Economy of the Russian Empire and the USSR. "rapid growth" of the economy in Tsarist Russia

• music: Arctida - My empire

GDP of the Republic of Ingushetia and other countries in 1913

In their propaganda calculations, modern fighters for the Soviet past usually do not like to touch on the topics of GDP, industrial and agricultural indices of the Russian Empire, since usually no belmes do not rummage through the rules for constructing these series, and in order to find suitable data, you need to dig in modern literature, which is extremely undesirable. It is much easier to find hundred-year-old waste paper posted on the Internet (like Rubakin and Solonevich) and post heartbreaking quotes from there ("half-impoverished country", "extreme economic backwardness", etc.). Sometimes in such "sources" something resembling macroeconomic indicators slips through, which Lenin's faithful admirers use. I am sure that the following excerpts, which I have collected for the collection, at least once caught the eye of people trying to figure out the issue (because they spammed the whole damn runet). For convenience in opposing the Soviet, I decided to compile a table with data on per capita GDP in 1913 in different countries, based on normal scientific research.

But first, a collection of quotes of varying degrees of idiocy:

Solonevich, stupid agitation from Krasnov and from Bakharev, who cannot even google the name of a publicist
The fact of Russia's extreme economic backwardness in comparison with the rest of the cultural world is beyond doubt. According to the figures of 1912, the national income per capita was: in the USA 720 rubles (in gold, pre-war terms), in England - 500, in Germany - 300, in Italy - 230 and in Russia - 110.(Suddenly, but even the more or less respected SIP for some reason did not doubt such rituals).

Rubakin, Scepsis dump and my beloved Scaramanga (where would we be without him)
According to N.A. Rubakin, in European Russia, which was, as you know, the most developed part of the Russian Empire, the annual per capita income in 1900 was 63 rubles, while in the USA - 346, in England - 273, in France - 233, in Germany - 184, Austria - 127, Italy - 104, Balkan states - 101 rubles. European Russia, concludes Rubakin, “compared to other countries, it is a semi-impoverished country. If 63 p. represent the amount attributable to a round bill per inhabitant, which means that many millions of Russian people do not get even this amount a year.

Idiot Brusilov decided to just invent numbers
In terms of gross national product per capita, Russia was 9.5 times behind the United States, England - 4.5 times, Canada - 4 times, Germany - 3.5 times, France, Belgium, Holland, Australia, New Zealand, Spain - 3 times, Austria-Hungary - 2 times.

Wikipedia loves rarities
GDP per capita, calculated in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, in the Russian Empire in 1913 was $1,488 per person, with a world average of $1,524, which was below the level of all European countries except Portugal, and approximately corresponded to that of Japan and the average level of Latin America. GDP per capita was 3.5 times lower than in the USA, 3.3 times lower than in England, 1.7 times lower than in Italy(Someone correct, otherwise it’s funny: there is a link to Maddison, who was updated a long time ago and gives completely different numbers).

Paul Gregory's research proves the failure of attempts to justify the revolution of 1917 on economic grounds.

The government and financial circles of the West, who scrupulously assessed the pace of economic growth of tsarist Russia, did their best to remove the dynamically developing competitor.

Paul Gregory answers a number of questions:

• What motivated foreign investors to invest billions in the Russian economy?
• What could Russia have achieved on the world stage without the 1917 revolution?
• How was the Russian economy protected from the influence of foreign investors?
• How did the economy of the USSR pay for its economic growth, and what experience could it not take from tsarist Russia?
• Why did Nicholas II introduce the gold standard in Russia? What results did this lead Russia to on the world stage?
• Why is there more data on the economy of the Russian Empire in foreign libraries than on any other country?

In 2003, a monograph by a well-known American economist was published in Russian. Paul Gregory titled "Economic growth of the Russian Empire. New calculations and estimates».

Paul Gregory is a professor at the University of Houston, a researcher at the Hoover Institution, a researcher at the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, and a specialist in the economic history of Russia and the USSR.

Gregory's view of the economy of the Russian Empire is interesting for several reasons: firstly, it is the view of a specialist and scientist; secondly, Gregory is politically neutral; thirdly, his research is based on very rich statistical material taken from high-quality pre-revolutionary sources that have a greater degree of reliability than, for example, some Soviet sources compiled to please a political order.

In this article, we will talk about the results and conclusions that Paul Gregory received in the course of a long-term study of the economy of the Russian Empire.

Already in the introduction, Paul Gregory writes the following:

“The prevailing notion was that the economy of tsarist Russia was a chain of failures, which was the cause of the revolution of 1917. My research, the results of which are presented in this book, proves otherwise.

All calculations were made on the basis of materials stored in the libraries of Western Europe and the USA. I had an extra opportunity to make sure that specialists in the history of pre-revolutionary Russia have at their disposal much more complete statistical materials compared to similar materials for this period in other countries. In many ways, this was facilitated by the developed bureaucratic management system that existed in the Russian Empire, where many departments were involved in the collection of statistical information.

What assessment of the position of the Russian Empire before the First World War does Paul Gregory give? The American economist states the following:

“Russia on the eve of the First World War was one of the main economic powers. It was ranked fourth among the five largest industrialized countries. The Russian Empire produced almost the same volume of industrial output as Austria-Hungary, and was the largest producer of agricultural goods in Europe.

In the Russian translation of the monograph, there is no exact indication of which indicator this statement was made on the basis of. However, later in his study, the author, when assessing the rate of economic growth, uses such an indicator as the total national product, or in other words, the gross national product (GNP), which reflects the total value of goods created only by residents of a particular country, regardless of their geographical location. It can be assumed that Gregory uses this indicator in his assessments.

GNP is very close in its value to GDP. For a better understanding, we present the following illustration.

“In 1861, the volume of production [GNP - approx. ed.] in Russia was about half the American, 80% of the volume of production in the UK and Germany and only slightly behind the French. In 1913, according to this indicator, Russia almost caught up with England, significantly surpassed France, twice overtook Austria-Hungary and reached 80% of Germany's production volume.

In other words, in the period from 1861 to 1913, the rate of economic growth in the Russian Empire was higher than in Great Britain, France and Austria-Hungary and was approximately equal to the German one.

Is it a lot or a little? In his study, the author gives the following indicators of economic growth calculated by him for different countries (only correlated figures are taken). GNP growth (%/year):

Russia (1883-1887 - 1909-1913) - 3.25%;

Germany (1886-1895 - 1911-1913) - 2.9%;

USA (1880-1890 - 1910-1914) - 3.5%.

One can see some difference in time frames, but the general trend is obvious: in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Russia was among the leaders in terms of economic growth.

One more clarification should be made: at present, economic growth of 3 percent or more is not considered unique against the backdrop of the rapidly growing economies of China and India, where growth at times reaches 10 percent or more per year. But it must be taken into account that at present the speed of all processes, including economic ones, has increased significantly. At the beginning of the 20th century, the main engine of economic growth in most countries was industry, now it is the service sector, which is developing faster than real production. Therefore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, an increase of 3.25% is a very good indicator.

