The share of the USSR in world production. The development of Russia, the USSR and the USA in charts

The economy of the USSR is the 2nd in terms of GDP in the world (after the US economy) economy on the territory of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which produced 1/5 of the world's industrial output. The economy of the USSR was the first in history to be centrally planned, which was carried out by three state institutions:
Gosplan of the USSR - State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
State Bank of the USSR - State Bank
Gossnab of the USSR - the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for material and technical supply Before the October Revolution of 1917, Russia lagged far behind the industrially developed capitalist states. In terms of industrial production, it ranked 5th in the world and 4th in Europe.

The first major state planning project was the GOELRO plan, followed by five-year plans - "five-year plans". The main emphasis of economic planning was placed on the rapid development of heavy industry in a short time to the detriment of the development of other consumer sectors, as a result of which, a few years after the start of planning, the USSR turned into one of the largest industrial and agricultural powers in the world. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was of great importance in the further development of the state economy. With the greatest efforts of the people, the Soviet Union managed to restore its positions in the world economy in less than 10 years after the end of the destructive war and subsequently take leadership positions in many respects. Already by the 1960s, the USSR economy ranked first in the world in: coal mining, iron ore mining, coke and cement production, production of diesel locomotives, production of sawn timber, woolen fabrics, granulated sugar and animal oil, etc. Second place in the world - the production of all industrial products, electricity, oil and gas production, the production of steel, pig iron, chemical products, mineral fertilizers, engineering products, cotton fabrics, etc. Later, the USSR overtook its world competitors in the production of steel, iron, oil production, the production of mineral fertilizers, reinforced concrete structures, footwear, etc. A distinctive feature of the economy in the late history of the Soviet Union is the shortage of consumer goods, which is explained by the imperfection of pricing processes and soft monetary policy, which aggravated during the period of perestroika. In the mid-1980s, the leadership of the Soviet Union made an attempt to restructure the Soviet way of managing with the introduction of elements of a free market - a mixed economy. However, by the 1990s, the Soviet Government had lost control over the state's economy for a number of reasons, which resulted in the accelerated collapse of the Soviet Union for the country.

The basis of the economic system of the USSR is socialist ownership of the means of production. It arose and became firmly established as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 and the building of socialism in the USSR. The working class, in alliance with the working peasantry, under the leadership of the Communist Party, abolished the political power of the bourgeoisie and landlords; through the nationalization and socialization of the main means of production in the most important sectors of the national economy, he won economic positions in the country. Relying on socialist property in these decisive spheres of the economy, the working class, under the leadership of the Communist Party, transformed small-scale peasant farming into large-scale socialist farming through cooperation. Small private peasant property was replaced by large-scale socialist collective-farm and cooperative property. As a result, by the mid-1930s socialist property in two forms - state and collective-farm-cooperative - became undividedly dominant in the country's economy

This led to a fundamental change in the goal of production, which began to be determined by the basic economic law of socialism, to ensure the well-being and all-round development of all members of society through the most complete satisfaction of their constantly growing material and cultural needs, achieved through the continuous growth and improvement of societies. production based on scientific and technological progress. This law expresses the fundamental advantages of the Soviet socialist economy over the capitalist economy, the aim of which is the pursuit of the greatest profit. Socialist ownership of the means of production gives scope for the development of the productive forces, since the socialist relations of production based on it fully correspond to their character. The socialist economy, unlike the capitalist one, develops according to plan, without crises and recessions. This ensures stable and high growth rates for the entire national economy. The socialist economy has possibilities, not limited by the framework of private property, of concentrating production and deepening the division of societies. labor through specialization and cooperation, which contributes to the rapid growth of the productivity of societies. labor is the main condition for the victory of the new society. building over the old.

Socialist property, the operation of the economic law of planned, proportional development of the national economy, opened up for the first time in the history of society the possibility of developing the entire national economy in accordance with a single state plan. A centrally planned economy provides benefits such as the concentration of resources in critical areas of societies. production, proportional development of the national economy. Plannedness makes it possible to better, more fully and efficiently use the resources of society - material, monetary and labor, first of all, to solve problems of national importance. The Soviet state maintains constant proportionality on the scale of the entire national economy, strictly taking into account the needs of society and the resources at its disposal, applying knowledge of the laws of societies. development, guided by the Marxist-Leninist theory. On the basis of scientific foresight, through planning, the Soviet state is improving the structure of social production.

The management of the national economy is carried out on the basis of democratic centralism, which involves the participation in this process of the working masses through state elected bodies, public organizations, production meetings held at each enterprise, etc., a nationwide discussion of national economic plans that make it possible to open and use production reserves. A form of mass participation of the working people in the planning and management of the national economy is also reciprocal plans that promote the development of the creative potential and energy of the people.

The driving force behind the economic development of the country has become mass socialist competition, the opposite of capitalist competition, which divides people and is inextricably linked with anarchy and the spontaneous nature of capitalist production. Socialist emulation raises the consciousness and patriotism of the working people in the interests of the further rapid development of the economy, the growth of production efficiency and labor productivity.

The Soviet economy is inherent in the socialist principle of distribution according to work (according to its quantity and quality - qualifications). Personal and collective material interest in the results of labor stimulates the growth of its productivity and production at every workplace, enterprise, throughout society.

