Financial policy with u witte. Economic and financial policy C

Formation of the Russian centralized state (14th - mid 16th century)

• Unification of Russian lands around Moscow. Relations with the Golden Horde and the Principality of Lithuania
• Registration of statehood. Political system and social relations

• Reforms of Ivan the Terrible. Strengthening the regime of personal power

• Change of the ruling dynasty. The evolution of the state system
• The main directions of Russian foreign policy in the 17th century. Bashkiria in the 17th century

• Reforms of Peter I. Completion of the formation of absolutism in Russia
• Russian foreign policy during the proclamation of the empire

• "Enlightened Absolutism" in Russia. Domestic policy of Catherine II

• Government circles and public thought on the ways of further development of the country
• Social and economic development of the country. Bashkiria in the first half of the 19th century

• Socio-economic development of the country and its features

• Social and political forces in Russia. Revolution 1905 - 1907
• Formation of political parties: social composition, program and tactics
• State Duma - the first experience of Russian parliamentarianism

• Changes in the alignment of political forces from February to October 1917. Alternatives for the development of events

• The Soviet state and the world in the 1920s and 1930s. The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945): Results and Lessons

• The objective need for change. Political system reforms
• Search for ways of transition to a market economy: problems and solutions

Witte's economic policy. Stolypin's agrarian reform

Industrial upsurge of the 90s XIX century. ensured high rates of development of heavy industry, which by the beginning of the XX century. gave almost half of all industrial production. Railway construction developed rapidly, stimulated by huge state investments. For 1890-1900 the length of roads in Russia has almost doubled

The result of the industrial upsurge of the last decade of the XIX century. was not only a general increase in industrial production (it increased by 2 times by the end of the century), but also a significant concentration of production, an increase in productivity, technical re-equipment of enterprises.

The industrial upsurge in Russia is closely related to economic policy government and its head S. Yu. Witte (1849-1915). Consistently occupying the posts of the head of the railway department, minister of finance, prime minister (1905-1906), he contributed to the industrial development of the country, but he considered this factor not as a purely technical one, but as the path of its bourgeois progress, as an important transformative economic factor as a social instrument for stabilizing the political situation in the country.

Witte's economic policy did not remain without the influence of the "owner of the Russian land" Nicholas II (1894-1918). The hopes of the liberals that the period of the reactionary reign of Alexander III would end with his death did not come true. The new emperor showed no inclination or desire to resolve the problems accumulated over the previous decades. During the years of his reign, Russia was to go through two wars and two revolutions.

One of component parts economic policy at the turn of the century was the establishment of high customs duties on goods imported into Russia and at the same time the elimination of obstacles to the penetration of foreign capital into the country. The introduction of the "gold standard", that is, the free exchange of the ruble for gold, facilitated an inflow of Money from abroad. Over a ten-year period, the amount foreign capital increased from 200 million rubles to 900 million rubles. The main contributors were banks and joint stock companies in Great Britain, France, Germany and Belgium. If in 1888 there were 16 foreign firms in Russia, then in 1909 there were 269. The government took large foreign loans. During S. Yu. Witte's tenure as Minister of Finance, Russia's debt increased by more than 1 billion rubles.

Russia exported capital to more backward countries like Iran and China, and mainly to Central Asia and Transcaucasia.

On the initiative of Witte, a wine monopoly was introduced, that is, the exclusive right of the state to sell alcoholic beverages. It provided the main revenues to the state budget: under Witt, 365 million rubles a year, under his successors - up to 543 million rubles.

At the same time, the economic policy of the tsarist government in the late XIX - early XX centuries. remained controversial. Both Witte's program and the government's course itself lacked a balance between the needs of industry and Agriculture... This imbalance was one of the reasons for the economic crisis of 1900-1903, which ended the industrial upsurge of 1895-1899. However, the crisis manifested itself only in a decrease in the growth rate of Russian industry, and not in a halt in its progressive development.

In 1909-1913. Russia experienced a second industrial boom, when the share of heavy industry in the total volume of industrial production reached 40%, and the country began to satisfy its demand for machinery and equipment by 56% at the expense of own production... But Russian industry could not successfully compete with the industry of Western countries, and certain successes were achieved more due to the regulatory role of the state. To ensure increased profitability, the government used lucrative government orders, monopolization of industry, high level exploitation, colonial policy. But if we compare the development of entrepreneurship in Russia and in the West, then the conditions of trade and industrial activity proposed by the autocracy did not ensure its free development.

A natural continuation of the government course at the beginning of the 20th century was the agrarian reform of P.A.Stolypin (1862-1911), who served as chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1906-1911. His reform was based on such measures as weakening the community, transferring land to the ownership of peasants, creating a farm-cut system, and intensifying peasant resettlements. Their implementation was due to the need for the accelerated development of capitalism in agriculture.

The main act of Stolypin's agrarian policy was the decree of November 9, 1906, according to which the peasants received the right to leave the community and secure their individual allotment as personal property. The state and county land management commissions used all methods - from propaganda of reform to direct pressure on village gatherings. The surplus allotment land was given to the "fortification" either free of charge or at a nominal (conditional) price.

The resettlement policy was an integral part of the agrarian reform. On the one hand, resettlement to Siberia and Kazakhstan made it possible to reduce social tension in European Russia, on the other hand, it contributed to the development of sparsely populated areas.

Stolypin's plan for the reconstruction of Russia was not limited to agrarian reforms. It also included a whole range of reforms of local self-government, education and religion. In particular, it was supposed to restore the non-estate principle and reduce the property qualification during elections to zemstvos, liquidate the volost court for peasants, that is, equalization of the peasantry in civil rights with the rest of the population, the introduction of universal primary education, the guarantee of freedom of conscience. However, these projects were failed in the State Council, as influential forces opposed Stolypin's course.

The results of the reform: withdrawal from the community in 1915 about 27% of all communal households, the creation of 1,265,000 farms and cuts (10.3% of the total number of peasant farms), the departure from the village to the city of 4 million community members who sold their land. For 10 years more than 3 million people have been resettled beyond the Urals. The sown area behind the Ural ridge has doubled.

The years of agrarian reform have been marked by a steady growth in agricultural production. The general harvest of grain, the production of marketable products, and the yield of grain have grown. Average annual wheat production for the period between the five years of 1898-1902. and 1908-1912, increased by 37.5%, corn - by 44.8%, barley - by 63.2%.

However, when assessing the results of the reform, it should be borne in mind that the state of affairs in agriculture in European Russia was influenced by many objective and subjective factors. So, since 1907, redemption payments for peasants were canceled, which created conditions for stabilizing their economy. Since 1907, the world prices for bread have risen sharply. The agrarian reform coincided with a number of fruitful years - 1909, 1910, 1912 and 1913. Agricultural production was also stimulated by the consumers of its products - industry and cities, which developed rapidly.

From an economic point of view, the agrarian reform had undoubted progressive features, replacing obsolete economic structures with more rational ones, which opened up opportunities for the growth of productive forces in agriculture. From a political point of view, it was rather conservative, since it wanted to lay a more solid foundation for the autocracy.

And the attitude of society to Stolypin's reforms was ambiguous. The peasants, on the one hand, accepted the idea of ​​private ownership of land, but, on the other hand, they understood that the reform would not save the countryside from land scarcity and landlessness, would not raise the level of peasant agriculture, and would not calm the village down. Both right-wing and left-wing political forces were decisive opponents of reformism, and the thin layer of society that divided Stolypin's policies could not ensure the success of his reforms.

Stolypin's agrarian policy was the last opportunity, through reforms "from above", to switch to new tracks of economic and political development. This opportunity could only be realized through the combined efforts of the entire society. However, the rapid polarization of society, the political agitation of the equalizing socialist trend of various political parties, the increasing confrontation in society - all this prevented the realization of such an opportunity.

S.Yu. Witte and National Economy Management

(to the 150th anniversary of his birth)

VADIM MARSHEV
professor at Moscow State University M.V. Lomonosov

A striking figure who stood at the head of the system government controlled economy in Russia, was Sergei Yulievich Witte (1849 - 1915). Having started his service after graduating from the Physics and Mathematics Faculty of Novorossiysk University (Odessa) as a cashier at the Odessa State Railway, he rose to its chief, and then Minister of Railways, Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. S. Witte finished his career as a member of the State Council (1906-1915).

