 2nd and 3rd engines, launch vehicles, orbital ships. Separately, as practice has shown, only engines survive.

NPO Energomash is actively pushing RD-180 and NK-33 to any Lockheeds with Martins and Boeings, and due to this it lives well. RSC Energia, which developed the Soyuz, Progress and Buran spacecraft, bends smoothly, since the bourgeoisie did not resist the delivery vehicles. The story with TsSKB-Progress is no better. Analogies can be drawn with our civil and military aviation. The same song was in 2008-2009 in Pikalevo at the cement factories. Knowing the result, I think you will be able to answer the question of how complete the theory of the market sanitizing function is, due to which “ineffective” companies die off.

And if it were a vertically integrated complex, then there is a high probability that everything would be fine. The low profitability of some industries would be compensated by synergy with others, since at the end of the chain there would be a quality product with high added value. As a result: the country would have a full-fledged space program and new production facilities; science has an incentive to development; people have work. Or do you think we don't fucking need a space program?

I will make a small remark. In the 30-50s, the law of vertical integration had not yet been fully implemented. The intermediate chains still had the opportunity to receive a minimum profit (3-4%), and all the added value was immediately appropriated by the society. Moreover, then there was no such thing as vertical integration. The discovery and scientific substantiation of it was made by a team of scientists headed by professor of Moscow State University S.S. Gubanov in the 90s, while studying the Soviet economy of that time.

Well, the leadership of the USSR, back in the 60s, decided to abandon this path of development. First, we split the production chains, allowing them to extract the maximum profit at each redistribution. Then, in the 90s, they set a course for complete decentralization with total privatization. That is, we put at the forefront not the efficiency of the country's economy as a whole, but the efficiency of individual enterprises.
Do you know what structure Samsung, Cisco, Melkosof, Toyota, Volkswagen, Apple, General Electric, Shell, Boeing, etc. have? Do you know what you owe the current economic leadership of the United States, Germany, Japan, China? In 1970, large Western vertically integrated corporations owned 48.8% of total capital, 51.9% - profits; in 2005, their share rose to 83.2 and 86%, respectively. Their share in exports, savings, R&D and R&D, and innovation is also comparable. This is not surprising, because they concentrate the best production, technological, research and management resources. Unlimited lines of credit, government lobbies.

In developed countries, the economy of corporations dominates completely, and not of small enterprises, which are successfully imposed on us. All of their largest companies operate on the basis of the law of vertical integration, on which the Stalinist economy was built and which we have abandoned.

Added value

However, let's return to the Stalinist USSR. In addition to the law of vertical integration in the USSR (and this is very important) socialized ... added value... Yes, added value is the holy of holies of capitalism, for which it exists, socialized. If in a capitalist economy all profit was appropriated by an individual capitalist or a group of them, and society received horseradish all over its face, then in the USSR it was socialized and went to reduce the cost of production, capital investment, free public goods (free medicine, education, sports, culture, compensation air-railway transportation). That is, it was aimed at improving the welfare of citizens. After all, the goal of a socialist economy is to improve the welfare of citizens, and not to maximize profits.

How did it work? Let's go back to our furniture factory. The relevant ministry, together with sectoral committees and specific enterprises, formed a plan, which determined a number of target indicators (about 30), incl. volume of products and their price. Then the production process was launched.

The whole pricing process looked like this. Enterprise-1 (P-1) sold intermediate products (for example, MDF) to Enterprise-2 (P-2) at a price that consisted of the cost price + 3-4% of profit P-1 (p1). P-1 used this profit to reward employees, pay for their vacations, and improve their financial situation. The state also levied a tax on this profit.

P-2, after the necessary manipulations with the goods (made a cabinet from MDF), gave it for sale through the state trade system at the price p1 + cost price + 3-4%. This price was called the enterprise's wholesale price (p2). Further, the state imposed the so-called turnover tax on this p2. Turnover tax was the very value added that was appropriated for the benefit of the whole society. The result was the wholesale price of the industry (p3). Well, on top of this price was imposed 0.5-1%, of which the activities of the state trade system were financed. As a result, p3 + 0.5-1% was called the retail price.

For example, we made a refrigerator. Its cost + our profit of 3% - 10 rubles. The state imposed on him a turnover tax of 25 rubles + 50 kopecks was spent on ensuring the trading system. The total retail price of the refrigerator is 35.5 rubles. And these 25 rubles of turnover tax went not to someone's pocket, but to the whole society.

Thus, the household cells received a minimum of profit, which was used to provide material incentives for the cell's employees. The main part of the added value through the turnover tax was socialized and went to free education, housing, medicine, sports, recreation, compensation for railway and air transportation. And also for the modernization of fixed assets and means of production, the construction of new enterprises and the implementation of infrastructure projects. Let me remind you that machines, land, buildings, etc. did not belong to separate enterprises, but were owned by the people. As you can see, no private planes, dozens of personal cars, castles and elite prostitutes. All to people.