The planned development of the economy ensures the rational allocation of production. forces throughout the country. During the years of Soviet power there have been fundamental changes in the distribution of production. forces associated with the growth of industrial production in the Union republics and the general advancement of production in the eastern regions of the country, rich in natural resources of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, coal, oil and gas, timber, and hydropower.

The USSR and the USA are two world superpowers that competed for supremacy in everything from the post-war period to the early 90s of the last century. A very important aspect of this struggle was the economy. Particularly great importance was given to the GDP of the USSR and the USA. Comparison of these indicators was quite a powerful tool in the propaganda of both countries. But at the same time, with the help of these economic data, we can now, through the veil of past years, restore the real state of affairs in the countries under study. So, what was the GDP of the USSR and the USA during the period of their rivalry?

The concept of gross product

But before analyzing the GDP of the USSR and the USA, let's find out what this concept is in general and what types of it exist.

Gross domestic product (GDP) is the value of all goods and services produced in a particular state or region. If we divide the total GDP by the average population of the territory to which it belongs, then we get the gross product per capita.

The indicators can be divided into two large groups: nominal and purchasing power parity. The nominal is expressed in the national currency, or in terms of the currency of any other country at the established rate. When calculating GDP at parity, the ratio of currencies to each other in terms of purchasing power for a specific type of goods or services is taken into account.

Comparison of economic indicators before World War II

Although the main peak of rivalry between the USSR and the USA falls on the period after World War II, for the sake of completeness, it would be useful to look at how their GDP changed in the first half of the 20th century.

The pre-war period was quite difficult both for the economy of the USSR and for V. At that time, the country was being restored after the Civil War, which resulted in two strong famine periods in 1922 and 1932-1933, and the United States in 1929-1932 experienced a period its history, known as the Great Depression.

Most of all, the economy of the country of the Soviets sank in relation to the US GDP immediately after the Civil War in 1922. Back then, domestic GDP was only about 13% of that of the United States. But, in the following years, the USSR began to rapidly reduce the backlog. By the pre-war 1940, the GDP of the USSR was equal to $417 billion in terms of the American currency, which was already 44% of the US figure. That is, the Americans at that time had a gross domestic product of about $950 billion.

But the outbreak of war hit the economy of the USSR much more painfully than the American one. This was due to the fact that the fighting took place directly on the territory of the Soviet Union, and the United States fought only abroad. By the end of World War II, the USSR's GDP was only about 17% of the US gross domestic product. But, again, after the restoration of production began, the gap between the economies of the two states began to rapidly decrease.

Comparison of GDP 1950-1970

In 1950, the share of the USSR in world GDP was 9.6%. This amounted to 35% of US GDP, which is even lower than the pre-war level, but, nevertheless, much higher than the figure for the first post-war year.

In subsequent years, the difference in the size of the gross products of the two superpowers, which by that time were the USSR and the USA, was increasingly reduced, although not at such a rapid pace as before. By 1970, the Soviet GDP was about 40% of that of the United States, which was already quite impressive.

USSR GDP after 1970

Most of all, we are interested in the state of the economy of the USSR and the USA after 1970 until the end, when the rivalry between them reached its maximum. Therefore, for this period, we consider the GDP of the USSR by years. Then we will do the same with the gross domestic product of the United States. Well, in the final stage, we compare these results.

USSR GDP for 1970 - 1990 in million dollars:

• 1970 - 433,400;
• 1971 - 455,600;
• 1972 - 515,800;
• 1973 - 617,800;
• 1974 - 616,600;
• 1975 - 686,000;
• 1976 - 688,500;
• 1977 - 738,400;
• 1978 - 840,100;
• 1979 - 901,600;
• 1980 - 940,000;
• 1981 - 906,900;
• 1982 - 959,900;
• 1983 - 993,000;
• 1984 - 938,300;
• 1985 - 914 100;
• 1986 - 946,900;
• 1987 - 888,300;
• 1988 - 866,900;
• 1989 - 862,000;
• 1990 - 778,400.

As you can see, in 1970 the gross domestic product in the USSR was 433,400 million dollars. Until 1973, it rose to 617,800 million dollars. The following year there was a slight drop, and then growth resumed again. In 1980, GDP reached the level of 940,000 million dollars, but the next year there was a significant drop - 906,900 million dollars. This situation was associated with a sharp drop in world oil prices. But, we must pay tribute to the fact that already in 1982, GDP resumed growth. In 1983, it reached its maximum - 993,000 million dollars. This is the largest value of the gross domestic product for the entire existence of the Soviet Union.

But in subsequent years, an almost continuous decline began, which clearly characterized the state of the USSR economy of that period. The only episode of short-term growth was observed in 1986. The GDP of the USSR in 1990 was $778,400 million. It was the seventh largest result in the world, and the total share of the Soviet Union in the world's gross product was 3.4%. Thus, if compared with 1970, the gross product increased by $345,000 million, but at the same time, starting from 1982, it fell by $559,600 million.

But here you need to take into account one more detail, the dollar, like any currency, is subject to inflation. Therefore, $778,400 million in 1990, converted to 1970 prices, will be equal to $1,092 million. As we can see, in this case, from 1970 to 1990, we will observe an increase in GDP in the amount of $658,600 million.

We considered this value, if we talk about GDP at purchasing power parity, then in 1990 it amounted to 1971.5 billion dollars.