During 17 years (from 1889 to 1906) of his tenure in leading government positions, S. Witte prepared and implemented more than 10 major national economic reforms, as a result of which Russia made a leap in its economic and especially industrial reorganization and development.

S. Witte's economic policy

While in senior management positions, S. Witte made the main emphasis in his activities on strengthening the role of the state in the management of the national economy, especially in critical situations. On the whole, his economic policy was based on two most important elements - protectionism and the attraction of foreign capital.

If the first was not original, but, in essence, continued the ideas of I. Vyshnegradskiy 1, the second demanded from S. Witte sharp changes in views, which was facilitated by the successful implementation of the monetary reform developed by him. Back in 1893, already being Minister of Finance (from 1892 to 1903), he spoke very cautiously about attracting foreign capital, expressing fear that “Russian entrepreneurship”, despite the customs fence, might not be able to overcome the rivalry of “foreign enterprise”. But by the end of the 90s, S. Witte began to advocate the intensive attraction of foreign capital.

Witte's main idea was the desire to involve Russia in the world economy, to open up broad paths for the country's industrial development, to establish a solid monetary system - the key to attracting capital to industrial activity and expanding the sphere of credit relations with Europe.

On the development of domestic industry

In March 1899, at a meeting of ministers chaired by the tsar, S. Witte's report “On the need to establish and then unswervingly adhere to a certain program of the empire's trade and industrial policy” was discussed, which contained his views on the prospects for Russia's economic development. In his report, he argued that the said policy should be carried out “according to a definite plan, with strict consistency and systematicity,” because only thanks to this, “not only a fundamental economic, but also a political task” could be solved - the creation of its own national industry.

Without denying that the population had enormous financial difficulties arising in connection with the introduction of the customs tariff in 1891, and at the same time pointing out the low quality of domestic products and the general underdevelopment of the national industry, S. Witte saw the solution to all problems in “capital, knowledge and enterprise” ... First of all - in capital, because without them "there is no knowledge, and there is no enterprise." Russia is poor in capital, therefore it is necessary to look for them abroad. At the same time, he insisted on maintaining the customs tariff of 1891, as well as on the fact that "at least until 1904" there was no constraint on the inflow of foreign capital.

By the beginning of the XX century. Witte's policy took on a concrete and purposeful character - within about 10 years to catch up with the more industrially developed countries of Europe, to take strong positions in the markets of the countries of the Near, Middle and Far East. The funds were offered the same - customs protection domestic industry and encouraging export; attracting foreign capital; accumulation of resources through indirect taxation, state wine monopoly and state railways.

S. Witte critically assessed the achievements of Russia, recognizing it as an agricultural country. In this regard, he wrote: “with the current system of political and economic international relations, an agricultural country that does not have its own industry sufficiently developed to satisfy the main needs of the population with the products of domestic labor cannot regard its power as unshakable; without its own industry, it cannot achieve real economic independence, and the experience of all peoples clearly shows that only economically independent peoples are able to fully exercise their political might. England, Germany, the United States, before becoming influential powers in international politics, with strenuous efforts and a comprehensive system of measures, planted and developed their industry. "

According to N. Bunge 2, none of the finance ministers of post-reform Russia used so widely the means of state influence on the country's economy as S. Witte. However, he did not neglect the experience of private entrepreneurship. Affected by the fact that for more than 10 years he was practically realizing and evaluating the possibilities of a private economy, occupying various leadership positions in the joint-stock company of South-Western Railways. As the manager of the south-western roads, S. Witte managed a 30-thousand-strong team and brought this private economy from a loss-making to a profitable one.

About work with personnel

Already there, his abilities to work with personnel were revealed. He managed to create such a working mood and so skillfully select people that the road began to work "miracles". All its employees stood for each other and were ready to do everything possible and impossible for the road. And as soon as S. Witte met a more or less outstanding person in any department, he immediately arranged for him at his place. Having occupied the highest public office, he used his knowledge and experience (and, above all, his experience of working with people) to make the country's state-owned railway economy profitable.

From the very first days of his activity as Minister of Railways, and soon the Minister of Finance, S. Witte began to attract specialists from the private sector known to him as employees, forming, as it is now fashionable to say, a team of specialists and leaders. It was necessary to overcome the established bureaucratic canons of the system of rank production. Fortunately, in the 1980s in Russia the issue of its abolition was seriously discussed, negative assessments of this system were expressed, which gave rise to mass “legalized” incompetence and, as a result, fettered the development of the country's productive forces.

At that time, a number of departments, in the interests of attracting specialists, began to be replenished with persons moving from private service to public service, and therefore, either did not have ranks, or were in ranks that did not correspond to their position. In this matter, S. Witte had and personal experience... As the manager of the southwestern roads at the time of his appointment as director of the railway affairs department of the Ministry of Finance, he had the rank of only IX class (titular councilor), and immediately received the rank of IV class (actual state councilor). True, this case was unique, purely personified, since the translation was carried out by the decision of Alexander III.

In connection with the urgent need for professionals and competent personnel, on the initiative of S. Witte, laws were issued that, contrary to the "Charter on Civil Service", new rules for the appointment of persons from the Ministry of Finance to the civil service, which allowed him to legally implement his personnel policy. So, he invited to the service specialists in the field of tariff business mainly from the administration of the south-western roads, who often did not have any ranks and even the right to join the civil service.

According to the assessments of contemporaries and researchers, this method of selecting officials was successful and, moreover, in all likelihood, the first attempt in the history of the Russian bureaucracy to introduce employees of business organizations into the middle officialdom.

Having become the Minister of Finance, S. Witte at the end of 1894 made a submission to the State Council, asking for permission to accept in the positions of all departments of the ministry up to the V class inclusive (the rank of state councilor) of persons who did not have the right to be assigned to the service, but subject to the availability of them higher education. This contributed to a significant increase in the composition of public institutions of people with higher education - from 1893 to 1896, their number increased by 64%, with an overall increase in staff of 6%. Assessing the personnel policy and real measures of S. Witte, one should not forget that all of them were carried out with the aim of making the state intervention in the country's economic life more effective.

Here is how S. Witte himself assesses his qualities of a leader: “I had the happiness in general, wherever I served, to invite talented employees, which, in my opinion, is one of the most important and necessary advantages of administrators for large peculiarities. Persons who do not know how to choose people, do not have a nose for people who cannot appreciate their abilities and shortcomings, it seems to me, they could not be good administrators and manage a big business. As for me, I can say that I have this scent, maybe natural, very developed. I always knew how to choose people, and no matter what position I held, and wherever I was, everywhere there was a large galaxy of talented and capable workers. This was the case on the southwestern railways. This was especially evident in the broader field of my activity, i.e. when I was finance minister for 10.5 years. All subsequent finance ministers who were after me, such as Pleske, Shipov, Kokovtsov 3 — all of these are my former employees whom I, so to speak, pulled out. Also among the members of the Council of State there is a whole series of members who were formerly my employees in various fields. Currently, the main posts of the Ministry of Finance are all occupied by my former employees, and this can also be said about private companies. "

About training

S. Witte also made significant contributions to the creation of a system of commercial and technical education. He was able to put this of paramount state importance on a solid foundation, removing from it all traces of "spiritual and conservative tutelage" and opening up a wide scope for private initiative. Only the list of educational institutions opened under the auspices of the Department of Trade of the Ministry of Finance shows how much he did for public education.

At the beginning, S. Witte, in order to initiate the activity of Russian industrialists and entrepreneurs in the establishment and management of commercial schools, passed the Regulation on Commercial Education through the State Council. As a result, representatives of private business began to willingly give money for this, and in 4-5 years, almost without spending public funds, 73 commercial schools were opened, the Stroganov School of Technical Drawing was reorganized and several industrial and art schools were established. The merit of S. Witte is also the law of 1897 on rural craft training workshops.

Having developed a network of secondary commercial education, S. Witte began a campaign to establish the first commercial and technical higher education institutions in Russia. educational institutions, "Which would contain various departments of human knowledge, but would have the organization not of technical schools, but of universities." Under his leadership, the statute of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute was developed and adopted by the State Council, and then this and two more institutes were opened (in Kiev and Warsaw).