The figures obtained by P. Gregory are confirmed in the research of the Groningen Center for Growth and Development under the leadership of Angus Maddison, the results of which the American economist cites in his monograph.

The Groningen Center study gives us GDP values ​​for different countries of the world for 1900 and 1913, calculated at purchasing power parity (PPP). Let's take a look at some of these numbers.

In 1900, the GDP of the German Empire was 162,335 million international Geary-Khamis dollars, for the Russian Empire this figure was 154,049 million dollars, and in 1913, the GDP values ​​for Germany and Russia, respectively, amounted to 237,332 million dollars and $232,351 million.

A simple mathematical calculation shows that Germany's GDP grew by 1.46 times over 13 years, and the Russian Empire's by 1.51 times. That is, if these figures are correct, the Russian GDP in 1900-1913. grew faster than Germany.

Studying the economy of the Russian Empire, Paul Gregory talks about the steps that were necessary for successful development:

Russia in the 1870s. had a sufficiently balanced economy to participate in the industrial revolution. The steps that needed to be taken were fairly obvious: reform of land relations, construction of railways, and improvements in education.”

It should be said that it was in these areas that truly revolutionary changes took place during the reign of Nicholas II. By 1913, the Russian Empire took 2nd place in the world in terms of the length of railways. Peasants in 1916 sowed (on their own and rented land) 89.3% of arable land and owned 94% of the livestock.

A real boom took place in Russian education: according to open sources, in the period from 1896 to 1910, 57 thousand primary schools were opened. The number of primary schools has doubled compared to the previous time period. 1,500 lower vocational schools, 600 city schools, 1323 secondary educational institutions have been created, 20 male higher educational institutions and 28 women's universities are being opened.

Thus, the necessary conditions for industrialization in Russia were created. However, there was one more necessary component - capital. An important place in this issue is given by the American economist to the introduction in Russia in 1897 of the so-called "gold standard" - the free conversion of the credit ruble into gold.

Gregory writes:

“The financial and tax policy of Russia since the 1870s. was aimed at joining the world gold standard.

By 1895, the Russian credit ruble was exchanged at a fixed rate for gold rubles. Russia officially introduced the gold standard in 1897, which increased Russia's credibility in the eyes of Western investors.

A distinctive feature of Russian policy in the last quarter of the 19th century was its deliberate pursuit of financial stability in order to attract foreign capital.

Unlike other countries that pursued a policy of financial stability and accumulated gold reserves in order to achieve a stable exchange rate, Russia did this in order to attract capital from abroad.

The financial stability provided by the gold standard was an important asset of Russian business policy. In addition to improving its position in the global financial community, Russia has relied on attracting large amounts of foreign capital. As a result, by 1917 Russia was the world's largest borrower, accounting for about 11% of the world's international debt.

The average annual inflow of foreign investment before the introduction of the gold standard (1885-1897) was 43 million rubles, and during the period of the gold standard (1897-1913) it reached 191 million rubles, an increase of almost 4.4 times . Prior to the introduction of the gold standard, the ratio of foreign investment to national income was just over 0.5% (or 5.5% of all net investment); after the introduction of the gold standard, this ratio was about 1.5% (11% of all net investment in Russia).

These facts require some explanation. There is a point of view that large loans in the foreign market were a huge mistake of the tsarist government, since they made the country dependent on foreign creditors. But, as Paul Gregory states:

“Russia began industrialization with surprisingly high levels of domestic savings. This meant that foreign finance had to play only a supporting role in raising the level of domestic capital accumulation. Pre-revolutionary Russia, unlike the Soviet leadership in the 1930s, was not forced to adopt a radical program of capital formation with the goal of “catching up” with the West in a few years. For tsarist Russia, this was not so necessary.

In other words, the Russian Empire, with the help of its high business reputation and financial stability, was able to attract huge foreign investments into its economy and, among other things, achieved high rates of economic growth due to them. Without loans, these rates would be somewhat lower. It is important to understand that the well-being of the Russian people was built on these funds. The Soviet Union also managed to achieve high rates of economic growth, but millions of lives, sweat and blood of the peoples of the country paid for them.

In conclusion, let us give Paul Gregory's assessment of the prospects for Russia's economic development.

“My book presents the success story of the economy of the Russian Empire: Russian agriculture, despite serious institutional problems, grew as fast as in Europe as a whole, and in general, the growth rates of output in the country exceeded those in Europe. Even if we project this growth very carefully into a hypothetical future, we will see that Russia is only a few decades away from becoming a prosperous economy in all respects.

From my point of view, if Russia after the war had kept on the path of a market model of development, the growth rates of its economy would have been no less than before the war. In this case, the pace of its development would be ahead of the average European. However, there is every reason to believe that by overcoming many institutional obstacles (by completing the agrarian reform, improving the system of legislation in the field of business regulation), post-war Russia's growth rates would exceed pre-war figures. Any of the proposed scenarios theoretically determines the position of that hypothetical Russia as one of the most developed national economies - not as rich as, say, Germany or France, but close to them.

For decades, Soviet economists and historians have been talking about backward pre-revolutionary Russia, which would not have expected anything good if there had not been a revolution. After the collapse of the USSR, liberal historians, economists, and political scientists took over the baton, repeating the words about “free market” and “democracy” like a mantra, in which only a market economy is possible. And again, they talk about the revolution of 1917 as a necessary step for the modernization of the country.

Paul Gregory's research proves the failure of attempts to justify the revolution of 1917 on economic grounds. No coups were required to turn Russia into an industrial power. All the necessary steps by 1917 had already been taken.

The only "economic" reason for the catastrophe of 1917 lies in the minds of people who associated material well-being with the democratic social structure of Western countries and did not understand that they already had everything necessary to build this well-being with their own hands.

And the power and financial circles of the West, which very scrupulously and objectively assessed the pace of economic growth of tsarist Russia, strongly contributed to removing the dynamically developing competitor.

In 2003, a monograph by a well-known American economist was published in Russian. Paul Gregory titled "Economic growth of the Russian Empire. New calculations and estimates.

Paul Gregory is a professor at the University of Houston, a researcher at the Hoover Institution, a researcher at the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, and a specialist in the economic history of Russia and the USSR.

Gregory's view of the economy of the Russian Empire is interesting for several reasons: firstly, it is the view of a specialist and scientist; secondly, Gregory is politically neutral; thirdly, his research is based on very rich statistical material taken from high-quality pre-revolutionary sources that have a greater degree of reliability than, for example, some Soviet sources compiled to please a political order.

In this article, we will talk about the results and conclusions that Paul Gregory received in the course of a long-term study of the economy of the Russian Empire.

Already in the introduction, Paul Gregory writes the following:

“The prevailing notion was that the economy of tsarist Russia was a chain of failures, which was the cause of the revolution of 1917.<…>My research, the results of which are presented in this book, proves otherwise.

All calculations were made on the basis of materials stored in the libraries of Western Europe and the USA. I had an extra opportunity to make sure that specialists in the history of pre-revolutionary Russia have at their disposal much more complete statistical materials compared to similar materials for this period in other countries. In many ways, this was facilitated by the developed bureaucratic management system that existed in the Russian Empire, where many departments were involved in the collection of statistical information.