Improving the well-being of citizens

Since the goal of the socialist economy was to increase the welfare of citizens, the priority for the state and enterprises was to provide people with everything they needed. At first, it was work and food. Next - clothing and housing. Then - medicine, education, household appliances. The system was not interested in profit, but in the number of products.

For example, refrigerators have appeared. It was decided to include refrigerators in the list of goods provided to the population. This meant that plans were being placed to develop models of refrigerators and build factories to manufacture them. At the stage of production development - quite naturally - there were not enough refrigerators. There was a shortage. But as the development progressed, production reached the planned level and the deficit disappeared. But a new product appeared - televisions and the cycle was repeated.

However, the well-being of citizens increased not only due to an increase in gross indicators. Reducing the cost of production played an important role. For example, a cabinet has a cost price of 10,000 rubles and an enterprise's wholesale price of 10,500 rubles. How to increase the profit of the enterprise at the planned prices? There are 2 ways: a) to reduce the cost; b) increase the amount of products produced.

That is, if in the first year the profit from one cabinet was 500 rubles, then, for example, in the second year the team was able to reduce the cost to 9000 rubles and produced several more cabinets in excess of the plan. As a result, the profit of the enterprise increased by at least 1,500 rubles. However, so that the staff of the enterprise does not get too hungry, the state annually revised prices downward. As a result, the products were gradually becoming cheaper, which means that the costs of citizens for its purchase decreased. In fact, there was competition for reducing production costs and for introducing methods to improve production efficiency.

The main goal of the Stalinist economy was to improve the welfare of the population, which consisted of: a) constant and planned reduction in production costs; b) expansion of free public goods; c) reducing the working time of citizens. And this goal was achieved by increasing the overall efficiency of the national economy, and not its individual enterprises.

This is where I, perhaps, will finish the first part, tk. due to hellish neural attempts at creative "copy-paste" my cranium, not burdened with anything superfluous, is tired of emitting word forms. the departure from the "Stalinist economy" (and even with Stalin alive) and what all this led to will be considered.

* Volume capital works in the USSR for three years of the Patriotic War (1942, 1943 and 1944) amounted to about 79 billion rubles, not counting the cost of the evacuated equipment. New and restored production capacities were put into operation on the territory of the USSR for the same three years of the war for 77 billion rubles. Rebuilt and put into operation in the eastern regions 2,250 large industrial enterprises and rebuilt in liberated areas over 6,000 enterprises... 100 thousand metal-cutting machines, 24 blast furnaces, 128 open-hearth furnaces, 4 Bessemer converters, 70 electric furnaces, 56 rolling mills, 67 coke oven batteries, coal mines with a capacity of 73 million tons of coal per year, power plants with a capacity of 3.4 million tons of coal were put into operation. kw, new railway lines with a length of 5,860 km.- Voznesensky N.A. War economy USSR during the Patriotic War. M., 1947.

Sources:

CAREFULLY! Weighs a lot!

1. Production of industrial products in the USSR (1913, 1928-1952) - http://istmat.info/files/uploads/36634/rgae_1562.33.1185_22-33.pdf;
2. Foreign trade of the USSR for 20 years 1918-1937. Statistical collection - http://istmat.info/node/22114;
3. Brief statistical collection - http://istmat.info/files/uploads/36699/narodnoe_hozyaystvo_sssr_za_1913-1955_gg.pdf;
4. National economy of the USSR - http://istmat.info/node/21341.

Antonov M.F. Capitalism will never happen in Russia! M., 2005.
Larin Yu. Private capital in the USSR. M., 1927.
Zverev A.G. National income and finance of the USSR. M, 1961.
Bachurin A.V. Profit and turnover tax in the USSR. M., 1955.
Gubanov S.S. Sovereign breakthrough. M., 2012.
Voznesensky N.A. The military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. M., 1947.
Molyakov D.S. Profit and profitability of an industrial enterprise. M., 1967. - http://www.library.fa.ru/files/Molyakov/Molyakov33.pdf;
Robert C. Allen. Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution. - http://books.google.ru/books?id=FX4o33jOIX0C&printsec=frontcover&vq=allen+farm+to+factory&lr=#v=onepage&q=allen%20farm%20to%20factory&f=false;
Gubanov S.S. Lenin's course towards state capitalism - http://behaviorist-socialist-ru.blogspot.ru/2013/09/blog-post_2203.html;
Grandberg Z. Neo-industrial paradigm and the law of vertical integration.
Naimushin V. “Post-industrial” illusions or systemic neo-industrialization: the choice of modern Russia.
Katasonov V.Yu. Stalin's economy in the history of the USSR - http://ruskline.ru/video/2014/02/10/ekonomika_stalina_v_istorii_sssr;
Questions of the Stalinist national economy - http://worldcrisis.ru/crisis/1313734.
Chebolization of the country (about Samsung) -