We can cite other examples of S. Witte's successes, but these examples convincingly speak of his outstanding state economic activity.

1 I. Vyshnegradskiy was the Minister of Finance from 1887 to 1892.
2 N. Bunge was finance minister from 1881 to 1886.
3 E. Pleske was Minister of Finance from 1903 to 1904, I. Shipov from 1905 to 1906, V. Kokovtsov from 1904 to 1905 and from 1906 to 1914.

foreign policy witte economic

• · Witte had a significant influence on the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian government. He actively promoted the development of Russian capitalism and tried to combine this process with the strengthening of the tsarist monarchy.
• · By the beginning of the XX century. Witte's economic platform will catch up with the more industrially developed European countries within about ten years, take a strong position in the markets of the East, ensure the accelerated industrial development of Russia by attracting foreign capital, accumulating domestic resources, customs protection of industry from competitors and encouraging export.
• · A special role in the Witte program was assigned to foreign capital; he advocated their unlimited involvement in Russian industry and railway affairs.
• · On the initiative of Witte, major economic measures were carried out: in 1894, a state monopoly was introduced on the trade in spirits. From now on, vodka trade was carried out only in state-owned wine shops. Under Witt, the wine monopoly generated a million rubles a day.
• · Also in 1894 the Siberian railway was built and in the 90s railway construction was launched.
• · In 1897, a monetary reform was carried out, according to which gold circulation was introduced and a free exchange of the credit ruble for gold was established. The Minister of Finance carefully prepared the reform, having previously accumulated a large gold reserve. The ruble has turned from a weak currency into one of the strongest and most stable in the world.
• · Russia has come out on top in the world in oil production; Russian government bonds were highly quoted abroad.
• · In reality, the entire policy of S. Yu. Witte was subordinated to a single goal: to carry out industrialization, to achieve successful development of the Russian economy, without affecting the political system, without changing anything in government.
• · For the same purpose, Witte begins to work out the peasant question, trying to achieve a revision of the agrarian policy. S. Yu. Witte was a staunch supporter of private peasant ownership of land and strenuously strove for the transition of the government to a bourgeois agrarian policy.
• · In 1899, with his participation, the government developed and adopted laws on the abolition of mutual responsibility in the peasant community.
• · On the initiative and under the chairmanship of Witte, on January 22, 1902, a Special Conference on the needs of the agricultural industry was created. His program of agrarian demands outlines the provisions that were subsequently used by P.A.Stolypin. Local committees of the meeting (82 provincial and regional and 536 uyezd and district) spoke in favor of the voluntary transfer of peasants from communal ownership of land to household land. Nicholas II did not dare to carry out reforms, and the Special Meeting on March 30, 1905 was closed, followed by the dismissal of the Minister of Finance.

Baltic State Technical University

"VOENMEH"

Economic policy

Witte

And her reforms

WITH students of the I-434 group

YES. Petrova

NS teacher:

S.Yu. Witte Minister of Railways in 1892, Finance in 1892-1903, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers in 1903-1905 and the reformed Council of Ministers in 1905-1906.

Sergei Yulievich Witte was born in Tiflis on June 17, 1849 and was brought up in the family of his grandfather A.M. Fadeev, a privy councilor who was in 1841-1846. Saratov governor, and then a member of the management council of the Caucasian governor and manager of the expedition of state property of the Transcaucasian region.

The memoirist Witte wanted to convince his descendants that he did not come from little-known Russified Germans, but was born into the family of a nobleman, who at the time of his birth had converted to Orthodoxy and over the years, under the influence of the Fadeev family, had become "and in spirit ... quite Orthodox." Witte made sure that this information about his pedigree got into reputable reference publications.

Such a zealous attitude of Witte to his noble origins and devotion to Orthodoxy is obviously easy to understand, knowing the atmosphere of the spiritual life of the Fadeyev family raising him, in which both the Lutheran past and the genealogy of his father were an eternal thorn.

Witte spent his early years in Tiflis and Odessa, where in 1870 he completed a course of science at the Novorossiysk University in the Faculty of Mathematics with a Ph.D. degree.

On July 1, 1871, Witte was ranked as an official in the office of the Novorossiysk and Bessarabian Governor-General, and 2 years later he was appointed head of the clerk. In the management of the Odessa railway, where his uncle assigned him to serve, he studied railway business in practice, starting from the lowest levels.

In 1874, with the abolition of the Governor-General of Novorossiysk and Bessarabia, Witte was "left behind the state on a common basis." However, in April 1877, he filed a petition for dismissal from public service.

After the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The Odessa railway, which belonged to the treasury, joined the private Society of South-Western Railways, headed by the famous banker and railway businessman I.S. Bliochom. There Witte got a job as head of the operational department. The new appointment required a move to St. Petersburg. He lived in the capital for about two years.

The spiritual world of the young man was shaped under the influence of his uncle. Witte was influenced by Slavophil ideas, was fond of the theological works of A.S. Khomyakov.

After March 1, 1881, Witte vividly joined the big political game started by Fadeev and his associates. As soon as news of the assassination attempt on Alexander II reached Kiev, Witte wrote to Fadeev in the capital and submitted the idea of ​​creating a noble conspiratorial organization to protect the emperor and fight the revolutionaries using their own methods. Fadeev picked up this idea in St. Petersburg and with the help of Vorontsov-Dashkov on the situation in Kiev and in the South, testifying to the fact that Witte was jealous of the fulfillment of the duties entrusted to him by the "Druzhina".

In 1886, following the Slavophil traditions, in No. 3 of Aksakov's "Rus" in the article "Manufacturing Serfdom" he declared himself an ardent opponent of the development of capitalism in Russia and the transformation of the Russian peasant into a partial worker, a slave to capital and the machine.

Witte was a man of practical mind, and although Fadeev's political program sunk deep into his soul, this did not prevent him in the second half of the 1880s from getting closer to the ideology-controlled group of Katkov, Pobedonostsev, Tolstoy, especially since this did not require significant internal restructuring from Witte ...

Witte, who served in 1887 as the manager of the South-Western Railways, unconditionally supported Katkov's campaign against Bunge in the press of the South, taking the side of Vyshnegradskiy. Vyshnegradskiy's victory opened the way for Witte to enter public service. In 1889, with the support of Moskovskiye Vedomosti, he was promoted to Director of the Railways Department at the Ministry of Finance. He had to give up the remuneration of 50 thousand rubles annually, which Witte received in the private service, and switch to a state salary of 16 thousand, of which Alexander 3 agreed to "pay from his wallet", taking into account Witte's merits in the railway business.

At the beginning of 1892 he was already the Minister of Railways. Further advancement in the career ladder was complicated by a new marriage after the death of his first wife. His second wife, Matilda Ivanovna Witte, was divorced and Jewish. In August 1892, due to Vyshnegradsky's illness, Witte became his successor as Minister of Finance.

Having occupied the chair of one of the most influential ministers, Witte showed himself to be a real politician. Yesterday's Slavophile, a staunch supporter of the uniqueness of the path of development of Russia, in a short time turned into an industrializer of the European model, who declared his readiness to bring Russia into the category of advanced industrial powers within two five years. And yet, Witte did not immediately free himself from the burden of the ideological baggage of his mentors Aksakov, Fadeev and Katkov, not to mention the fact that the economic system he created was dependent on the political doctrine of Alexander III, formulated by the efforts of Katkov and Pobedonostsev.

In the early 1890s, he still did not betray communal ideals, he considered the Russian peasantry a conservative force and "the main pillar of order." However, it was Witte in 1894-1895. achieved the stabilization of the ruble, and in 1897 he did what his predecessors did not succeed in - he introduced gold money circulation, providing the country with hard currency until the First World War and an influx of foreign capital. At the same time, taxation has sharply increased, especially indirect taxation. One of the most effective means of siphoning money out of the people's pockets was the state monopoly introduced by Witte on the sale of alcohol, wine and vodka.

The peculiarity of the course pursued by Witte was that, like none of the tsarist finance ministers, he widely used the exceptional economic power of power that existed in Russia. The instruments of state intervention were the state bank and the institutions of the Ministry of Finance, which controlled the activities of joint-stock commercial banks.