What assessment of the position of the Russian Empire before the First World War does Paul Gregory give? The American economist states the following:

“Russia on the eve of the First World War was one of the main economic powers. It was ranked fourth among the five largest industrialized countries. The Russian Empire produced almost the same volume of industrial output as Austria-Hungary, and was the largest producer of agricultural goods in Europe.

In the Russian translation of the monograph, there is no exact indication of which indicator this statement was made on the basis of. However, later in his study, the author, when assessing the rate of economic growth, uses such an indicator as the total national product, or in other words, the gross national product (GNP), which reflects the total value of goods created only by residents of a particular country, regardless of their geographical location. It can be assumed that Gregory uses this indicator in his assessments.

GNP is very close in its value to GDP. For a better understanding, we present the following illustration.

“In 1861, the volume of production [GNP - approx. ed.] in Russia was about half the American, 80% of the volume of production in the UK and Germany and only slightly behind the French. In 1913, according to this indicator, Russia almost caught up with England, significantly surpassed France, twice overtook Austria-Hungary and reached 80% of Germany's production volume.

In other words, in the period from 1861 to 1913, the rate of economic growth in the Russian Empire was higher than in Great Britain, France and Austria-Hungary and was approximately equal to the German one.

Is it a lot or a little? In his study, the author gives the following indicators of economic growth calculated by him for different countries (only correlated figures are taken). GNP growth (%/year):

Russia (1883-1887 - 1909-1913) - 3.25%;

Germany (1886-1895 - 1911-1913) - 2.9%;

USA (1880-1890 - 1910-1914) - 3.5%.

One can see some difference in time frames, but the general trend is obvious: in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Russia was among the leaders in terms of economic growth.

One more clarification should be made: at present, economic growth of 3 percent or more is not considered unique against the backdrop of the rapidly growing economies of China and India, where growth at times reaches 10 percent or more per year. But it must be taken into account that at present the speed of all processes, including economic ones, has increased significantly. At the beginning of the 20th century, the main engine of economic growth in most countries was industry, now it is the service sector, which is developing faster than real production. Therefore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, an increase of 3.25% is a very good indicator.

The figures obtained by P. Gregory are confirmed in the research of the Groningen Center for Growth and Development under the leadership of Angus Maddison, the results of which the American economist cites in his monograph.

The Groningen Center study gives us GDP values ​​for different countries of the world for 1900 and 1913, calculated at purchasing power parity (PPP). Let's take a look at some of these numbers.

Changes in the GDP of the leading European powers in 1900 and 1913

In 1900, the GDP of the German Empire was 162,335 million international Geary-Khamis dollars, for the Russian Empire this figure was 154,049 million dollars, and in 1913, the GDP values ​​for Germany and Russia, respectively, amounted to 237,332 million dollars and $232,351 million.

A simple mathematical calculation shows that Germany's GDP grew by 1.46 times over 13 years, and the Russian Empire's by 1.51 times. That is, if these figures are correct, the Russian GDP in 1900-1913. grew faster than Germany.

Studying the economy of the Russian Empire, Paul Gregory talks about the steps that were necessary for successful development:

Russia in the 1870s. had a sufficiently balanced economy to participate in the industrial revolution. The steps that needed to be taken were fairly obvious: reform of land relations, construction of railways, and improvements in education.”

It should be said that it was in these areas that truly revolutionary changes took place during the reign of Nicholas II. By 1913, the Russian Empire took 2nd place in the world in terms of the length of railways. Peasants in 1916 sowed (on their own and rented land) 89.3% of arable land and owned 94% of the livestock.

A real boom took place in Russian education: according to open sources, in the period from 1896 to 1910, 57 thousand primary schools were opened. The number of primary schools has doubled compared to the previous time period. 1,500 lower vocational schools, 600 city schools, 1323 secondary educational institutions have been created, 20 male higher educational institutions and 28 women's universities are being opened.

Thus, the necessary conditions for industrialization in Russia were created. However, there was one more necessary component - capital. An important place in this issue is given by the American economist to the introduction in Russia in 1897 of the so-called "gold standard" - the free conversion of a credit ruble into gold.

Gregory writes:

“The financial and tax policy of Russia since the 1870s. was aimed at joining the world gold standard.<…>

golden ruble

By 1895, the Russian credit ruble was exchanged at a fixed rate for gold rubles. Russia officially introduced the gold standard in 1897, which increased Russia's credibility in the eyes of Western investors.

A distinctive feature of Russian policy in the last quarter of the 19th century was its deliberate pursuit of financial stability in order to attract foreign capital.<…>

Unlike other countries that pursued a policy of financial stability and accumulated gold reserves in order to achieve a stable exchange rate, Russia did this in order to attract capital from abroad.<…>

The financial stability provided by the gold standard was an important asset of Russian business policy. In addition to improving its position in the global financial community, Russia has relied on attracting large amounts of foreign capital. As a result, by 1917 Russia was the world's largest borrower, accounting for about 11% of the world's international debt.<…>

The average annual inflow of foreign investment before the introduction of the gold standard (1885-1897) was 43 million rubles, and during the period of the gold standard (1897-1913) it reached 191 million rubles, an increase of almost 4.4 times . Prior to the introduction of the gold standard, the ratio of foreign investment to national income was just over 0.5% (or 5.5% of all net investment); after the introduction of the gold standard, this ratio was about 1.5% (11% of all net investment in Russia).

These facts require some explanation. There is a point of view that large loans in the foreign market were a huge mistake of the tsarist government, since they made the country dependent on foreign creditors. But, as Paul Gregory states:

“Russia began industrialization with surprisingly high levels of domestic savings. This meant that foreign finance had to play only a supporting role in raising the level of domestic capital accumulation. Pre-revolutionary Russia, unlike the Soviet leadership in the 1930s, was not forced to adopt a radical program of capital formation with the goal of “catching up” with the West in a few years. For tsarist Russia, this was not so necessary.

In other words, the Russian Empire, with the help of its high business reputation and financial stability, was able to attract huge foreign investments into its economy and, among other things, achieved high rates of economic growth due to them. Without loans, these rates would be somewhat lower. It is important to understand that the well-being of the Russian people was built on these funds. The Soviet Union also managed to achieve high rates of economic growth, but millions of lives, sweat and blood of the peoples of the country paid for them.

In conclusion, let us give Paul Gregory's assessment of the prospects for Russia's economic development.

“My book presents the success story of the economy of the Russian Empire: Russian agriculture, despite serious institutional problems, grew as fast as in Europe as a whole.<…>, and in general, the indicators of growth in output in the country exceeded those in Europe. Even if we project this growth very carefully into a hypothetical future, we will see that Russia is only a few decades away from becoming a prosperous economy in all respects.<…>

From my point of view, if Russia after the war had stayed on the path of a market model of development, the growth rates of its economy would have been no less than before the war. In this case, the pace of its development would be ahead of the average European. However, there is every reason to believe that by overcoming many institutional obstacles (by completing the agrarian reform, improving the system of legislation in the field of business regulation), post-war Russia's growth rates would exceed pre-war figures. Any of the proposed scenarios theoretically determines the position of that hypothetical Russia as one of the most developed national economies - not as rich as, say, Germany or France, but close to them.