The value of the gross product for individual republics

Now let's take a look at how much the GDP of the USSR in the republics was in 1990, or rather, how much, in percentage terms, each subject of the Union put into the common piggy bank of gross income.

Naturally, the richest and most populous republic, the RSFSR, brought more than half into the common pot. Its share was 60.33%. Then followed the second most populous and the third largest republic - Ukraine. The gross domestic product of this subject of the USSR was 17.8% of the all-Union. In third place is the second largest republic - Kazakhstan (6.8%).

Other republics had the following indicators:

• Belarus - 2.7%.
• Uzbekistan - 2%.
• Azerbaijan - 1.9%.
• Lithuania - 1.7%.
• Georgia - 1.2%.
• Turkmenistan - 1%.
• Latvia - 1%.
• Estonia - 0.7%.
• Moldova - 0.7%.
• Tajikistan - 0.6%.
• Kyrgyzstan - 0.5%.
• Armenia - 0.4%.

As you can see, the share of Russia in the composition of the all-Union GDP was greater than that of all other republics combined. At the same time, Ukraine and Kazakhstan also had a rather high share of GDP. The rest of the subjects of the USSR - much less.

For a more complete picture, let's take a look at GDP today. Let us determine whether the order of location of the former Soviet republics in terms of gross domestic product has changed.

The size of GDP according to the IMF for 2015:

1. Russia - $1325 billion
2. Kazakhstan - $173 billion
3. Ukraine - $90.5 billion
4. Uzbekistan - $65.7 billion
5. Belarus - $54.6 billion
6. Azerbaijan - $54.0 billion
7. Lithuania - $41.3 billion
8. Turkmenistan - $35.7 billion
9. Latvia - $27.0 billion
10. Estonia - $22.7 billion
11. Georgia - $14.0 billion
12. Armenia - $10.6 billion
13. Tajikistan - $7.82 billion
14. Kyrgyzstan - $6.65 billion
15. Moldova - $6.41 billion

As you can see, Russia remained the undoubted leader in terms of GDP of the USSR countries. At the moment, its gross product is 1325 billion dollars, which in nominal terms is even more than it was in 1990 as a whole for the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan came in second place, ahead of Ukraine. Uzbekistan and Belarus also switched places. Azerbaijan and Lithuania remained in the same places where they were in Soviet times. But Georgia has noticeably slipped, letting Turkmenistan, Latvia and Estonia go ahead. Moldova has fallen to the last place among the post-Soviet countries. And she missed ahead, the last in Soviet times in terms of GDP, Armenia, as well as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

US GDP from 1970 to 1990

Now let's look at the dynamics of changes in US gross domestic product over the last period of the existence of the USSR from 1970 to 1990.

Dynamics of US GDP, mln USD:

• 1970 - 1,075,900.
• 1971 - 1,167,800.
• 1972 - 1,282,400.
• 1973 - 1,428,500.
• 1974 - 1,548,800.
• 1975 - 1,688,900.
• 1976 - 1,877,600.
• 1977 - 2,086,000.
• 1978 - 2,356,600.
• 1979 - 2,632,100.
• 1980 - 2,862,500.
• 1981 - 3,211,000.
• 1982 - 3,345,000.
• 1983 - 3,638,100.
• 1984 - 4,040,700.
• 1985 - 4,346,700.
• 1986 - 4,590,200.
• 1987 - 4,870,200.
• 1988 - 5,252,600.
• 1989 - 5,657,700.
• 1990 - 5,979,600.

As you can see, the nominal GDP of the United States, in contrast to the gross domestic product of the USSR, grew steadily over the period from 1970 to 1990. Over 20 years, it has increased by $4,903,700 million.

The current level of the US economy

Since we have looked at the current state of the level of gross domestic product in the post-Soviet countries, we should find out how the United States is doing with this matter. According to the IMF, US GDP in 2015 was $17,947 billion, more than three times the 1990 figure.

Also, this value is several times greater than the GDP of all post-Soviet countries combined, including Russia.

Comparison of the gross product of the USSR and the USA for the period from 1970 to 1990

If we compare the level of GDP of the USSR and the USA for the period from 1970 to 1990, we will see that if in the case of the USSR, starting from 1982, the gross product began to decline, then in the United States it continuously grew.

In 1970, the gross product of the USSR was 40.3% of that of the United States, and in 1990 it was only 13.0%. In natural terms, the gap between the GDP of both countries reached $5,201,200 million.

For reference: Russia's current GDP is only 7.4% of the US GDP. That is, in this regard, the situation, compared with 1990, has worsened even more.

General conclusions on the GDP of the USSR and the USA

Throughout the existence of the USSR, its gross domestic product was significantly inferior in size to that of the United States. Even in the best years for the Soviet Union, it was about half the size of the US gross domestic product. In the worst periods, namely after the Civil War, and before the collapse of the Union, the level dropped to 13%.

An attempt to catch up with the United States in economic development ended in failure, and in the early 90s of the last century, the USSR ceased to exist as a state. At the same time, in 1990, the situation with the ratio of the GDP of the USSR to the GDP of the United States was approximately at the level of the situation after the end of the Civil War.

The level of GDP of modern Russia lags even more behind American indicators than it was in 1990 in the USSR. But there are objective reasons for this, since Russia currently does not include those republics that made up the Soviet Union and also contributed to the treasury of the total GDP.

More precisely, in one chart.