During the boom of the 1890s, the Witte system contributed to the development of industry and railway construction. From 1895 to 1899, a record number of new railway lines, on average, more than 3 thousand km of tracks were built per year. By 1900, Russia came out on top in the world in oil production. The seemingly stable political regime and the developing economy froze a small European holder willingly buying high-interest bonds of Russian government loans (in France) and railway companies (in Germany). In the 1890s, the influence of the Ministry of Finance increased sharply, and Witte himself for some time came to the fore in the bureaucratic apparatus of the empire.

In the late 1890s, it seemed that Witte had proved the incredible with his policies: the viability of a feudal by nature power in the context of industrialization, the ability to successfully develop the economy without changing anything in the public administration system.

Witte considered it possible to extend the experience of his economic reform to the local government system in the distant future.

However, Witte's ambitious plans were not destined to come true. The first blow to them was struck by the world economic crisis. The accelerated industrialization of Russia could not be successful while maintaining traditional system power and existing economic relations in the village, and Witte soon began to realize this.

Not wanting to "be a fool" Witte in 1896, following Bunge's insistent advice, refused to support communal land tenure. In 1898, he made the first attempt to achieve a revision of the agrarian course in the Committee of Ministers, which, however, was thwarted by V.K. Plehve, K.P. Pobedonostsev and P.N. Durnovo. By 1899, with the participation of Witte, laws were developed and adopted to abolish the mutual guarantee. But communal land tenure proved to be a tough nut to crack. In January 1902, Witte chaired a Special Conference on the needs of the agricultural industry, thereby taking, it would seem, to his Ministry of Finance the general development of the peasant question. However, Witte got in the way of his longtime opponent Plehve, who was appointed Minister of the Interior.

Whatever the cumulative reasons for Witte's dismissal from the post of minister, his resignation in August 1903 dealt a blow to him: the post of chairman of the Committee of Ministers, which he received, was incomparably less influential.

In the summer of 1904, after the murder of E.S. Sozonov, Minister of Internal Affairs Plehve, Witte returned to an active state. Contrary to his claims that his police career did not appeal to him, he tried to take the vacant place.

On January 17, 1905, Nicholas 2, who turned for advice not only to Witte, but also to other ministers, ordered him to compose a meeting of them on "measures necessary to calm the country" and on possible reforms beyond those provided for by the decree of December 12, 1904 ...

On March 21, the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of Solsky, not without severity condemned the decree of February 18, 1905, which allowed petitions. The tsar was, as it were, accused of liberalism. Witte's active participation in that meeting did not remain without consequences. On March 30, the tsar closed the agricultural conference headed by Witte since 1902, and on April 16 - the conference of ministers under his chairmanship, created on January 17, 1905, which managed to meet only twice on the occasion of the "united" government.

Increase in the efficiency of agricultural production with low prices for its products was an important part of Witte's industrialization program. He saw in this a means both for freeing up workers in the countryside, which would be used in industry, and for reducing the cost of wages for the industrial proletariat. It was then that the main brake turned out to be the community, to which he was an adherent in his youth.

In the community, Witte saw not only an obstacle to the development of agricultural production, but also one of the forms of a revolutionary threat, since it brought up a disregard for the right of property. However, apart from the abolition in 1903 of the mutual responsibility for the payment of direct taxes, Witte - he himself admitted this - did little in his ministerial post against the community.

In December 1904, Witte published under his own name a "Note on the Peasant Business" based on the proceedings of the Conference. According to Sergei Yulievich, for the peasants the community was "not a source of benefits, but a source of disputes, discord and economic turmoil." But he admitted that the community could be beneficial for the peasants - "with inexhaustible soil, primitive culture and cheap agricultural products." Also, Witte and his meeting insisted on the legal equality of the peasants with other estates.

The appearance of this program in print was used by opponents of Witte. On March 30, 1905, the meeting was closed by the tsar. Witte believed that this was due to the intrigues of Goremykin, Krivoshein and Trepov, who portrayed the Conference as "a revolutionary club."

Witte responded to the revolutionary events of the first days of October 1905 with a speech that "a strong government is needed to fight anarchy" and a note to the tsar with a program of liberal reforms.

Vite learned in relation to Nikolai II and Alexandra Fedorovna, who participated in the most important decisions of those days, a strict and decisive course of action. He offered them a choice either to establish a dictatorship, or - their premiership on the basis of a series of liberal steps towards society in the constitutional direction. His game was almost a win-win: he knew very well that the tsar was wary of a military dictatorship, seeing in it a belittling of autocratic power; moreover, the two candidates for dictators whom Witte named were in no way suitable for this role. And after several days of serious hesitation, the tsar agreed to publish a document drawn up under Witte's leadership, which became known as the manifesto of October 17. Russian citizens were granted civil liberties by this manifesto, and the future State Duma, whose convocation was proclaimed back on August 6, was endowed with legislative rights instead of the legislative rights promised on August 6. Witte succeeded in publishing, along with the manifesto, his most respected report with a program of reforms.

For all the disagreements between historians and legal scholars regarding the assessment of the manifesto of October 17, it is with this act that the transition from an autocratic form of government in Russia to a constitutional monarchy is traditionally associated, as well as the liberalization of the political regime and the entire way of life in the country. To the merits of Witte to old Russia, expressed in economic transformations and the just concluded peace with Japan, he has now achieved the manifesto of October 17, which raised hopes for a political renewal of the state and society. On October 19, a decree appeared on the reform of the Council of Ministers, headed by Witte.

As finance minister, Witte had more power and influence than he did as head of government. Not only the limited competence of the Council of Ministers played a role here, but also the completely different nature of Witte's relations with Alexander 3 and Nicholas 2.

The conflict escalated in the first half of February 1906, when Witte, in order to circumvent the norms of the law, according to which neither he nor the Council of Ministers as a collegium enjoyed the right to participate in the appointment of ministers, gathered them all for a private meeting and, declaring his intention to resignation, achieved a unanimous decision that the tsarist candidates did not meet the requirement of uniformity in the composition of the government.

Having become the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Witte did not lose interest in the reorganization of peasant land tenure, although the question of the compulsory alienation of part of the state and landowners' lands in favor of the peasants was now becoming central.

Witte, undoubtedly, initially supported N.N. Kutler, who headed the department of land management and agriculture in his office. If this project was adopted, 25 million dessiatins were subject to compulsory alienation, and the planned amounts that the peasants were to pay to the landowners significantly exceeded the redemption payments under the 1861 reform.

The question of the transition to individual peasant ownership was included in the curriculum for the Duma studies, developed by the Witte cabinet.

In general, Witte tried to conduct business in a Western way, studying the press as an expression of public opinion and influencing it with its help. Of course, the count paid special attention to all the critical articles addressed to the government. Rare newspapers did not criticize him and, taking advantage of the then freedom of the press, openly scolded him.

At the end of April 1906, before the opening of the Duma, Witte retired. He believed that he had ensured the political stability of the regime by fulfilling his main tasks; the return of troops from the Far East to European Russia and a large loan in Europe.

Resignation from the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers was for Witte the end of his political career.

During the winter of 1906-1907. under the leadership of Witte and with the help of his literary collaborators, the manuscript "The Emergence of the Russo-Japanese War" was prepared, which had "the character of a kind of personal memoirs of a count on matters related to the Far East."

At the end of 1913, Witte took the most active part in the campaign launched by the right-wing against the chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance Kokovtsev.

Waging a war against Stolypin, and then Kokovtsev, Witte hoped that the departure of his influential opponents from the state scene would allow him to return to political activity. He did not lose this hope until the last day of his life. At the beginning of the First World War. Predicting that it would end in collapse for the autocracy, Witte declared his readiness to take on a peacekeeping mission and try to enter into negotiations with the Germans. But he was already terminally ill and died on February 28, 1915.

The royal couple greeted the news of Witte's death as a gift of fate. For Nicholas II, the events of the revolution he hated were primarily associated with the name of Witte. The tsar could not forgive him for the humiliations he endured in the difficult days of autumn 1905, when Witte forced him to do what he did not want and which contradicted the ideas of autocratic power that were firmly established in his mind.