For decades, Soviet economists and historians have been talking about backward pre-revolutionary Russia, which would not have expected anything good if there had not been a revolution. After the collapse of the USSR, liberal historians, economists, and political scientists took over the baton, repeating the words about “free market” and “democracy” like a mantra, in which only a market economy is possible. And again, they talk about the revolution of 1917 as a necessary step for the modernization of the country.

Paul Gregory's research proves the failure of attempts to justify the revolution of 1917 on economic grounds. No coups were required to turn Russia into an industrial power. All the necessary steps by 1917 had already been taken.

The only "economic" reason for the catastrophe of 1917 lies in the minds of people who associated material well-being with the democratic social structure of Western countries and did not understand that they already had everything necessary to build this well-being with their own hands.

And the power and financial circles of the West, which very scrupulously and objectively assessed the pace of economic growth of tsarist Russia, strongly contributed to removing the dynamically developing competitor.

The outgoing century is actually the first in the history of mankind when it became possible to conduct a more or less reliable analysis of long series of statistical data for countries that make up the majority of the world's population and produce the lion's share of the world product. The decisive role in this was played by the emergence and subsequent improvement of the system of national accounts, the development of the methodology and practice of international economic comparisons. The results of the relevant studies became the statistical base on the basis of which the Institute for Economic Analysis calculated the most important economic indicators for Russia and other countries of the world. [International Comparison of Gross Domestic Product in Europe.1993. Results of the European Comparison Program. UN, New York and Geneva, 1997; Heston A., Summers R. 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Beck, Munchen, 1987; Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik in Zahlen, 1945/49-1980. Von R. Rylewski and M.O. de Hipt. Verlag C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1975-1982; Matolcsy M. and Varga S. The National Income of Hungary, 1924/25-1936/37. P.S. King & Son, Ltd., London, 1938; Icelandic Historical Statistics, Statistics Iceland, Reykjavik, 1997; Mukherjee M. National Income of India. Trends and Structure. Statistical Publishing Society, Calcutta, 1969; Sommario di Statistiche Storiche dell "Italia, 1861-1965. Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Roma, 1968; Sommario di Statistiche Storiche, 1926-1985. Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Roma, 1986; Indagine Statistica sullo Sviluppo del Reddito Nazionale dell "Italia dal 1861 al 1956. Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Roma, 1986; Fua G. Lo Sviluppo Economico in Italy. Vols. 1-3. Franco Angeli Editore, Milano, 1978-1981; Fua G. Notes on Italian Economic Growth, 1861-1964. Editore Giuffre, Milano, 1965; Repaci F.A. La Finanza Pubblica Italiana nel Secolo, 1861-1960. Zanicelli Editore, Bologna, 1962; Forsyth D.J. The Crisis of Liberal Italy. Monetary and Financial Policy, 1914-1922. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993; Changing Economy in Indonesia. A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the early 19th Century up to 1940. Vols. 2, 5, 11. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976-1991; Historical Statistics of Japan. Vols. 1-5. Japan Statistical Association, Tokyo, 1987-1988; Emi K. Government Fiscal Activity and Economic Growth in Japan, 1868-1960. Kinokunia Bookstore Co., Ltd., Tokyo, 1963; Hwang E.-G. The Korean Economies. A Comparison of North and South. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993; Bahl R., Kim C.K., Park C.K. Public Finances During the Korean Modernization Process. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986; Public Finance in Korea. Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 1992; Suh S.C. Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean Economy, 1910-1940. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1978; Statistiques Historiques, 1839-1989. Statec, Luxembourg, 1990; Statistics on the Mexican Economy, 1900-1976. Nacional Finaciera, S.A., Mexico, 1977; Bennett R.L. The Financial Sector and Economic Development. The Mexican Case. The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965; Reynolds C.W. The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1970; Zeventig Jaren Statistiek in Tijdreeksen, 1899-1969. Staatsuitgeverij, Gravenhage, 1970; Tachtig Jaren Statistiek in Tijdreeksen, 1899-1979. Staatsuitgeverij, Gravenhage, 1979; Bloomfield G.T. New Zealand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics. G.K. Hall & Co., Boston, 1984; National Accounts, 1865-1960. Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, Oslo, 1970; Historical Statistics, 1978. Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, Oslo, 1978; Historical Statistics, 1994. Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, PDC, Oslo, 1995; Trends in the Norwegian Economy, 1865-1960. Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, Oslo, 1966; 25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-1972. Central Statistical Office, Karachi, 1972; Portocarrero F.S, Beltran A.B., Romero M.E.R. Compendio Estadistico del Peru: 1900-1990. Universidad del Pacifico, Centro de Investigacion, Lima, 1992; USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-1980. Washington, 1982; Steinberg D. The Soviet Economy. 1970-1990. A Statistical Analysis. San Francisco, 1990; Kudrov V. Soviet economy in retrospect: the experience of rethinking. M., 1997; South African Statistics, 1995. Central Statistical Service, Pretoria, 1997; van Waasdijk T. Public Expenditure in South Africa. Witwatersrand University press, Johannesburg, 1964; Historical Statistics of Sweden. Vols. 1-3. Central Bureau of Statistics, Stockholm, 1959-1960; Krantz O. Offentlig Verksamhet, 1800-1980. Studentlitteratur, Lund, 1987; Historical Statistics of Switzerland. Ed. by H.Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer. Chronos-Verlag, Zurich, 1996; National Income in Taiwan Area of ​​the Republic of China, 1997. National Accounts for 1951-1996. Bureau of Statistics, Taipei, 1997; Po S.P.S. Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1978; Wilson C. Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics. G.K. Hall & Co., Boston, 1983; National Income and Expenditure of Turkey, 1962-1973. State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1974; McCarthy J. The Arab World, Turkey, and The Balkans (1878-1914): A Handbook of Historical Statistics. G.K. Hall & Co., Boston, 1983; Mitchell B.R. British Historical Statistics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; Peacock A.T. and Wiseman J. assisted by J. Veverka. The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961; Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970. Vols. 1-2. US Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C., 1975; Kuznets S. National Product since 1869. Arno Press, New York, 1975; Long Term Economic Growth, 1860-1970. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington, D.C., 1973; National Income and Product Accounts of the United States. Vol. 1, 1929-58, vol. 2, 1959-88. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington, D.C. 1992-1993; Kurian G.T. Datapedia of the United States, 1790-2000. America Year by Year. Bernan Press, Lanham, MD, 1994; Economic Report of the President. US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1999; historical tables. Budget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 1999. US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1998; Izard M. Series Estadisticas para la Historia de Venezuela. Universidad de Los Andes, Merida, 1970; Baptista A. Bases Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1989. Ediciones Maria de Mase, Caracas, 1991; Jugoslavia, 1918-1988. Statisticki Godisnjak. Beograd, 1989; national statistical reference books for various years. ] According to the same sources, in a number of cases the indicators of the national accounts were specified.