You can often find a comparison of the standard of living of countries (as an option - the power of their economy, etc.), based on a comparison of their GDP. This method borders on insanity - different economies not only use different methods for calculating GDP, but also this indicator has different meanings in them. The GDP of the USSR is not at all the same as the GDP of the USA. If only because in the USSR a lot of benefits were distributed in a non-monetary way. This is especially true for the service sector - after all, it is impossible to calculate the price of a service objectively.

If a lawyer in the United States requires a thousand dollars for an hour of work, then it is considered that his work is worth that much. A thousand dollars for a lawyer. The doctor who uses his services receives by setting the appropriate fee for the appointment. Both are included in GDP. In the USSR, both a lawyer and a doctor work for a salary, and not for fees, although the results of their activities for the population are no worse. And the GDP is less.

Even the transition to parity prices does not help, since it is also, let's say, slightly speculative and approximate.

Moral from there: GDP is well suited for comparing an economy to itself. In comparison of different systems, GDP can show something, but up to orders of magnitude differences, and not by several times and not by percentages.

However, in the article that I want to bring to your attention, other estimates are made using GDP. Namely: a graph of relations between the GDP of Russia / the USSR and the USA was built. This chart illustrates relative development of the economy. And here the use of GDP is quite correct.

The chart itself, I must say, is impressive. I haven't seen a clearer chart in a long time.

Russia - XX century. Tragedy in one schedule, five parts, with a prologue and an epilogue.

Prologue.

I bow at the feet of Mr. A. Illarionov, former adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin, now a senior employee of the Cato Institute, USA and, therefore, an implacable fighter for the truth ... Freddy Krueger appeared to A. Illarionov and forced him to present a report with a specific title: "Premonition of a catastrophe" in the Independent Press Center. So far, however, the author's grave forebodings have not come true and the presented report could certainly not be remembered a year later. Moreover, graphs like the “index of political freedoms”, regularly sucked from the special finger of special employees of special research centers, are inexpensive.

But, there was something extremely important and, one might say, eternal in this report, which is useful to reflect on today. Namely, this is a graph of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Russia as a percentage of that of the United States for the period from 1885 to 2006, that is, for 121 years, which captured three main stages in the life of Russia in the twentieth century: the last thirty years of the existence of the Russian empire, the Soviet period and, of course, perestroika with democratization.

Extremely well chosen by A. Illarionov and the country of comparison.

The United States, as you know, is a showcase of a liberal-democratic civilization, the richest and most powerful country in the world today. Indeed, what better proof of the prosperity of the Empire before the "October Revolution", the failure of the Soviet period and the success of the reformers, than a comparison with the undeniable successes of the United States - a country located in an excellent climate, which, unlike Russia, had never experienced external invasions, long before the beginning of the reporting period, which ended the civil war and, thus, developed its advanced capitalist economy in truly greenhouse conditions, better than which one can imagine?

Well, again, Mr. A. Illarionov, a recognized liberal, a prominent economist, will not allow himself to embellish the “achievements of the USSR”. No no. There is no doubt that all possible methods of eliminating "falsifications of the Soviet period" in this graph, built, as you can understand, according to Angus Madison, the world's leading specialist in economic comparative studies, have been applied. So, let's believe A. Illarionov.

Schedule

Here it is, Graph. The Great Schedule, which reflects revolutions and wars, defeats and victories, Gagarin's flight, Brezhnev's stagnation, "Gorbachev's new thinking" and the great achievements of the reformers. Each reader, of course, has the right to interpret it independently. But I would like to draw special attention to some of its features, which clearly refute some of the historical myths that exist among the Russian “progressive intelligentsia”.

Part one. Trends.

The entire historical period, covering the end of the 19th century, the twentieth century and the beginning of the 21st century, can be divided into three qualitatively different periods: the thirty-two-year period of Imperial Russia from 1885 to 1917, the sixty-three-year Soviet period - from the moment the USSR was formed in 1922 to 1985 - until the arrival of the "reformer" Gorbachev and a twenty-one-year period of "reforms" from 1985 to 2006.
The short period from 1917 to 1922 - a period of anarchy, civil war, the collapse of the country - a period of unrest that cannot be attributed to any specific state category.

Omitting the details of the Chart - we will discuss them below - we will focus on the first obvious circumstance: in complete contradiction to the myth that has spread in recent years about "prosperous Russia under the tsar", we see that over the past thirty-two years of the Empire, the ratio of Russia's GDP per capita population to GDP per capita in the United States was deteriorating almost monotonously and fell from 40% to 23% by the time the revolution began.

Since the meaning of facts is known only in comparison with other homogeneous facts, I will mention that at that time, the average GDP per capita of African countries in relation to the group of developed countries of the West was about 18%.

It is also worth recalling that for almost the entire period under review, until 1914, Russia did not participate in any significant wars, except for the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and its general lag behind the United States with wars cannot be directly related, respectively, for even in the best pre-war year, 1913, this ratio hardly exceeded 30% and was one-third lower than at the beginning of the period under consideration.

The second myth that immediately collapses when analyzing the Madison-Illarionov graph is that the Soviet-era economy was supposedly inefficient. It also does not find its scientific confirmation.

It follows from the Graph that in the long term - over 63 years - from the moment the USSR was formed in 1922 until the arrival of Gorbachev, despite the losses in the wars, the country returned and even somewhat exceeded the best level of the imperial era of 1885 in this indicator.