Witte stood out for his unusual pragmatism, bordering on politicking. Slavophil education did not prevent him in the 1890s from pursuing a program of accelerated industrial development of Russia with the involvement of foreign capital. From convinced supporters of the community, he moved to the camp of its implacable opponents. Having assumed the post of Minister of Finance with the intention of starting an inflationary policy, Witte did what his predecessors failed to do: he stabilized money circulation and introduced the gold currency. Having failed in 1899 Goremykin's attempt to establish a zemstvo in the Western Territory and accusing him of almost constitutionalism, Witte will prepare a manifesto on October 17 - an act much more significant in its political consequences. Witte proved to be an outstanding master of patching up a sprawling political regime, protecting it from radical renewal. He did much to prolong the age of the old government, but he was unable to adapt his obsolete system of government to new relations and institutions and to resist the natural course of things.

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They were contradictory.

By 1914, Russia in terms of industrial volume. production ranked 5th in the world, behind the USA, Germany, England, France. At the same time, the gap between Russia and the three largest powers remained very significant. By volume of prom. USA production exceeded Russia by 7 times. Germany 3 times, England almost 3 times. Russia was slightly inferior to France.

Russia's share in the world industrial production was 5%, and France 6%. For important industries, prom. production Russia ranked 4th in the world. These are mechanical engineering, steel production, rolled products. In terms of oil production in 1913, Russia was second only to the United States.

However, the process of industrialization in Russia was not completed by 1914. The share of industry in the gross national product grew, but was inferior to the share of agriculture. According to the calculation method, which was applied by Strumilin, and then by the English scientist, by 1914 industry accounted for 27-28% of the gross national product, while agriculture accounted for 55%. Those. industry did not become the dominant sector in the economy.

Recently, a number of researchers have questioned these numbers. This technique does not take into account that in Russia prices for industrial. goods were artificially inflated, and prices for agricultural goods were artificially low. If we take an allowance for this, it turns out that the share of industry was even less.

... exceeding the share of light industry.

In countries that have made industrialization, the bulk of industrial production was created in the heavy industry sector.

In Russia, the situation was the opposite: heavy industry developed at a faster pace, but still the bulk of industrial production. products in value terms were created by light industry enterprises. By 1914, about 60% fell to the share of light industry, about 40% to the share of heavy industry.

Retained their position in the prom. sector, many small enterprises that worked without the use of machines at all. By 1913, there were about 30 thousand prom. factory-type enterprises and 150 thousand handicraft enterprises based on manual labor with a small number of workers. They gave a considerable share to the prom. production. That. a large share of the industry was still produced by the pre-industrial method, by hand.

By 1914, many important industries, which had a very painful effect on the country's situation during World War I, were still in their infancy, did not meet the needs, and the dependence on imports remained very high. For example, in mechanical engineering, more than half of agricultural machinery was imported from abroad. Half of the cars are not C / X also from abroad.

Domestic industry could not keep up with the needs of the domestic market. During the fast prom. the rise of the pre-war, the growth of imports in the industry. sphere. This was such an unfavorable trend that emerged before the 1st World War, as a decrease in the positive balance in the trade balance of Russia. Exports exceeded imports, but this excess decreased. During World War I, when world economic ties were disrupted, the Russian economy found itself in a difficult situation.

Speaking about the industrial development of Russia, especially in the 1890s, it is necessary to dwell on the economic policy of the tsarist government.

The autocracy embarked on the path of creating a powerful domestic industry and consistently pursued this line. The apogee of the policy of encouraging the industrial development of the country reached just in the 1890s. This path was associated with the activities of Sergei Yuryevich Witte, who from 1992 to 1903 served as Minister of Finance. In addition to finance, the ministry also supervised the commercial and industrial sector.

Only in 1905 a separate Ministry of Trade and Economy was created.

The policy of forcing industrialization was called the "Witte System".

Witte was one of the largest states. figures of Russia in the last decades of its existence. Witte has never been one of the forgotten characters in Russian history. Much has been written about him both in Soviet times and in post-Soviet times.

They wrote a lot and in different ways. He had enthusiastic admirers and opponents. He wrote his memoirs, but in a revised form, because the original was classified in the American archives, where it was transferred by the widow. But there were no sensations in the original. The editorial revision, it turned out, was aimed at making the memoirs more readable, because the originals are difficult to read.

Witte's memories are interesting but biased.

The memoirs were first published in 1922. Memories of Witte caused a flood of counter-memories in the emigre milieu. One of the leaders responded to Witte by publishing his refutations, which he clothed in the form of a letter, although Witte was no longer alive. He wrote: I am writing to you, Witte. And then there was a list of Witte's sins.

Witte was born in 1849. His father was a native of the Baltic States, a Lutheran who converted to Orthodoxy. By his mother, Witte was related to the princes Dolgoruky, and raised his family to the Chernigov prince Mikhail Yaroslavich.

Witte spent his youth in Tiflis. Then he graduated from the Faculty of Mathematics of the Novorossiysk University. After graduating from university, he wanted to pursue a scientific career and Witte entered the civil service in the office of the Odessa Governor-General. He did not serve for long and moved to a private enterprise in the Joint Stock Company of the South-Western Railway. He began his service from the very bottom. To gain experience, he first became a cashier. Then he was promoted and became a manager.

Witte received his first experience of participating in political activities in 1881. Impressed by the murder of Alexander 2, he turned through his uncle to the new emperor Alexander 3 with a letter in which he proposed to create a counter-terrorist organization. (His uncle, Fadeev, was a well-known publicist who was surrounded by the new emperor). Such an organization was created, but it was quickly closed down. Nevertheless, Witte was noticed.

Witte was an adherent of Slavophilism for quite a long time. He was against the rapid industrial development of Russia, he believed that industry, industrialization turn people into an appendage of machines. But in the 1880s, his views underwent a change in this regard. Witte realized that it was impossible at the end of the 19th century to remain in the ranks of the great powers without a developed industry.

Witte was influenced by the views of the German economist Friedrich List. Germany was inferior in industrial terms to England and France. How can Germany close the gap? List acted as an active promoter of the policy of strict protectionism. List proceeded from the fact that countries that had taken the lead in industrial development flooded the market of more backward countries with their cheap and high-quality products and strangled their industry in the bud. A way out of this situation is the establishment of high customs barriers, under the protection of which domestic products can develop.

List's ideas were adopted by Witte and he even wrote a brochure.

Witte's rise to power began in the late 1880s, after the wreck of the tsarist train. The reasons for the disaster were as follows: the imperial train, which was equal in weight to the weight of a freight train, moved at the same speed as a passenger train, i.e. faster than necessary. It was very risky. Witte, who had to accompany the imperial family as director of the Society of Southwest Railways, repeatedly drew the attention of the Ministry of Railways that this was dangerous. In the end, the rails broke down. The incident was scandalous.

Nevertheless, Alexander III drew attention to Witte, to his warnings. On behalf of the king, Witte was invited to the state. service. Witte writes in his memoirs that he did not want to, but accepted the tsar's proposal, because he could not help but accept. In fact, this is not the case. Witte has long been eager for the state. service. He had contacts with Vyshnegradskiy, Witte was published in Moskovskiye Vedomosti. But there was an obstacle financial nature... As the manager of the Southwest Railways Society, he received much more than he would have received from the state. service. He received 50 thousand rubles a year. And as the director of the department, which was offered to him, he could only receive 8 thousand rubles. Alexander 3 expressed his readiness to pay Witte from his own funds another 8 thousand rubles. In total, 16 thousand, this is also not 50. But the government apparently attracted him more.

In 1889, Witte took over as Director of the Railway Department, which oversaw the financial aspects of railway construction. The Minister of Finance was his patron Vyshnegradskiy.

In 1892, Witte was appointed Minister of Railways. At the same time, Vyshnegradskiy fell seriously ill, he had a stroke. Witte was appointed his successor by Alexander III. Since then, from 1992 to 1903, Witte served as Minister of Finance.

Witte can be ranked among the outstanding states. figures. He possessed a deep mind, energy, ability to analyze, and was an excellent organizer. He was a master of political intrigue.

In the bureaucratic environment of St. Petersburg, Witte was an alien element. He was a provincial, with the wrong accent, did not know how to express himself smoothly, with rude manners. But this impressed Alexander III, since he himself was not a secular person, he felt a kindred nature in Witt.

