The results and consequences of the NEP briefly. What is NEP

Test on the topic "NEP"

8. Who owns the statement: “NEP is serious and will last for a long time”?

9. Match the term with its definition

date

ANSWERS:

1. a 2. c 3. b 4. c 5. d 6 g 7. b 8. c
9.

• · Fast recovery Agriculture, industry, transport
• · Revival of trade
• · Urban population growth
• ·Increasing worker productivity
• ·Increasing standard of living
• · Accelerated social differentiation in the city
• The emergence of a "new bourgeoisie"
• Acceleration of the stratification of the peasantry
• · Rising economic instability
• Regular economic crises
• · Rising unemployment

Let us also consider the tasks, contradictions and results of the NEP in the table below.

It would be wrong to imagine the country's development during the NEP period in cloudless terms. New economic policy concealed deep contradictions. The main one was that the Bolshevik regime, having made forced concessions to the “private owner,” retained in its hands the main economic and political levers of power. Despite the introduction of self-financing, a bureaucratic system of industrial management remained. All leading positions were occupied by communists, often without the necessary competence. Naturally, the activities of such “managers” reduced the efficiency of state industry. The maintenance of this large administrative apparatus also required significant expenses. In an effort to maintain the support of workers, the regime artificially established relatively high level wages, which does not correspond to real labor productivity. All these factors inevitably caused an increase in production costs. “Price scissors” became a permanent feature of the NEP economy and caused growing discontent among the peasantry.

Another major contradiction of the NEP was that private entrepreneurs and traders (“nepmen”), having received the opportunity to engage in relevant activities, did not acquire the necessary social and legal guarantees. They still did not have voting rights and were subject to various forms of political discrimination. Their businesses could be confiscated at any time. In addition, soon after the introduction of the NEP, considering that the “private traders” had done their job, the authorities began to strangle them with exorbitant taxes. For their part, the “nepmen”, not feeling the necessary stability, were afraid to invest capital in production and preferred the path of speculation and various frauds. A significant part of the profit was simply wasted. This caused a negative attitude of the masses towards “private traders”, which was carried over to the NEP message.

No less acute contradictions characterized the development of agriculture during the NEP period. Overcoming devastation and the economic revival of the countryside inevitably led to the stratification of the peasantry. It is clear that large peasant farms were more efficient and marketable. Meanwhile, despite all the “mitigations,” the regime continued to persecute the “kulaks” - at best, they were simply tolerated for the time being. "Kulaks" were still deprived of voting rights and were subjected to various oppressions. Since the peasantry for the most part was poor, and there were few real rich people, local authorities and “activists” regarded the slightest signs of prosperity as grounds for classifying them as kulaks. This approach had fatal consequences for millions of peasants later, during the years of collectivization, but its results were already evident during the NEP period.

As a result of such a policy, the peasantry was deprived of incentives to work: the more hardworking and skillful the owner was, the more likely he was to get into the “kulaks”. Many came to the conclusion that it was better to be a “poor”, since this category of the population was considered the “support of Soviet power” and received various types of help.

In the second half of the 20s. 35% of peasant farms as “poor” were exempt from agricultural tax, the main burden of which fell on the wealthier peasants. In an effort to avoid the exorbitant tax pressure, strong farms were fragmented, artificially turning into “poor people.” In the 20s the rate of fragmentation of peasant farms was 2 times higher than before the revolution, which became one of the most important reasons for the decline in the marketability of agriculture.

Accordingly, the export of agricultural products fell, and, consequently, the possibility of importing equipment necessary for industrial modernization was reduced. Compared to 1909-1913. in 1925 The USSR was able to import half as much equipment as pre-revolutionary Russia in 1913. .

Thus, paradoxically, by the end of the 20s. a significant part of the population was dissatisfied with the NEP. The communists and some of the workers considered him a “betrayal of the revolution”; the Nepmen and the mass of peasants were dissatisfied with the insufficient concessions from the regime. Therefore, when Stalin took the path of eliminating the NEP, he did not meet the necessary resistance.

During the period of the NEP, such a sharp reform movement, largely unexpected from the point of view of a change in political and tactical guidelines for the new party and state power, the unity and cohesion of its leadership was required. Meanwhile, changes in the economy have affected almost all parts of the national economy: agriculture, industry, and trade. The assumption of multi-structure and the determination of the place of each of these structures in the socio-economic development of the country took place in an atmosphere of intense struggle for power between several party groups. In the struggle of party-state leaders, there was a settling of personal scores, tactical maneuvering in order to create dominant groups that were supposedly “true exponents of Lenin’s legacy” and could most accurately reflect the opinion of the broad party masses.