Before proceeding directly to the analysis of statistical data, it is necessary to make two more important clarifications. The first of them concerns the time limits of the period under study. Despite the significant achievements of historical statistics in recent times, the quality of statistical indicators decreases significantly as we move away from today, and the number of countries for which relevant estimates are available is sharply reduced. Since more or less reliable estimates of GDP in 1913 were obtained for 50 countries, and in 1900 - only for 41 countries, the choice of the starting point for the period under review was made in favor of 1913. The final point of the period under consideration was 1998 - latest year for which relevant statistics are available.

The second clarification is caused by the limited data on the economic differentiation of regions and parts of the countries of the world that have undergone significant territorial changes during the 20th century. In this regard, in the calculations carried out, an assumption was made, according to which in 1913 the level of GDP per capita production in the territory of the present Czech Republic coincided with the corresponding indicator determined for the territory of the whole of former Czechoslovakia; the indicator of the Russian Federation - with the indicator of the entire Russian Empire, the indicator of present-day Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) - with the indicator of Yugoslavia within the borders of 1948-1991, the indicators of the Northern and Southern parts of Korea in 1913 were taken the same. In other cases, the boundaries of the territories for which economic indicators were determined in 1913 coincide with the boundaries of these countries in 1998.

Economic results of the 20th century

The most important indicators, according to which the position of a country in the world economy is traditionally judged, are the area of ​​its territory, the population, the GDP produced, the volume of exported goods, as well as the values ​​of the last two indicators per capita. Table data. 1 indicate a radical decline in the place and role of Russia in the world's territory, population, and economy during the 20th century. If the share of Russia in the land area of ​​the planet decreased by 23%, then in the world population - by 74% (almost 4 times), and in world GDP - by 83% (almost 6 times). If we eliminate the influence of the factor of shrinking territory as a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire, and then the USSR, and compare the indicators related to the Russian Federation within the boundaries of 1998, then Russia's share in the world population has more than halved, and in world GDP - more than than three times.

Table 1. Changes in the share of Russia in the world in the twentieth century

A source: IEA

The significant relative (and absolute, in terms of population) decline in Russia's demographic and economic potential has led to sharp disproportions in terms of Russia's relative weight in the world. If in 1913 the share of the country in the world territory exceeded its share in the population and GDP of the world by about one and a half times, then in 1998 the share of Russia in the world population was 4.6 times, and the share in world GDP - in 7 more than once less than its share in the world territory. As world history convincingly demonstrates, no one has been able to maintain such disproportions for a long time in the presence of neighboring countries rapidly increasing their demographic, economic and military potentials. Sooner or later there will be a correction. If a country that finds itself in a similar situation does not restore its demographic and economic potential to an acceptable level in a timely manner, the inevitable "adjustment" occurs at the expense of the territory.

A radical change in Russia's place in the world occurred under the influence of a number of factors, among which three main groups can be distinguished - territorial, demographic and economic. According to Table. 1 we define the contribution of each of these groups.

• Territorial. The collapse of the Russian Empire at first, and then the former USSR and the acquisition by almost two dozen peoples living on their territory of their state independence allow us to explain by 100% the decrease in the share of Russia in the area of ​​the world's land surface, by 61.9% - in the world population , by 34.6% - in world GDP. Perhaps, the action of only this group of factors should be recognized as historically quite objective and inevitable.
• Demographic. Relatively lower than the world average, birth rates, higher mortality rates and, accordingly, average life expectancy can explain 38.1% in the reduction in the share of Russia in the world population and 21.2% in the decrease in the share of Russia in world GDP. An analysis of the immediate causes of the demographic catastrophe that broke out in Russia in the 20th century is beyond the scope of this article. It should only be noted here that the significant influence of economic factors on demographic dynamics is beyond doubt.
• Economic. The decline in the relative per capita output of GDP (from 96.7% of the world average in 1913 to 66.1% in 1998) explains the 44.2% reduction in Russia's share in world GDP. If we recognize the fact of the double collapse of the empire as natural, beyond the effective influence of national authorities, and exclude territorial factors from our consideration, then economic reasons can explain 67.6% of the change in Russia's place in the world economy. If, in addition to this, the demographic development of a country is recognized solely as the result of its economic development, then economic causes become in fact the only ones in explaining the change in the country's place in the world economy.

Be that as it may, even when using the most conservative approaches, it is obvious that the reduction in the share of Russia in the world economy in the 20th century is predetermined primarily by a significantly slower growth in GDP per capita than the world average. Why has Russia's economic growth been so slow?

Country differences in economic growth rates

In order to answer this question, let us compare the results of the economic development of 50 countries of the world in 1913-1998. (Table 2). Consideration of these data allows us to formulate several important observations.

Table 2. Dynamics of GDP per capita in 1913-1998

A source: IEA

First, there was an absolute increase in GDP per capita in all countries, and positive economic growth was recorded in all countries. Therefore, it is impossible to judge the successes or failures in economic development in the long term only on the basis of data on the absolute values ​​of growth. It is necessary to have an idea of ​​how the economic growth in a given country turned out to be compared with the indicators of other countries, with average regional or world averages.

Second, economic growth in the countries of the world turned out to be extremely uneven. If we use as a criterion the rate of economic growth in the United States, then the best results in 1913-1998. demonstrated by Japan, Taiwan, Norway, Iceland and Finland. If we take as a starting point the average level of GDP per capita, then these same countries have improved their performance to the greatest extent. On the other hand, Argentina, Cuba, New Zealand, the Philippines and North Korea worsened them the most.

Third, according to the change in its position on the GDP per capita scale, Russia was in the bottom quintile of the list along with the above-mentioned countries, as well as Bulgaria, Myanmar, Yugoslavia and Bangladesh. Thus, the 20th century was "lost" economically not only by Russia, but also by a number of other countries.

The change in the relative position of countries on the global scale is predetermined by differences in their economic growth rates (Table 3). The absolute record holder for this indicator in the 20th century was Taiwan, where GDP per capita increased by an average of 3.64% per year and, as a result, increased by almost 21 times over 85 years. Taiwan is followed by Japan and South Korea. These three countries were able to demonstrate real "economic miracles" in the past century. On the opposite side of the scale are Cuba, Myanmar and North Korea, countries whose economic development in the coming century deserves to be called "economic disaster." Here, the same as in Table. 2, the Russian Federation is in the quintile of countries with the lowest rates of economic development.

Table 3 Growth of GDP per capita in 1913-1998

A source: table 2

Table data. 3 allow us to draw attention to the cumulative effect of average annual economic growth rates. Differences between the extremes of average annual economic growth at first glance look very small - only 3.26% per year (the difference between Taiwan and Cuba). However, maintaining a difference at this rate for 85 years results in more than 15-fold differences in absolute growth rates. As a result, Taiwan (in 1913 the Chinese island of Formosa, under Japanese colonial rule), which at that time was one of the poorest countries in the world, by the end of the century became one of the richest countries in the world (in terms of GDP per capita - at the level Sweden and New Zealand). On the other hand, Cuba, which was quite prosperous in 1913 (at the level of Finland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Greece), by the end of the century sank to the level of Pakistan.