It should be emphasized that the indicator under consideration is relative - the GDP of 1985 is compared with the US GDP of 1995, which was several times higher than the US GDP in 1922. In other words, the constancy of the ratio of the per capita GDP of the country to the per capita GDP of the United States indicates that the country is developing as fast as the United States. Rising ratio means that it is developing faster than the US. Therefore, since in 63 years the USSR improved this indicator by almost four times, it is clear that it developed faster than the United States. You can even calculate how much faster. To do this, take the root of the power of 63 from the ratio of the indicator in 1985 to its value in 1922, and then subtract one. The growth of the indicator was 3.91 times. The 63rd root is 1.0218.

This means that the USSR, on average, over 63 years has developed 2.18% faster than the United States. But the average US growth rate over the years has been about 2% per year on average. This means that the USSR developed at least twice as fast as the leading capitalist power.

No less interesting is the last period of the life of the country. It follows from the graph that when Gorbachev came to power, the ratio of per capita GDP of the USSR to the US GDP was the best for the entire 130-year historical period - more than 40%. However, shortly after he came to power, the most rapid decline in history began. If in the 18 pre-war years the position of the USSR relative to the American level has improved threefold, then in the 12 post-Gorbachev years, Russia's per capita GDP has almost tripled. The country again fell to the "African" level of 18% of the per capita income of the United States. The fall is almost the same as a result of Hitler's attack on the USSR.

Of course, the United States at the end of the 20th century was richer than it was in 1941. Therefore, the dip in relative per capita GDP during the years of perestroika was not as severe as the similar dip in the war years, because in absolute terms the country remained richer than during the war years. But the scale of the catastrophe that befell Russia in the late 80s and 90s is obvious.

As an intellectual exercise, I invite the reader to take a close look at the graph and decide on its basis which of the historical periods was the most successful for Russia? Just take a look and decide for yourself.

Part two. Empire and its problems.

Today, people often try to present things in such a way that revolutions in Russia arose “for no reason at all” and the country fell victim to a handful of adventurers. Illarionov's schedule also refutes this myth.

Against the backdrop of a general decline that continued throughout the last three decades of the life of the empire, one can notice some features. What, for example, is connected with the first noticeable failure, related to the beginning of the 90s of the 19th century? - I suspect that not every modern historian can remember what actually happened in these years in Russia? - And there was a Great Famine of the early 90s - one in a series of famines that engulfed Russia.

Reference: In 1891-1892, 16 provinces of European Russia and the province of Tobolsk) with a population of 35 million were engulfed in famine. In the Volga region, the eastern regions of the black earth zone suffered from a catastrophic famine - 20 provinces with a 40 million peasant population. In a less extensive area, but with no less intensity, the famine was repeated in 1892-1893. According to L. Tolstoy, “1/3 of Russia was captured by famine, and that same third that always fed most of the remaining two-thirds” (vol. 29, p. 118). It is believed that in 1891 alone, from one to two million people died of starvation in Russia.

Hungry years were repeated in Russia with enviable regularity. The largest catastrophes occurred in 1900-1903 and 1911.

Reference: Hunger claimed a million lives a year. Thus, the famine of 1911 covered 35-40 provinces and, according to official data, 1 million 160 thousand people died in 1911 from hunger and diseases associated with hunger. Cases of cannibalism have been reported in a number of starving regions.

A number of politically motivated leftists attribute the famine of 1911 to the failure of the Stolypin reforms, which began several years earlier. This, of course, is not true. In such a short period of time, the Stolypin reforms could not and did not qualitatively change the structure of the population of Russia - until the beginning of the 30s, Russia remained a deeply agrarian country, in which more than 80% of the population was peasant. There was only one reason for the famine until the famine of the early 30s: small land - the average allotment was 7.9 acres per yard, poverty - up to 30% of the peasants were "horseless" - and therefore did not have the opportunity to manage in any efficient way, but also the level of agriculture of those who had horses was extremely low. Only large landlord farms had the opportunity to apply modern agricultural technology and, therefore, received three to four times higher yields than the bulk of small landowners.

The agrarian question and the under-industrialization of Russia were its curse. The main task of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century was the release of excess mouths from the countryside and their absorption by the industry that was to be created. The graph shows that Stolypin's reforms aimed at resolving this issue, although they did not save from hunger, however, had a positive effect. From their beginning until the outbreak of the First World War, Russia developed noticeably faster than the United States - about the same as in the first post-Stalin years. The war stopped this growth and threw the country back.

From the Graph it can be seen that both revolutions of the early twentieth century occurred after a fall in GDP per capita caused by wars and, therefore, as a result of a real deterioration in the life of the population. It is unlikely, therefore, that they can be considered the result of the activities of opposition parties. If it was effective, it was only because it fell on the ground well prepared by economic problems. The drop in per capita GDP to about the level of 1905 caused the revolution of 1917 and plunged the country into a final catastrophe, lowering it into Troubles in terms of the well-being of the population below the level of African countries.

The details of this catastrophe are not visible on the Chart, so we will not dwell on the Time of Troubles and leave it to the reader to decide for himself: did our grandfathers and great-grandfathers have reason to be dissatisfied with the imperial power?

Part Three: Stalin's tread.

The turmoil led to the disintegration of the country. Article 16 of the Treaty of Versailles required Germany to recognize all “new states formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire. The beginning of the exit from the turmoil and the improvement of the economic condition of the country dates back to the moment of its revival under the name of the USSR - by 1922.