In the end, the struggle for power ended in victory for the Stalinist group. It was the Stalinist authoritarian team, in the fight against the right-wing opposition, achieving its complete defeat by 1928-1929, that captured all the heights of the party and state leadership and pursued an openly anti-NEP line.

Speaking about the results of the NEP, we note that its beginning coincided with unprecedented difficulties. The first year of the NEP was accompanied by a catastrophic drought that affected the Volga region, southern Ukraine and North Caucasus- those areas where during the Civil War the interventionists and White Guards carried out their rampages especially violently and for a long time. Of the 38 million dessiatines sown in European Russia, 14 million of them were completely lost, so that only 150 million poods of tax in kind were collected. Residents of the affected areas were evacuated to Siberia; a mass of people (about 1.3 million people) walked independently to Ukraine and Siberia. The official figure of those affected by the famine was 22 million people. According to official data, more than 5 million people died as a result of the famine.

The transfer of industry to self-financing required the abandonment of the wage system established during the times of war communism, which destroyed personal interest in the results of production. During this period, wages in kind for workers, engineers, directors, etc. in the form of rations prevailed over money, and its size was determined not by the intensity and qualifications of the worker’s labor, but by the size of his family. The task of changing the wage system was set already in the first year of the NEP. In December of the same year, a new 17-bit tariff schedule was introduced. The rate of a highly skilled worker was 3.5 times higher than the rate of an unskilled worker. There was a gradual transition from natural to in cash wages. For 1922 specific gravity monetary wages increased from 22.2% to 79%, and in the first half of 1923. the natural part was only 9%. Workers were given the opportunity to increase their earnings with increased labor productivity, regardless of the percentage of the amount of earnings to the basic tariff rate.

Unemployment was a serious problem. The NEP objectively led to an increase in unemployment among managers: by January 1924, among the 1 million unemployed, there were 750 thousand former employees. Unemployment exacerbated class contradictions in the country as a whole.

And yet, in general, there was a sharp shortage of industrial goods, which led to an increase in prices, and this, in turn, hampered the growth of living standards of all categories of the population.

The housing problem, despite the “densification of the bourgeoisie” carried out in the first revolutionary years, not only was not resolved, but also became even more aggravated. A real disaster for the country was agrarian overpopulation: in the countryside there was a multimillion-dollar mass of “surplus” population who had difficulty making ends meet. A huge number of such people flocked to the cities in search of a better life.

Due to expansion bank issue the balance between the size of trade turnover and the amount in circulation was disrupted money supply. A real threat of inflation arose, a sign of which was already in September 1925 the rise in commodity prices and the increasingly felt shortage of essential industrial goods. The peasantry very quickly reacted accordingly to this situation, which led to the disruption of the grain procurement plan. And this entailed the failure to fulfill the export-import program and a reduction in income from the sale of bread abroad. To maintain a stable exchange rate for the chervonets domestic market The State Bank was forced to constantly put gold and foreign currency into circulation in order to withdraw cash surpluses. But these measures did not lead to a reduction in emissions, but to the depletion of foreign exchange reserves.

In the fall of 1923, the so-called “sales crisis” broke out in the country. The desire to obtain maximum profit under the conditions of self-financing pushed workers of the Supreme Economic Council, heads of trusts and syndicates to raise the price of “their” goods to the limit. A good harvest was harvested, but the peasants were in no hurry to hand over grain low prices, since they did not offset the production costs. The relatively low purchasing power of peasants led to the overstocking of warehouses not only with agricultural machines, but also with the simplest and most necessary means of agricultural production: scythes, harrows, plows, etc. The state was forced to intervene in the pricing process, administratively reduce prices for industrial goods, increase purchase prices for agricultural products and organize cheap loan for the peasantry.

Nevertheless, the NEP ensured the stabilization and restoration of the economy. The results of the new economic policy are simply impressive. By 1925, the restoration of the national economy was largely completed. General release industrial products over 5 years, NEP grew more than 5 times and in 1925 reached 75% of the level of 1913; in 1926, in terms of gross industrial output, this level was exceeded. There was an upsurge in new industries. In agriculture, the gross grain harvest amounted to 94% of the 1913 harvest, and in many livestock indicators, pre-war indicators were left behind.