Seemingly insignificant fluctuations in average annual economic growth rates over a long period of time lead to truly amazing results. For example, an increase in the average annual growth rate over 85 years by "only" 1.0% can increase the absolute indicator of GDP per capita from 1.45 times to 3.37 times (indicators of Myanmar and Indonesia), from 2.35 times to 5.34 times (indicators of Argentina and Switzerland), from 3.54 times to 8.27 times (indicators of Australia and Iceland), from 9.12 times to 20.91 times (indicators of Finland and Taiwan). In effect, this means that by increasing the average annual economic growth rate by 1%, over a period of less than a century, it is possible to achieve more than a doubling of output and per capita income.

What explains country differences in economic growth rates?

Types of economic systems and economic growth

Factors often cited to explain country differences in economic growth rates include: country dimensions or the size of the economy. It is argued that large countries (in terms of population or GDP) cannot grow as fast as relatively small countries do. Graphs 1 and 2 show that there is no statistically significant relationship between country size and economic growth rates. There are large countries whose economic growth rates have exceeded the world average for a century - Japan, the USA, Germany, Brazil, France. On the other hand, there are many small and medium-sized countries that have developed extremely slowly - Cuba, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Ghana, New Zealand, Hungary. Of the two Koreas, the more populous southern part of the country has become one of the world leaders in terms of economic growth, while the smaller northern part has become one of the world leaders in terms of stagnation. Of the two Germanys, the demographically and economically larger Western part of the country developed more rapidly, while the smaller Eastern part lagged more and more behind [Main trends in the world economy in the second half of the twentieth century. -- Economic questions, 1997, "10, pp. 134--135].

According to another popular belief, an important role in determining the rate of economic growth is played by starting level of economic development. Less developed countries are said to be growing faster than more developed ones. True, there is another point of view, according to which poor countries fall into the so-called "poverty trap", from which they then cannot get out. Graph 3 shows that there is no statistically significant relationship (neither negative nor positive) between the initial level of economic development and subsequent economic growth rates. There are countries in the world that were very rich in 1913, and then developed both very quickly (Ireland, Denmark, Switzerland, USA) and rather slowly (Argentina, New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain). On the other hand, some countries that were very poor in 1913 remained in this cohort (North Korea, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India). Others have shown fantastic economic growth rates and have been able to really break out of poverty (Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand).

The absence of any relationship between the initial level of economic development and the rate of economic growth was also shown for a wider set of countries for the period 1979-1996. [The secret of China's economic "miracle". -- Economic questions, 1998, "4, p. 16]. It was also demonstrated there that the structure of production and employment does not affect the rate of economic growth [ there, from. 16--17].

Thus, neither the size of the country (or economy), nor the initial level of economic development, nor the features of the structure of the economy are able to explain country differences in economic growth rates. How are they explained?

Let us check whether such a factor plays any role as type of economic system. To do this, all countries from the table. 3 we will group on the basis of the existence of a centrally planned economy (CPE) in them during any period of time in the 20th century (Table 4). There were 8 such countries out of our list of 50 countries. The remaining 42 countries formed a group of countries with a market economy, respectively (including such slowly developing countries as Myanmar, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and India).

Table 4 Economic growth in countries with different economic systems in 1913-1998.

љ A source: table 2

Average annual economic growth rates in the group of 8 ETCs (1.18%) were notably lower than the average for the 42 market economies (1.94%) than the average for the entire sample of 50 countries (1.82 %) and even than the world average (1.56%). Moreover, none of the CPE countries during the 20th century had an average annual economic growth rate that exceeded the average for the entire sample of 50 countries (1.82%). Therefore, despite an almost 2.9-fold increase in absolute per capita GDP (from $1,568 to $4,541), the relative positions of this group of countries have noticeably deteriorated. In relation to the world average, its indicator fell from 94.5 to 73.6%, in relation to the average indicator of a sample of 50 countries - from 66.5 to 36.9%, in relation to the average level of a group of countries with a market economy - - from 62.5 to 32.9%.

Accordingly, the relative positions of the group of countries with market economies (despite huge differences within it) improved significantly, and the absolute growth of GDP per capita in them turned out to be twice as fast as in the countries with the CPE (5.93 and 2.89 times).

Against the results and conclusions obtained here, an objection is possible related to the choice of a specific comparison period, since for many former socialist countries the 1990s turned out to be years of deep economic crisis, and, consequently, the results of their economic development turn out to be worse than they could be and were before. the beginning of this crisis. In order to test the extent to which this objection is justified, a comparison was made of the economic development rates of the countries with the CPE (and their regions that later became independent states) during the "golden age" of their economic growth - from 1950 to 1989. (for the USSR and post-Soviet states - from 1950 to 1991) [The main trends in the world economy in the second half of the twentieth century. -- Economic questions, 1997, "10, pp. 130--137.]. It turned out that not a single country with a CPE, even in this most favorable period for them, developed faster than comparable countries with a market economy.

Thus, a pattern well known from practical experience is statistically confirmed: an economic system based on central planning hinders rapid economic growth. Countries with centrally planned economies tend to develop more slowly than countries with market economies.

The formulation of this postulate is important, but not sufficient. He does not answer many questions.

• Firstly, contrary to fairly common expectations, the transition to a market economy in Russia and a number of other countries with a CPE has not yet led to an acceleration of economic growth and a significant improvement in people's well-being. On the contrary, in many countries the transition to a market economy was accompanied by an aggravation of the economic crisis. The protracted lack of economic growth (and in some cases a sharp decline in production), a significant decline in living standards made some observers express doubts about the correctness of the transition to a market economy. For many of them, albeit low, but nevertheless positive rates of economic growth in a planned economy look much more attractive than a rapid reduction in production or its stagnation in a market economy.
• Secondly, some market economies have had long-term economic growth rates comparable to those of the CPE countries or even lower. In particular, the economic growth in China turned out to be faster than in any other large Asian country with a market economy - India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia. The Czech economy developed faster (even taking into account the crisis of the 1990s) than the highly developed Australian or New Zealand ones. And Hungary and Bulgaria had higher growth rates than market Argentina or the Philippines. Why?
• Thirdly, among countries with a market economy, the spread of values ​​between the average annual economic growth rates is very large and reaches 3.20% (between Taiwan and Myanmar). This means that in the presence of a market economy in 85 years it is possible to increase per capita income in the country by more than 20 times and only by 45%. How can such a huge difference be explained?

The answer to these questions lies in the nature of the economic policy pursued.

Types of economic policy and economic growth

In order to reveal the nature of the impact of economic policy on economic growth, 42 market economies were grouped by economic growth rates (top half of Table 5). A fairly clear negative relationship was found between them and public finance indicators (government spending and budget deficit), normalized by the level of economic development. The latter was defined as the ratio of GDP per capita of the respective country to the world average. Consequently, indicators of public finances, normalized by the level of economic development, show the extent to which the state financial burden on the economy in a given country deviates from the “normal” value for it, predetermined by its level of economic development.

Table 5 Economic growth in countries with market economies in 1913-1998.