But the same features of Witte prevented him from finding a common language with Nicholas 2. Not only personal features, of course, there were also political motives. Nicholas 2 was a man of a different kind. In the end, Nikolai 2 and Witte broke up, hating each other.

A contemporary remarked this: the sovereign is a miniaturist, and Witte is a rude savage, they cannot understand each other in principle.

Nevertheless, under Nicholas II, up to his resignation in 1903, Witte largely determined the economic, commercial and industrial policy.

Witte outlined his program in 1893, shortly after his appointment as Minister of Finance. In a corresponding note, Witte summed up the industrial development of Russia over the 3 post-reform decades (starting with the abolition of serfdom). Witte wrote that these years were not in vain. The industrial development of the country has advanced significantly, but Russia is still qualitatively lagging behind the leading powers. The task was to overcome this lag, or at least to substantially reduce it.

Witte acted as an active supporter of widespread government intervention in the economy. He emphasized that the financial, legal, economic prerequisites for rapid industrial development in the West have been taking shape over a century, while in Russia they are _______, so the state cannot leave the business of industrial development in private hands, private initiative, it is still too weak. The state cannot limit itself, as in the west, only to the establishment of the rules of _______, and then the entrepreneur will act on his own. The state should actively help private entrepreneurs, provide them with patronage. In fact, widespread government intervention in the economy was viewed by Witte as an important means capable of ensuring the rapid development of the economy.

What were the building blocks of the Witte System? It can be called a system rather conditionally, because he was not its creator. In many ways, although he did not like to write this in his memoirs, he continued the work of those who had held the post of finance minister before him, Bunge and Vyshnegradsky. In many ways, he realized what they had in mind, but could not implement.

The most important component was the policy of customs protectionism. In 1891, under Vyshnegradskiy, a protective customs tariff was adopted. Witte stood for its inviolability and even for tightening. Becoming Minister of Finance, Witte secured the consent of Alexander III that the Minister of Finance, by agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, would be given the right to increase the customs tax rate established by the law of 1891 for the goods of those countries that pose a threat to the Russian economy and which are not in their own turn does not create favorable conditions for Russian exports. Such a country was Germany, which at the end of the 19th century was the main trading partner of Russia. Indeed, Russian-German political relations deteriorated significantly in the early 1890s. The sides took diametrically opposite positions on many issues. Germany supplied industrial goods to Russia and was interested in low duties. But this had a detrimental effect on the domestic industry, since at that time Russian industry could not compete on equal terms with the German industry.

On the other hand, Russia supplied agricultural products to Germany. The Germans, protecting their landowners, set high duties on Russian products. This was not in Russia's interests. And so in 1893 the Russian-German customs war began, which was expressed in the fact that the Germans consistently increased duties on Russian agricultural products. And Witte, in turn, raised duties on German manufactured goods. Relations between the two empires deteriorated extremely, and there was even talk about the fact that the customs war would develop into a real war. Witte took a very tough stance in this conflict with Germany.

The cutback in trade ties with Germany was quite painful for the Russian economy and for consumers. But Witte believed that for Germany, the decline in trade ties with Russia was even more painful. This was a factor when the so-called backwardness advantage worked. Economically, Russia was a more backward country than Germany. But that was her strength. As a more backward country, Russia was less connected with the external market and less dependent on it. Therefore, the reduction in relations with Russia, the German economy experienced more painful than the Russian economy experienced a reduction in trade relations with Germany.

Finally, in 1894, a Russian-German trade agreement was concluded. The parties made concessions. This trade agreement was beneficial for Russia. Witte managed to defend his main positions. The trade agreement was concluded for a period of 10 years. In 1904, it was replaced by an agreement that was less profitable for Russia, since in this case the Germans took advantage of the Russian-Japanese war.

The treaty of 1894, which protected against German competition, served as a model in accordance with which trade agreements were concluded with a number of other states, with France and Austria-Hungary.

Witte consistently pursued a course of protecting domestic industry from foreign competition.

What were the consequences? Contradictory. On the one hand, the protection of the domestic industry ensured its rapid growth. On the other hand, this policy was burdensome for the population. It was impossible to do without foreign goods, since domestic producers did not satisfy the needs of the domestic market. But due to high customs duties, these foreign goods were sold at inflated prices.

For this, Witte's policies were criticized in the ruling circles. Witte realized that in general it was burdensome for the population, but as he stated: great tasks require great sacrifices. The state needs a powerful industry. Witte stood for the shortest possible time during which these sacrifices would be made. We need to develop our own economy faster. And this requires money, but there was not enough money. Way out: attracting foreign capital to Russia.

And in the 1890s, a lot was done in this regard.

There were many capitals in Western Europe that were looking for their use outside the national economies. Russia was a very attractive market for foreign investment. This was facilitated by internal political stability, low salary workers. In many ways attractive to foreign investors the Russian economy also appeared thanks to the Russian policy of customs protectionism. After all, this policy protected the products produced domestically, without relative to whom the enterprise belongs. If it is located in Russia, then it does not matter that it exists on English, French, German money.

29. Economic policy S.Yu. Witte and the agrarian reform of P.A. Stolypin.

The industrial upsurge in Russia is closely connected with the economic policy of the government and its head S. Yu. Witte (1849-1915). He contributed to the industrial development of the country, but viewed this factor not as a purely technical one, but as the path of its bourgeois progress, as an important transforming economic factor, as a social instrument for stabilizing the political situation in the country.

Witte's economic policy did not remain without the influence of the "owner of the Russian land" Nicholas II (1894-1918). Nikolai did not show any inclination or desire to resolve the problems accumulated over the previous decades.

One of the components of economic policy at the turn of the century was the establishment of high customs duties on goods imported into Russia and, at the same time, the elimination of obstacles to the penetration of foreign capital into the country. The introduction of the "gold standard", that is, the free exchange of the ruble for gold, facilitated the inflow of funds from abroad. The main contributors were banks and joint stock companies in Great Britain, France, Germany and Belgium.

On the initiative of Witte, a wine monopoly was introduced, that is, the exclusive right of the state to sell alcoholic beverages. It provided the main revenues to the state budget.

At the same time, the economic policy of the tsarist government in the late XIX - early XX centuries. remained controversial. Both Witte's program and the government's course itself lacked a balance between the needs of industry and agriculture. This imbalance was one of the reasons for the economic crisis of 1900-1903, which ended the industrial upsurge of 1895-1899. However, the crisis manifested itself only in a decrease in the growth rate of Russian industry, and not in a halt in its progressive development.

In 1909-1913. Russia experienced a second industrial boom. But Russian industry could not successfully compete with the industry of Western countries, and certain successes were achieved more due to the regulatory role of the state.

A natural continuation of the government course at the beginning of the 20th century was the agrarian reform of P.A.Stolypin (1862-1911), who served as chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1906-1911.

The goal of the reform: preservation of landlord landownership, acceleration of bourgeois changes in agriculture, education in the peasant a sense of ownership, thereby relieving social tension in the countryside and creating there the support of the government - the rural bourgeoisie.

The essence of the reform:

Decree of November 9, 1906. allowed the peasant to leave the community, and the law of June 14, 1910. made going out a must.

a peasant could combine plots of land into a single cut or move out to a separate farm

a fund was created from part of the state and imperial lands

for the purchase of land, the Peasant Bank gave cash loans

the government encouraged the resettlement of peasants beyond the Urals, because in the center of Russia there was a "land hunger".

The resettlement policy was an integral part of the agrarian reform. On the one hand, resettlement to Siberia and Kazakhstan made it possible to reduce social tension in European Russia, on the other hand, it contributed to the development of sparsely populated areas.

The reform contributed to the recovery of the country's economy. Agriculture has become sustainable. The purchasing power of the population and foreign exchange earnings associated with the export of grain have increased.

In practice: 35% of peasants left the community 10% started a farm. 16% of the settlers returned to the central regions and joined the army of the proletarians. 20% of the peasants who took out a loan went bankrupt. The peasant's land needs were not met. The reform hastened social stratification - the formation of the rural bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Late 19th - early 20th century. It strengthened the ruble not only in our country, but throughout the world thanks to the establishment of its free exchange for gold. The reason for its implementation was the instability of the monetary system in Russia at the end of the century. However, after the “recovery” of the ruble, the prestige of the domestic economy increased significantly, which led to an increase in investment and an inflow of foreign capital.