According to a member of the Royal Historical Society, Paul Kennedy, the level of industrial production in Russia in 1922 was 12% of the level of the last pre-war, 1913. The fall in GDP per capita, of course, was smaller - only three times - because Russia was an agrarian country and the share of industry in GDP was relatively small. The country emerged from the turmoil, torn apart by internal economic and contradictions.

The graph, however, shows that having taken control in 1922 of a country with a GDP per capita of 12% of the US - that is, in a worse condition than the average African countries, for some 18 pre-war years, Russia is now in shape The USSR, compensated for all the losses of the previous 40 years, including the losses associated with the revolutions, the First World War and the Civil War, and practically reached the best level of 1885.

By 1928, the country had regained the industrial potential of 1913 and moved on. However, this movement was special. The main task was to prepare the country for the inevitable future World War. To the reader who is not very familiar with history, linking together the First and Second World Wars may seem strange. In fact, these wars are two episodes of one, global war: Germany against Britain's leadership in the world and for the redistribution of colonies. The First World War exhausted the opponents, but did not solve the problem. It is no coincidence that when signing a ceasefire with Germany on behalf of the Allies at the end of November 1918, Marshal Foch uttered a phrase known to the whole world: "We are not signing peace, but a truce for 20 years." The marshal was wrong by 9 months. The war began on September 1, 1939.

The USSR also had other good reasons to believe that war was inevitable. In fact, the USSR was in a blockade. Plans for a war against the USSR were constantly exaggerated in the West and in Japan. This is now Tanaka's memorandum, published by the Chinese government in 1927 and implying, in particular, the seizure of the eastern regions of Russia by some people is called into question. But back in 1946, this document, the original of which was never found - like the original of the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact - did not cause doubts and was one of the main documents of the American prosecution of the Japanese militarists in the Tokyo Tribunal. For the USSR in 1928, this document was a fact. The USSR had extremely tense relations with England, diplomatic relations with which were constantly in danger of breaking. Even the non-aggression pact with France, the USSR Ambassador Valerian Dovgalevsky managed to sign only in 1932, when the German problem began to manifest itself with might and main.

But the state of the Red Army in the late twenties was horrendous. Less than 10 years after the end of the civil war, it was in many ways a collection of detachments of field commanders who, during the troubled times of the civil war, were accustomed to anarchist freemen. It is no coincidence that until 1935 the Red Army was only a quarter of a regular one. Three-quarters of the units were formed according to the militia-territorial principle and obeyed their leaders rather than a single leadership. Its technical equipment was no less catastrophic.

According to the mobilization plan for May 1928, the Red Army could oppose the enemy with 100 infantry divisions, 90 tanks (there were about 200 of them with armored vehicles) and 7034 guns, mostly foreign-made and produced before the First World War (Source: RGAE. F. 4372. Op.91. D.213. L.109). Lennard Samuelson writes about the state of the Red Army in 1927-1928. : The production of tanks in the Soviet Union had not even begun yet, although a number of related projects were under development. The People's Commissar of Defense called for all economic issues of a defensive nature to be submitted to the military in time. During 1928, several military planning commissions were created... In April 1928, a decision was made on the participation of military representatives at all stages of the development of the national economic plan, whereas previously they were invited only to the final stage of formulating plan assignments.

For comparison, before the start of the war with the USSR, Germany seized the weapons of more than 200 divisions of the defeated or capitulated armies of European countries. In France alone, 4,930 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 3,000 aircraft were captured, and 92 divisions were equipped with French vehicles.

A natural question for readers: What would happen if the USSR delayed industrialization and met the Nazi attack in 1941 with 90 tanks and 7,000 guns, but most importantly, without an industry capable of restoring inevitable losses during the war faster than the enemy?

The Soviet leadership decided to accelerate the industrialization of the country. In three five-year plans, the country had to create an industry capable of withstanding any combination of opponents. I do not want to impose on the reader the opinion of whether this decision was necessary? - Let the reader think for himself, not a small one.

But industrialization was impossible without the involvement of labor from the countryside, in which 84% of the population lived in 1928. In other words, Russia once again faced the need to solve the Stolypin problem. Yes, from an abstract point of view, the farmer's way would be more effective than collectivization. When they talk about the inefficiency of the collective farm system, they compare it with the efficiency of farms. But is it so in comparison with small, impoverished, Russian farms? - Not. The mere enlargement of the socialized allotments made it possible to increase efficiency in comparison with farms of 3-4-5-10 acres, on the scale of which it is impossible to use equipment and advanced technologies in any way effectively. The average American farmer owns today 200-300 hectares of land. There were only a few such allotments in Russia, and in order for them to appear in droves, it was necessary that 10 small farms would go bankrupt for every “surviving” farming family. From Europe, to the USA, this process took many decades: the entire 19th century plus a large part of the 20th. Did the USSR have such a reserve of time, if before the war, according to all estimates, 15 years were left at the most? - What would happen to the country if the process of ruin would take not decades, but a few years, as it was necessary for a successful organization, especially in a country where just 10 years ago the revolution won under the slogan "Land to the peasants"? - There was the experience of the Stolypin reform - much less ambitious and hasty than Russia needed in the late 20s, which led to Stolypin ties and played a significant role in the emergence of revolutions: in 1915 there were 177 peasant uprisings in Russia, and in 1916 - almost 300.