It turned out (and this can be called the second postulate) that The highest rates of economic growth are observed in countries that pursued the most liberal economic policies and had the lowest rates of government spending and budget deficit, normalized by the level of economic development. Conversely, the countries with the highest state burden on the economy are characterized by the lowest rates of economic growth.

To test the obtained pattern, the same 42 market economies were regrouped this time depending on the size of the state burden on the economy, normalized by the level of economic development. The pattern has been preserved: countries with the least government burden on the economy grow much faster than countries in which the government burden on the economy is significantly greater.

The same pattern was then tested in a subset of 8 countries with CPE (upper and lower parts of Table 6). Although the absolute values ​​of the state burden on the economy have increased significantly compared to countries with a market economy, the pattern has retained its effect on a significantly narrower sample. And among the countries with the CPE, the countries in which the relative level of state burden on the economy was lower than the average for the group developed relatively faster. Countries with a higher state burden on the economy developed the slowest.

Table 6 Economic growth in countries with centrally planned economies (CPE) in 1913-1998.

Calculated according to tables 5 and 6 of the Appendix

The revealed relationship linking the rate of economic growth with the size of the state financial burden on the economy seems to be of a universal nature. It is not only confirmed when comparing the averages for subgroups of countries with market economies, with the CPE, and for the entire sample of 50 countries (lower parts of tables 5 and 6), but also when constructing regression equations (graphs 4 and 5). The curve formed by the trend line describing the relationship between the level of government spending and the rate of economic growth can be called economic growth curve in the 20th century.

This curve shows that in countries where development-adjusted government spending exceeds 100% of GDP [because government fiscal burdens are normalized to economic development, they can exceed 100% of GDP], the average annual economic growth during the century did not exceed 1%. Reducing the normalized state burden on the economy to 50% of GDP raises potential economic growth rates to 1.5% per year. A further reduction in the normalized state burden on the economy to 30% of GDP will increase the potential growth rate of the economy to a little over 2 percent per year. With a decrease in the load to 20% of GDP, it is possible to accelerate economic growth to 2.5% per year, and if it is reduced to 15% of GDP and below the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita rise up to 3% per year.

To determine the possibilities of each type of economic system in terms of achieving the desired rate of economic growth, let's combine the upper parts of the table. 5 and 6 in the table. 7 in such a way that the groups of countries of the world in it were arranged in descending order of average annual economic growth rates. It turned out 5 peculiar "steps" on the "ladder" of economic growth. The top two positions (with growth rates above 2.5% and between 2.0 and 2.5% per year) are occupied exclusively by market economies. Therefore, in order to achieve the maximum rate of economic growth, it is necessary to simultaneously have a market economic system and low parameters of the state financial burden on the economy. At the bottom three "steps" of economic growth (from 1.5 to 2.0%, from 1.0 to 1.5% and less than 1% per year) one can find himself in both a market economy and a centrally planned economy. At the same time, however, CPE countries tend to have much higher levels of fiscal burden than their market counterparts.

Table 7 Ranking groups of countries in the world by economic growth rates,
type of economic system and parameters of economic policy in 1913-1998.

The economy of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century.

On the one hand, history teaches us that in 1917 a social revolution took place in the Russian Empire, caused by the plight of the workers and peasants.

On the other hand, historians argue that the Russian Empire in the mid-19th - early 20th centuries demonstrated phenomenal economic growth.

The volume of industrial production in the country during this period increased seven times. All the results of the Stalinist five-year plans were compared not with anything, but with the level of 1913.

The discrepancy between these two statements over and over again makes researchers look for conspiracy theories behind the revolutionary events that turned our history upside down. Well, this is their right - but a completely exhaustive explanation can be obtained, bypassing the role of palace conspiracies, spies and agents of foreign influence.

“In 1913,” many publicists and amateur historians write, “a new page was opened in the history of aviation, the world's first four-engine aircraft took off. Its creator was the Russian designer I. I. Sikorsky. In 1913, the gunsmith V. G. Fedorov began testing an automatic rifle. The development of this idea during the First World War was the famous Fedorov assault rifle.

Note that the number 1913 in such articles, reports and infographics is more common than any other. The same was in the days of the USSR.

Indeed, in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the government of the Russian Empire actively used measures to stimulate the economy, develop production and commodity markets, and protect domestic producers.

Protectionist measures - up to protective customs tariffs - were the general policy of the Ministry of Finance. In foreign trade, the authorities adhered to the strategy of creating a positive trade balance, and general economic success made it possible to introduce gold circulation in the country in 1897.

For the development of large-scale industry, the empire widely attracted foreign investment. During 1861-1880, the share of Russian investments in production amounted to 28%, foreign - 72%. From 1893 to 1903, up to 5.5 billion rubles were invested in railway, industrial and urban construction, which was 25% more than investments over the previous 30 years.

In the Donbass and Krivoy Rog, there were 17 new metallurgical plants created with the participation of French, Belgian, as well as German and English capital.

In the field of oil production (Baku fields), in addition to the "Russified" Nobel Brothers Partnership, the French banking house Rothschild Brothers has been actively working since 1886, here they cooperated with the British firms Lane and McAndrew, Samuel and Company and others.

The main areas for Franco-Belgian capital were the metallurgy and coal industry of the South of Russia, for the British - the copper and gold mining industry, for the German ones - the chemical and electrical industries, as well as the heavy industry of Poland and the Baltic states.

In total, from 1860 to 1900, the volume of industrial output in the empire increased more than seven times. Russia confidently entered the top five most economically developed countries in the world.

It is possible to list the unique achievements of pre-revolutionary Russia for a long time. And all this will be true. However, there are numerous buts.

The order for the famous Fedorov assault rifle (self-loading rifle) was indeed placed during the First World War, but it was not possible to establish its serial production at the enterprises due to the low production culture. During the test in the troops in 1916, according to the designer himself, the sample did not give good results due to manufacturing flaws and the complexity of the design, as Fedorov himself wrote about.

Record-breaking aircraft were built in the Russian Empire, but the country simply did not have its own aircraft engine building until 1915. Sikorsky's four-engine Ilya Muromets, unique for its time, was equipped with 130-horsepower Mercedes engines, and its predecessor, the four-engine record-breaking Russian Knight, was equipped with German 100-horsepower engines manufactured by Argus Motoren.

Sopwith biplanes were also not Russian-made machines: Sopwith Aviation Company is a British company. And, just as importantly, this is a production car, not built to set records. It was used in both the French and Russian Air Forces, and during the First World War, in the Air Forces of other countries.

The Russian-Baltic Carriage Works in Riga produced quite modern cars for their time, you can’t argue with that. In the Russian Empire, submarines were also developed, for example, the Dolphin and Kasatka. But the type "Catfish", with which network authors do not hesitate to illustrate their stories about the industrial successes of Nicholas II, was an American project of the Dutch company.

As for the metaphorical "plow", indeed, in 1909 at the shipyards of St. Petersburg were laid down (and launched in 1911) four Russian dreadnoughts - battleships of the "Sevastopol" type. In 1911-1917, three more battleships of a somewhat lightweight design were built for the Black Sea Fleet - the Empress Maria type.