Hereby economic miracle we can mention the mentioned improvement of the financial system and stabilization of the domestic currency. In the 1924-1925 business year, the deficit was completely eliminated state budget, and the Soviet ruble became one of the hardest currencies in the world. The rapid pace of restoration of the national economy in the conditions of a socially oriented economy, set by the existing Bolshevik regime, was accompanied by a significant increase in the living standards of the people, the rapid development of public education, science, culture and art.

But, to overcome the crisis, the government took a number of administrative measures, strengthening centralized management of the economy, limiting the independence of enterprises, increasing prices for industrial goods, and raising taxes on private entrepreneurs, traders, and wealthy peasants. The state decided to deal with all the socio-economic troubles at one blow, without developing a mechanism for interaction between the state, cooperative and private sectors of the economy, but by searching for and neutralizing “pests” and “enemies of the people.” All this ultimately led to the collapse of the NEP.

On the curtailment of the NEP, V.I. Shishkin in this part expresses his opinion on this reason. The Bolshevik leadership at that time did not even set any serious task of developing the economy on the basis of production voluntary cooperation in the countryside in order to make it the support of the industrial development of the country. State industry, operating on the basis of the NEP, was not able to rhythmically and without contradictions with the peasant economy take a serious step towards industrialization and, in turn, become the basis for a large collective modern sector Soviet village.

After the XIV Congress, the collapse of the NEP began. In words the party advocated the NEP, but in reality it sought to get closer to the previous tough course. Specifically, the logic of curtailing the NEP looked like this.

Increased control and subordination market relations begins around 1925, when, as is known, the growth rate of social production fell sharply due to the completion of the restoration of the national economy and the development of a course towards industrialization. The search for funds to carry out the latter led to a violation of the equivalence of commodity exchange on a value basis and its gradual replacement by state distribution, which strengthened the tendency towards centralization of management of the economy and the country as a whole. In 1927 new line was determined in the decisions of the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in which a program was put forward for the “reconstruction” of the NEP to solve the problems of socialist construction, expand the planning principles in the economy, and actively attack the capitalist elements of the city and countryside. Further steps to implement this program led to the completion of the reconstruction of the administrative-command system, which, naturally, differed in form from the military-communist one.

Industry did not supply the required quantity of its products to the village. Agriculture, in turn, intermittently supplied the cities with raw materials and food, and also supplied an insufficient amount of grain for export for the purchase of necessary industrial equipment abroad. The peasantry did not seek to expand its production, as industrial goods became more and more expensive.

In the second half of 1926, the government was faced with the question of in which direction the economy would develop further. The “new opposition” insisted on a return to forced methods of confiscation of agricultural products, replacing the well-known slogan “facing the village.” The “right deviationists” still adhered to the principles of “self-supporting socialism.” The question of grain procurements turned from a purely economic to a political one. The fate of the NEP and the future of “self-supporting socialism” depended on his decision.

The procurement crisis and food difficulties allowed Stalin to defeat the “new opposition.” Gradually, the state revived the emergency measures of the times of “war communism.” To this end, already at the end of 1927, the confiscation of “grain surplus”, illegal searches of peasant barns, and the establishment of checkpoints on roads that prevented the delivery of grain to city markets began.

In open speeches in 1928, Stalin still demanded the abolition of various violations of “revolutionary legality” in relation to the peasants, calling them “relapses of surplus appropriation,” and even insisted on a slight increase in procurement prices for bread. But at closed plenums of the Central Committee, Stalin demanded the application of harsh measures to the kulaks, acceleration of the collectivization process, and sharply criticized “some comrades” who advocated the development of normal market relations in the countryside. He believed that the wobbly mechanism should be dismantled without hesitation market economy, replacing it with command methods that fully corresponded to socialist ideals. Stalin proposed starting this dismantling from the village, without waiting for it to rise again against Soviet power.

As a result, the NEP was completely curtailed. So, it should be recognized that the procurement crises of 1926-1928 meant a complete collapse of the new economic policy, since it fit only into the situation of “civil peace.” The command system could only exist under conditions of extreme tension, through intimidation and terror, which was contrary to the NEP.

It is widely believed that the collapse of the NEP occurred in response to the external danger of the “capitalist encirclement”, which forced the USSR to carry out accelerated industrialization at the expense of other sectors of the economy and a decrease in consumption. However, the threat of war was only a pretext for curtailing the NEP. In fact, there were deeper reasons.