The question, then, is this: did the country have the technical and political opportunity to follow the farmer or "cooperative" Bukharin path? Did she have enough time left for this? - For some reason, supporters of the farming path of Russia's development do not bother themselves with these questions. But in vain. For the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

The industrial growth of the USSR was accompanied by a high level of costs. First of all, we are talking about the famine of 1932-1933. It showed up on the Chart with a relatively small dip, comparable to that of 1911, which is indicative of its magnitude.

First of all, it is necessary to immediately and unambiguously dismiss any arguments about the “intentionality” of this famine. This "idea" was born somewhere in British circles, who had experience of deliberately organizing a famine in India. We are talking about several organized famines in Bengal, designed to clear a place for planting opium. Bengal opium was exported by British businesses, including the royal family, to China, which almost destroyed that country in the 19th century and led to two opium wars that Britain fought with China under the slogan of fighting for the right to free trade. In this case, drugs.

The historical facts do not confirm the intentional famine of 1932-1933. First of all, there were no radical changes in the structure of the country's population by the beginning of the thirties. And, as the experience of tsarist times shows, famines were constantly repeated in Russia. Moreover, as a rule, they occupied a period of several years, since in the first year the seed fund was consumed and the scale of crops fell next year.

Other facts speak about the natural nature of the famine of the thirties. First of all, the notorious law "on three spikelets", aimed at combating the massive theft of grain, was adopted on August 7, 1932 - that is, when it became clear that the harvest was not enough. Secondly, grain withdrawals for state needs were sharply reduced from more than 30% to 23-24%. Thirdly, in order to preserve the grain fund, grain was ordered to be stored in common elevators. And, finally, in the spring of 1933, for ineffective work to eliminate hunger, a number of workers of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture were convicted, which at the same time meant state recognition of the fact of hunger.
Finally, these years were also hungry in Moldova, which at that time was not part of the USSR at all.

Of course, the extremely high rates of collectivization also caused severe negative consequences, which in turn was due to the limited time that the country had for industrialization and preparation for the coming war. Collectivization caused discontent among a considerable part of the population and the threat of destabilization of the country, which the authorities could not allow. Naturally, the prosperous part of the peasantry was the least inclined to accept collectivization. Perhaps it would be more effective to achieve a two-fold system: along with the socialization of land and property of the poor part of the rural population, which did not lose anything from this, to preserve the “kulak”, but essentially farming, farms. But then who would go from the village to the industry?

“Repressions” require a special, non-ideologized conversation. Since they are not directly reflected in the Chart, we take this topic out of the scope of this discussion.

One way or another, at the cost of enormous efforts, by 1938, according to Paul Kennedy, the level of industrial production in the USSR was already 850% of the level of 1913. This means that from 1922 to 1938 - in 16 years, the level of industrial production in the USSR increased 67 times, which is very good. History knows no analogues of such rates of economic recovery and growth. The food problem was solved: the country began to produce about 30% more agricultural products than in 1928, with a significantly smaller number of people employed in agriculture, which confirms that the collective farm form of ownership, less efficient than farm ownership, was, however, noticeably more effective than the archaic agrarian small-ownership system inherited by the USSR from tsarist Russia.

The attack of fascist Germany again threw the country back. The war cost the country dearly. If during the years of the war the United States, thanks to the sale of weapons and Lend-Lease, almost doubled its GDP in five years, the USSR lost about a quarter of the national wealth. World War II cost the country dearly. The USSR lost not only 27 million people, which is an economic factor in itself, but practically a quarter of its national wealth. During the war years in the USSR, 1710 cities, more than 70 thousand villages, 32 thousand plants and factories were destroyed, 98 thousand collective farms were plundered. Therefore, the two-fold "on average" excess of the rates of development of the USSR compared to the United States, which we wrote about in the first part, is in fact significantly underestimated due to these unimaginable losses.

Sometimes they like to recall the heavy losses in equipment and people in the first six months of the war, forgetting that it is not so much the number of weapons that is important in itself, which, of course, is also important. Much more important is the industrial potential, which makes it possible to make up for the combat losses of these weapons in a timely manner. Such a potential of the USSR was created in two and a half five-year plans - in 13 years. Would victory be possible without this potential? Seems like a strange question. But if so, then the reproach is that in 18 years the USSR ensured the growth of the industry "only" 67 times, as Paul Kennedy claims, but, let's say. Not in 200. Or not in 2000. It would be nice. Is it just real?

What would be. if the country developed at the same pace as before and after the war, but there would be no war? - Extrapolation shows that already somewhere by 1950-1955, the USSR would have overtaken the United States in terms of GDP per capita. However, there was a war. And it didn't happen.

However, despite the losses, by the end of the Stalin era, which was marked by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the country had practically restored the best ratio of per capita GDP to per capita GDP of the United States (recall that US GDP almost doubled during the war years and 40% of US GDP in 1957 year - this is much more than 40% of US GDP, say, in the year 1939)

The results of this era are as follows: the USSR created a nuclear missile shield, which ensured its purely military invulnerability for many years. Thanks to this, in the last years of Stalin's life, it became possible to think about the growth of people's living standards and "deploy" the country's potential, expressed just by GDP, to the needs of people. In the early 1950s, a program of mass industrial housing construction was adopted, a program for space exploration, including manned flights and landing on the moon, light industry began to expand. Life expectancy rose almost to the American level of that time and was higher than in Japan.