But everything is relative. The British "Dreadnought", which made a naval revolution and gave rise to the "dreadnought race", was laid down in 1905 and launched in 1906. From 1906 to 1909, seven more dreadnought-type ships were laid down at the shipyards of England. In 1909, another revolution in naval affairs took place - the battleship Orion was laid down, which gave the name to the series of ships of the same name (three more were laid down in 1910).

Thus began the era of superdreadnoughts, for which the Russian battleships of the Sevastopol and Empress Maria types were late.

To show how much Russia has changed over the 100 years preceding the revolution, we note that in 1817 the construction of the St. Petersburg-Moscow Highway, the second highway in the empire, that is, gravel, was started and completed in 1833. In 1820, a regular stagecoach service between the two capitals was opened - the journey took 4.5 days.

For 10 years, 33 thousand people were transported along this route, three thousand a year - this was the scale of passenger traffic between the largest cities of the country.

The first Russian railway - Tsarskoye Selo - was opened in 1837, just 80 years before the Revolution. The second, connecting St. Petersburg and Moscow, - in 1851. By the 80s of the 19th century, the length of railways in Russia reached 20 thousand km. From 1893 to 1902, another 27,000 km of rail tracks came into operation. For comparison, in the United States by 1869, 85 thousand km of steam railways were built - an average of 2 thousand km per year.

Prior to the widespread development of railway communication, the empire did not have a country-wide market - it was fragmented into several parts that were not connected with each other.

The grain trade is most indicative in this sense: in the first half of the 19th century, experts identify at least three regional market conditions with their own internal pricing - the Volga market, which developed along the main waterway of the country, the Central Black Earth and the Black Sea-Ural. In practice, this meant the following.

“In 1843, the cost of 1 quarter of rye (about 200 kg) in Estonia rose, due to crop failure, to 7 rubles. At the same time, in the Chernihiv, Kiev, Poltava, Kharkov provinces, a sack of flour (144 kg) was sold at 1 ruble. 20 kop. It was practically impossible to deliver grain from this fertile region to the starving provinces, and the country that exported grain abroad through the ports of the Black and Azov Seas, at the same time had to import it through the Baltic.

The situation developed in a similar way two years later - in the Pskov province the price of a quarter of rye increased to 10 rubles, and in Orel and Mtsensk it did not go for one and a half rubles. “Such a difference in prices did not exist in any developed country in the world,” historians say.

“Everyone knows,” wrote the economist, member of the State Council L. V. Tengoborsky, “that due to the lack of good communications, it often happens that many of our provinces suffer from famine and epidemic diseases, while in other provinces there is such an excess of grain, that they have nowhere to put it.”

Only large-scale railway construction made it possible to create a single market for food and industrial goods in the country - by the 80s of the XIX century. But the crisis of transportation in 1914-1916 again threw Russia into the past, breaking up the single economic space into many poorly connected regions, provoking famine in some places and an excess of bread in others.

Only 30 years elapsed between these events - the creation of the single market and its collapse during the war.

It is pointless to argue with the fact that the growth rates of the empire's economy were truly impressive. But as of the textbook year 1913, in terms of the main economic indicators (coal mining, iron and steel production, the volume of engineering products, the length of railway lines), Russia was inferior to the USA, Germany, Great Britain and France, ahead of Italy, Spain and Japan. That is, it closed the top five leaders of economic development.

At the same time, the high growth rates of that period are explained by the effect of a low start. Such an indicator as "the rate of economic growth" is generally extremely crafty. At the beginning of the 21st century, Iraq showed phenomenal rates - which is not surprising, because the United States democratically bombed it into the Stone Age. Against the backdrop of complete devastation, the launch of even one oil well immediately gave economic growth, measured by tens of percent. But this did not cancel the devastation in everything else.

The story of Russia's rapid economic development at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries gives many the impression of linear upward growth. But this is a deep delusion - the country during this period developed extremely unevenly.

Historians single out the crises of 1857, 1866-1867, 1869, 1873-1875, 1881-1883, but the most destructive was the financial crisis of 1898-1903, which grew into an economic and economic disaster.

The nature of this crisis was directly related to the large-scale attraction of foreign capital to Russia. Commercial banks, bursting with money going to the empire, willingly credited the stock market game, issuing loans secured by securities. But in 1898, throughout the West, because of their own crisis, discount rates were raised. Western players began withdrawing their capital from Russia and dumping Russian securities.

In August 1899, the news of the bankruptcy of two of the largest entrepreneurs, owners of many banks and companies, Mamontov and von Derviz, sounded like a bolt from the blue. The stock market began to panic. September 23 of that year went down in history as the “black day of the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange”.

This panic gave rise to a protracted financial crisis. Its scale can be represented from the following data: from 1899 to 1902, the share price of the South-Eastern Railway fell by 52.6%, the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works - by 63.4%, the Putilov Plant - by 67.1%. The fall in shares meant a decrease in the capitalization of enterprises, thus, the financial crisis developed into an industrial one.

Newspapers wrote: "Payments are being suspended, trading establishments are shutting down, factories and factories are downsizing or outright shutting down work." According to far from complete data, almost 100,000 workers were fired from iron mines and ferrous metallurgy enterprises by 1903 alone. In the mining industry in 1900-1903, 3088 factories and factories were closed, 112.4 thousand people were laid off. So mass unemployment came to the empire.

“In Nikolaev,” historians note, “there were 2 thousand dismissed factory workers, in the Yekaterinoslav province - 10 thousand, in Yuzovka - 15 thousand.” “Factories,” the press reported, “with a few exceptions, stopped working; many workers roam the city in search of work or bread.”

In this light, the nature of the First Russian Revolution of 1905 becomes much clearer. Understanding the nature of the February Revolution of 1917, when the workers demanded bread on the streets, although there was no famine in the country, is also not difficult.

Many authors rightly point out that even at the height of the grain crisis in Petrograd in February 1917, there were enough other products in stores - from fish to sausages. But the fact is that the main food product of workers in the cities of the empire was precisely bread.

According to budget surveys of St. Petersburg textile workers in 1908, per consumer in their families with an annual income of about 200 rubles (per adult) consumed 21 pounds of butter, 107 pounds of meat, 163 pieces of herring, 57 bottles of milk, and bread - 927 pounds per year.

Similar surveys of Tula workers in 1916 gave the following results: 196.7 pounds of milk and butter were consumed per year, fish - 11 pounds, meat - 76.4 pounds, vegetables - 792 pounds, bread - 709 pounds, of which white, wheat - only 297.1 pounds.

During the First World War, as a result of a transport crisis, the price of bread in European Russia tripled. This was a monstrous blow to the family budgets of a huge mass of the population.

During the war, the state of the Russian Empire did not make any attempts to ration the supply of food, to arrange the distribution of bread that had become scarce, to introduce a rationing distribution system.

In some places, cards were introduced on their own initiative by local authorities, in each case their own, but they did not have the ability to control the market as a whole, so they did not go further than trying to somehow distribute the reserves available in the cities.

In February 1917, due to the worsening railroad crisis, bread ran out in the capital of the empire, in Petrograd. What follows is well known.

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