Causes

Witte's financial reform was caused by the need to create a stable currency, which was so needed by the monopolistic associations that emerged at the turn of the century in our country. The fact is that at the time in question in Russia, under the influence of the main trends in the world economy, large monopolistic associations, such as cartels and syndicates, began to appear. Large monetary transactions required a currency that would retain the value of financial capital.

At first, the government tried to solve the problem by issuing so-called extra paper money, but this did not help. By the end of the century, the need for introduction became apparent. Witte's financial reform was carried out according to the Western European model. The fact is that the gold coin standard was introduced in many European countries in connection with the emergence of a single world market. Russia was actively engaged in foreign trade, and therefore, just like its partners, needed a similar monetary system.

Target

The tsarist government was interested in developing the country. The latter circumstance was greatly hindered by the fact that the ruble, although it was a convertible currency, was nevertheless not strong enough to serve as the equivalent of an exchange.

Foreign entrepreneurs often hesitated to sell their denominations, since it was not backed by gold. Witte's financial reform aimed to overcome this barrier and put the ruble on a par with European monetary units... This should have attracted investments in the domestic economy.

Preparatory Measures

Witte's financial reform, dated 1897, was prepared by his predecessors. Bunge and Vyshnegradskiy understood the weakness of the paper monetary system and tried to replace it with a metal standard. Both wanted to make the domestic ruble strong enough for it to be freely exchanged not only for silver, but also for gold. To achieve this goal, they set the task of creating a stock of this valuable metal by making foreign loans, as well as limiting imports and increasing exports of goods.

Thus, even before Witte came to the post of Minister of Finance, the exchange rate of the domestic currency was stabilized. By the year of the reform, the gold reserve of our country reached more than 800 million rubles. National Bank under the new minister, he introduced foreign currency into circulation and stopped speculative actions on the credit ruble.

"Recovering" the economy

The implementation of Witte's financial reform was a natural continuation of the policy of his predecessors, who by their measures achieved a firm fixation of the ruble and the cessation of exchange speculation. Thus, all the necessary prerequisites for the introduction of the gold standard were created. Stock this precious metal, stable exchange rate, a well-formed budget, the development of foreign and domestic trade, the independent work of the Ministry of Finance contributed to the "recovery" of the domestic economy and became an incentive for a breakthrough in industrial development, which Russia had achieved by the beginning of the First World War.

Minister of Finance policy

Sergei Yulievich Witte held this post for ten years and achieved a lot during this period. Thanks to his efforts, railway construction was accelerated, a profitable trade agreement with Germany was concluded, and a wine monopoly was introduced, which became an important source of replenishment of the state budget. Thanks to his monetary reform, gold turnover increased sharply, and the number of paper units fell, which, of course, increased the prestige of the Russian economy in the world market.

Sergei Yulievich Witte achieved a "recovery" of the domestic financial system, which was reliable until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. However, it should be noted that many contemporaries were dissatisfied with the abolition of bimetallic circulation in the country, since the bulk of the population began to experience an acute shortage of monetary units, which negatively affected their purchasing power.

gold standard

This concept means the recognition of gold as the main monetary commodity and the only equivalent of values. The advantage of this system is that it is not subject to inflation. In the event of a drop in economic activity, this valuable metal settled in the hands of contemporaries, but when the situation stabilized, it was again put into circulation. The financial reform of Witte in 1897 was primarily beneficial for the development of foreign trade, as it facilitated the payment of transactions. The landlords and nobles were very dissatisfied with the introduction of the gold standard, but the enterprises of the domestic bourgeoisie received a new impetus for development largely due to the export of grain, which increased incomes.

First steps

Witte's financial reform, the reasons for which were caused by the instability of the monetary system in the second half of the 19th century, began with a decree of the emperor in 1895, which allowed transactions to be paid in gold domestic currency or bank notes at its rate. However, the new denominations entered circulation rather slowly. Therefore, the State Bank decided to buy a gold coin at a good price - 7 rubles 40 kopecks.

The latter measure helped to stabilize the ratio between paper and metallic currencies. In 1897, the government decided to introduce gold circulation in Russia. Coins from this metal began to be minted in 1897. The first of them were in denominations of 5 and 10 rubles. Imperials (15 rubles) and semi-imperials were also produced, which made up half of their cost. However, it is indicative that the majority of the population still preferred paper money, since it was easier to keep on hand.

Effects

Witte's financial reform, the results of which turned out to be generally very positive for the domestic industry, was prepared in strict secrecy, since its developers were not in vain afraid of opposition from court circles and the local nobility. The fact is that the introduction of the gold standard strengthened the position of the Russian bourgeoisie, but led to a drop in prices for agricultural products. After the start of the reform, its initiators came under sharp attacks from the public.

However, Witte enlisted the support of the emperor and a special financial committee and secured the approval of his project. As a result, the ruble exchange rate stabilized, and domestic entrepreneurship received a new impetus for development. The positions of the domestic economy in the world market have strengthened, which has brought the Russian industry to a new level. One of the disadvantages of the reform is the increase in Russia's debt due to the attraction of foreign capital, but the cost of borrowing has fallen.

In addition, in the course of the reform, there was an increase in state property due to the creation of a gold reserve and the acquisition of railways in the ownership of the treasury. The success was facilitated by the skillful budgetary policy Witte, who refused to save public funds. He opposed this thrift with financial activity, contributing to the inclusion of capital in industrial turnover. So, it strengthened the Russian economy and brought it to the world level.

The purpose of the work is to comprehensively analyze the reform activities of S.Yu. Witte, his financial policy and monetary reform. The set goal is clarified by more specific tasks:
- to analyze the factors that influenced the formation of S.Yu. Witte;
- to identify the conditions and causes of inflation and instability of the state budget in the 60-80s;
- to characterize the reformatory activities of S.Yu. Witte in the field of finance and money management;
- to analyze the monetary reform of 1895-1897 and its results;
- to show the importance of Witte's activities for the country's economy.

Introduction 3
1. FINANCIAL POLICY S.Yu. VITTE 5
1.1. Main directions of financial policy 5
1.2. Wine Monopoly 8
2. MONETARY REFORM S.Yu. VITTE 10
2.1. Milestones in the history of money circulation in Russia 10
2.2. The mechanism of the monetary reform S.Yu. Witte 11
2.3. The value of the monetary reform S.Yu. Witte 13
Conclusion 16
BIBLIOGRAPHIC LIST 18

The work contains 1 file

INTRODUCTION

Historically, it is customary to view the development of the state and society through the prism of the activities of individuals who have made the greatest contribution to transformations in various fields. One of the outstanding figures in the economic, social and political life of the country at the end of the X I X - early XX centuries. is Sergei Yulievich Witte. A well-known politician and financier, he began his career in the state power system from the position of Head of the Ministry of Railways, then becoming Minister of Finance, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Head of the Council of Ministers, member of the State Council, he was engaged in severaldevelopment and implementation of a new course of economic policy of the country and carried out the first deep reforms of the political system of autocratic Russia.

The most famous and significant for Russia was the financial policy of S.Yu. Witte and the monetary reform he carried out from 1895 to 1897.

The chosen topic seems to be relevant, since the domestic economic policy at the end of X I X - early XX centuries. was quite successful and led to positive shifts in the economy, stabilization of the state budget and the strengthening of the ruble. It is known that the Bolsheviks during the period of the New Economic Policy used some of the principles of reforms proposed by S.Yu. Witte, in particular, achieving the convertibility of the ruble, attracting foreign loans and direct investment. The economic reforms carried out in our country should be based on the study of such experience, strategies and results of economic policy.

The purpose of the work is to comprehensively analyze the reform activities of S.Yu. Witte, his financial policy and monetary reform. The set goal is clarified by more specific tasks:

Analyze the factors that influenced the formation of the personality of S.Yu. Witte;

Identify the conditions and causes of inflation and instability of the state budget in the 60-80s;

Describe the reformatory activities of S.Yu. Witte in the field of finance and money management;

Analyze the monetary reform of 1895-1897 and its results;

Show the importance of Witte's activities for the country's economy.