The collapse of the NEP was beneficial to certain influential forces within the country, namely, the bureaucratic apparatus, which had its own interests that differed from the interests of the workers and peasants. Immediately after the revolution, the apparatus began to live in accordance with these interests, subordinating the entire economic and political life of the country.

After the end of the Civil War, Bolshevik Russia found itself on the brink of economic collapse. A large number of enterprises were destroyed, and there was an acute shortage of agricultural products. That is why at the tenth congress of the RCP (b), which took place in March 1921, it was decided to move from war communism to a new economic policy.

The essence and features of the NEP

The new policy was a rather complex structure. Indeed, as a result of the influence of war communism, there were actually only two categories of inhabitants left in the country - workers and peasants. The introduction of the NEP led to the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a new class, whose influence was especially strong in the consumer sphere.

In addition, according to V. Lenin, the NEP maneuver made it possible to strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. And relative freedom in economic management stabilized the political situation. Thus, the essence of the NEP was to achieve the ultimate goal - building socialism - in a roundabout way.

The main reasons for the introduction of the NEP

The main reasons that prompted the leadership of the young country to introduce the NEP were the following factors:

desire to restore normal economic relations;

normalization of connections between city and countryside;

stabilization of the financial sector;

the need to establish relationships with other countries;

suppression of the growing discontent of the peasants, which resulted in the so-called kulak rebellion.

The impact of the NEP on agriculture

The new policy was marked by the introduction of a tax in kind instead of appropriation. In fact, this led to a reduction in the amounts required to be paid by almost half. Moreover, the entire burden of the tax burden fell on rich peasants, called kulaks. At the same time, peasants were limited in trading agricultural products remaining with them after paying taxes.

Nevertheless, the NEP gave its first results. Beginning in 1922, there were no more problems with food shortages. And three years later, the sown area reached the pre-war level, and the number of livestock increased significantly.

Impact of NEP on the industrial sector

Radical changes were also made in industry. Thus, the chapters were transformed into what were called trusts. They were given complete independence in the financial and economic spheres. Trusts were created both at the centralized and local levels. Their management independently decided all questions about the quantity and nature of products, the place of their sale, etc.

Moreover, the trust’s activities were not financed from the budget, and their debts were not considered government debts. It should be noted that the activities of the trusts after payment of all fees also remained at their disposal. In fact, this led to the formation of economic accounting, in which it independently conducts its activities and uses the profit received.

Thus, it formed a complete government, which, in turn, made it possible to introduce into it the principles of planned management. Already in 1925, making a profit for the trust ceased to be considered the main goal and such a concept as commercial calculation came to the fore. In general, the situation with the trusts was quite contradictory, because their management was carried out on the basis of two mutually exclusive principles - planned and market.

Reforming the financial sector

New economic relations demanded significant reforms and financial area. The main transformations were reduced to the following areas:

creating a deficit-free budget;

cessation of inflation processes;

development of a new tax system;

resumption of work of banks and savings banks;

creation of a single monetary system and stable currency.

In 1922, the chervonets began to be issued, the cost of which was equal to the pre-revolutionary ten in gold.

After some time, the government initiated two devaluations, during which half a million old sovznak were exchanged for one kopeck. Thus, two were liquidated parallel currencies, but the reform itself was clearly confiscatory in nature. However, the chervonets went international, in particular, it was used in European countries, the Baltic states, etc.

For further development of the financial system it was returned commercial loan, joint stock banks and exchanges. But the strengthening of the planned component in the economy led to inflation. The Bolsheviks banned the export of chervonets abroad, as a result of which it turned into domestic currency. In general, the reform achieved its goal – financial system was improved, streamlined, and the national economy was rebuilt in accordance with the requirements of the NEP.

What consequences did the NEP have?

Beginning in 1925, the new policy began to gradually wind down. The private sector was forced out of industry, people's commissariats were created in the field of economy, which practiced a rigid planned approach to economic management. A course towards collectivization and industrialization was adopted. Thus, as of October 1931, when the NEP was officially cancelled, in fact it no longer existed.

To undoubted success new policy applies . But due to the lack of qualified personnel, primarily managers, economists, etc., numerous mistakes were made. The country had very low economic potential. Successes were achieved through the use of pre-revolutionary capacities. Private capital and wealthy peasants were discriminated against in every possible way. And with the end of the NEP, it was decided to eliminate the private sector altogether.

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