1. FINANCIAL POLICY S.Yu. VITTE

1.1. Main directions of financial policy

S.Yu. Witte headed the financial department at a time of crisis for the state, when finances and the economy were seriously undermined by the famine of 1891-1892, unprecedented in scale, and inflation.

Minister of Finance S.Yu. Witte continued the traditions of his predecessors: M.X. Reitern, N.X. Bunge, I.A. Vyshnegradskiy. However, his approach to business had a significant difference. S. Yu. Witte managed to convince Nicholas II of the need for a consistent economic program for the development of industry and the industrialization of the economy. Therefore, “all actions of S. Yu. Witte in the implementation of reforms in the country were of a thoughtful, logical nature, his economic policy turned into a system in which every action was supported by subsequent steps” 1. In this sense, the reform carried out by S.Yu. Witte, can serve as a didactic guide for all statesmen, it should be studied and promoted as one of the brightest experiences in the history of the world economy.

The reform of S.Yu. Witte included four main directions that ensured the industrial growth in Russia in the 90s of the XIX century.

The first step was to carry out financial reform, which included a tough tax policy with the aim of increasing state budget revenues. The most important condition for economic transformation was the monetary reform of S. Yu. Witte, which guaranteed the stability and solvency of the ruble. The transition to the gold standard turned the ruble into one of the most stable European currencies, which contributed to the development of banking and the expansion of foreign investment.

The second step of the reforms was the consistent industrial policy of the state. S.Yu. Witte noted that the stability of the monetary system and sound finances are not an end in themselves, they also will not lead to the automatic spontaneous development of industry. Significant efforts are needed on the part of the state in order for the country to turn into an industrial, developed power. Thus, the industrial policy to support and develop the national economy predetermined the success of S.Yu. Witte.

The third step was that S.Yu. Witte managed to attract large investment funds. Domestic resources - loans, borrowed funds - could not cover the industry's need for capital in a booming environment, so foreign capital made it possible to significantly expand the sources of financing. The inflow of foreign capital has become a massive phenomenon and has almost tripled over the decade of the 90s. The share of foreign capital in joint stock companies was about 25%.

“The policy of S.Yu. Witte combined openness and protectionism. High customs duties on imports, up to 33%, supported domestic producers, while low export duties and permission for foreign companies to acquire factories and mines attracted massive amounts of foreign capital ”2.

The fourth step allowed S. Yu. Witte to direct the efforts of the state, national industrialists, and foreign capital in one direction. S.Yu. Witte successfully identified the point of economic growth, choosing the industry that served as an impetus for the development of the entire economy. This industry was the construction of railways. The development of railway transport stimulated the growth, on the one hand, of the extractive industries and metallurgy, on the other, it required the development of mechanical engineering, carriage and steam locomotive building. The ramified system of railways, which in 10 years increased by 22 thousand km, involved remote areas in the national economic complex, led to regional specialization in agriculture and a greater division of labor in the economy.

At the beginning of November 1892 S. Yu. Witte presented to Alexander III a report "On the methods of constructing the Siberian railway track". He linked the rationale for this construction with the development of a huge territory, the development of economic ties between the European part of Russia and Siberia, as well as with the development of world trade. It was about a market with a population of almost half a billion (China, Japan, Korea) and a half billion (in rubles) international trade turnover. The signing of an agreement with China on the construction of a railway line was a major success for S.Yu. Witte.

The development of domestic industry and the extensive construction of railways necessary for this S.Yu. Witte considered it a prerequisite for successful foreign economic activity: trade with other states, the possibility of obtaining loans, attracting foreign capital.

The construction of the railway not only expanded the economic opportunities of Russia in the Far East, but also provided such economic benefits and advantages as “a reduction by one third of Chinese customs duties on imported and exported goods, freedom to set railway tariffs, etc.” 3.

Finance Minister S. Yu. Witte was confronted with the fact that there were large reserves of gold that could not be put into circulation. At the same time, the State Bank had to maintain commercial turnover in the country (for which it was necessary to allow a new issue of credit notes), and the Treasury had to make a number of payments from the budget, so a new internal loan in credit currency was carried out. Thus, S.Yu. Witte has earned himself the unjust fame of a supporter of unlimited issues of paper money. But he could not do anything else at that moment. By that time, the ruble exchange rate had not yet been consolidated, which served as the basis for speculation. The question of whether gold, silver, or both metals should be made exchangeable for a credit ruble was not resolved.

At the end of 1894, the question of liquidating the debt of the state (treasury) to the bank on credit notes of temporary issues of 1877-1878. was completely resolved, although in subsequent years, emissions had to be used for internal purposes. From January 1881 to January 1, 1897, the treasury debt to the bank decreased from 962 to 621.3 million rubles.

Under S.Yu. Witte continued to improve the work of the State Bank, which, on the one hand, played the role of a local operating institution for St. Petersburg and its region, and on the other, was supposed to carry out banking throughout the country.

In 1893, the Minister of Finance S.Yu. Witte raised the issue of exempting the State Bank from performing current affairs and operations of the city of St. Petersburg.

1.2. Wine monopoly

An important contribution to the stabilization of the budget and the Russian currency is introduced at the initiative of S.Yu. Witte state monopoly on the production and trade of alcoholic beverages. It also existed earlier, along with wine ransoms (a system of levying income from the sale of alcoholic beverages by the treasury), but it was finally approved at the end of the 19th century.

S. Yu. Witte introduced monopoly at first in 4 provinces (Perm, Orenburg, Ufa, Samara), in subsequent years it was extended to the whole country. The establishment of the wine monopoly was dictated by the interests of the state treasury and the landlord winemakers. With the introduction of the wine monopoly, the income of the innkeepers and tax farmers passed into the hands of the government. With the help of the wine monopoly, the state received the opportunity to increase drinking income not only by extending it to new areas and by increasing the sale of spirits, but also by increasing the prices of these drinks.

The fiscal significance of the wine monopoly in pre-revolutionary Russia was extremely high: for the period “from 1897 to 1914. revenues from the wine monopoly increased from 52 to 824 million rubles, these revenues constituted the main item of budget revenues and in 1913 were almost three times more than all direct taxes ”4. In this regard, the state budget was not without reason called the "drunken budget." Contrary to the assurances of the authorities, the introduction of the monopoly did not help to reduce drunkenness and improve the morality of the people. On the contrary, the secret sale of wine increased, and most importantly, a whole army of new officials in charge of the monopoly appeared, which often led to arbitrariness and corruption.

The wine monopoly was the most effective, but not the only measure for replenishing the treasury and indirectly taxing the people. The increase in excise taxes and, consequently, the retail prices for everyday mass consumption goods, such as matches, tobacco, kerosene, sugar, tea, and others, was also of significant importance. Excise taxes on a number of such goods were repeatedly increased.

In contrast to the tax policy of N.X. Bunge, S.Yu. Witte mainly used taxes to mobilize and concentrate capital in industrialization. The state not only invested in industry, but also began to receive significant income from it. Railroad revenues have gradually replaced customsduties and drinking excise.

Economic aspects prevailed in the financial policy of the state.

2. Monetary reform

2.1. A brief history of money circulation in Russia

The oldest monetary goods in Russia, as in many other countries, were cattle and furs. However, even in Kievan Rus, the transition from these primitive types of money to metal money took place, since then the history of monetary circulation in Russia has undergone many changes: the change of the hryvnia to the ruble, the copper revolt, the appearance of the first paper money - banknotes, the monetary reform of 1839, which proclaimed the basis of the monetary system silver and providing for the exchange of banknotes, which were by that time in circulation, with state credit notes. Since the monetary reform of 1839-1843. and before the Crimean War of 1853-1856. in Russia there was a stable currency in the form of silver monometallism. However, during the Crimean War, the exchange of banknotes was discontinued, and new inflation began, primarily due to the fact that the issue of banknotes by the State Bank had been used for a long time to finance the military expenditures of the tsarist government. Credit tickets only by their name were credit money, in fact, they were non-exchangeable paper money, issued not in the order of accounting for commercial bills, but in the manner of granting loans to the government by the State Bank. The over-issue of this paper money led to its depreciation.