Part Four. "Builders of communism", or "golden stagnation".

The fourth stage, as can be seen from the graph, includes the years of administration of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. After a short development by inertia, until about the beginning of the 1960s, the ratio of the per capita GDP of Russia and the United States remained practically unchanged until 1985 - before Gorbachev came to power.

The chart gives a clear definition of what has been aptly called stagnation. After a short period of inertial development, when the last projects of the Stalin era were implemented, such as mass housing construction, manned space flight, development stopped. The country stopped overtaking the USA and after 1978-1979 there was a gap. It was reflected on the chart in the form of a small peak and the “oil boom” of the 70s. During these years, the country achieved the best per capita GDP ratio with the United States at 43%, surpassing even the record of 1887. However, in general, during the 20 years of "building communism" from 1964 to 1985, the country's per capita GDP remained on average equal to about 40% of the US GDP. What is - stagnation: The country has developed, but not the United States has already caught up.

It was the time of the "golden stagnation", since the country was in this period in the best relationship with the United States. But it was also the era of lost time. In the Stalin years, the country built a "tank and a dugout." This one was prompted by the requirements of the era. After the creation of the nuclear missile shield, the country achieved, at least for quite a long time, strategic security and guaranteed peacetime, which has almost never happened in its history. It was high time to start building a “house and a tractor”, because it was inconvenient to live in a dugout and plow on a tank. But this did not happen. Starting with Khrushchev, the country continued to operate the "tank and dugout" in conditions for which they are categorically unsuitable.

Part five. "New Thinking".

The problem is that there is no "new thinking" in nature. There is either the ability to think, or the absence of this ability. Gorbachev successfully demonstrated this, as the Chart also clearly shows.
This period is not over and living witnesses to it today. They should evaluate it.

Epilogue.

Today, the material situation of Russia is, of course, better than it was in 1922. But as far as safety is concerned, the same cannot be said. The strategic security of the 1950s-1980s has been completely lost. Therefore, it is impossible to say today with confidence that Russia today has the possibility of long-term peaceful construction - at least in a twenty-year perspective - is impossible. Ahead may be a difficult time of choice between the disappearance of Russia from the historical horizon in the spirit of the anti-utopia "Moscow 2042", or another stage of mobilization of all forces for the sake of the survival of the country, which is the hardest for people, as it was in the 20s and 30s of the XX century.

History, of course, does not repeat itself. But it is not literally repeated. But its laws are unchanged.

Russia has faced a lot of difficult trials, its history is truly dramatic. Over the past hundred years, Russia has had to endure a whole series of regional conflicts, two world wars, and the Cold War. As a result of these events and their consequences, the world has witnessed the collapse of two established state systems in our country, colossal geopolitical and economic changes. There were losses of territory and reunifications, retreats along political fronts and resounding victories in the world political arenas, financial and economic crises and periods of incredible growth.

Today, any responsible citizen of Russia has questions: What has modern Russia acquired as a result of numerous reforms? How effective is modern Russia compared to the Russia of the Soviet Union? What is the future of the new Russia?

To answer these questions, we conducted a comparative analysis of the most important indicators of Russia's development during two periods of its history - as a federal republic (RSFSR) within the Soviet Union during the reconstruction after the Great Patriotic War from 1945 to 1960 and the formation of an independent Russian Federation (RF). ) after the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1995 to 2010. The year 1995, not 1991, was taken for the study, in order to give the new Russia a slight head start, because the results of the end of World War II and the Cold War were different. In 1945, there were no destructive forces, the Soviet Union expanded its borders and influence in the world, which contributed to the early start of economic growth. After the fall of the Union, inertial forces began to act, which continued until 1998. On the other hand, it would be unfair to give the Russian Federation too much head start over the RSFSR, since the government had chances to turn the tide and use the advantages of a market economy as early as the middle of the last decade.

What have we lost?

To understand what Russia gained from 1945 to 1960 and from 1995 to 2010, one must first understand what it lost.

During the war years (1941-1945), almost 27 million people died in the USSR (the RSFSR lost about 14 million), millions became disabled. In the RSFSR, 1710 cities and large urban-type settlements were destroyed, in some of them there were practically no surviving buildings. About 71 thousand villages and villages were burned. 30,000 industrial enterprises, tens of thousands of bridges and crossings, hundreds of thousands of railways and highways were destroyed. During the war, the entire economy was adjusted to military needs. As a result of the loss of the population, enterprises and all kinds of infrastructure, the GDP of the territories liberated from occupation fell by more than 30% (Fig. 1). But thanks to the incredible courage of every soldier-liberator and every home front worker, the GDP of the whole country decreased by an average of 14% compared to 1940.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the losses were no less impressive, but in some ways much more serious. The population of Russia during this period changed, unlike other indicators, slightly - by only 4.4%, but a comparison in terms of GDP at PPP gives a depressing picture. In 1991, the GDP at PPP in the RSFSR exceeded 1.9 billion US dollars (the USSR had a GDP equal to 3.1 billion at the time of the collapse, and a few years earlier - 3.5 billion). In 1995, the PPP GDP in the Russian Federation amounted to only 1.25 billion, i.e. loss of 34.2%.

Rice. 1 Losses of Russia after the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the USSR

It turns out that after the war, the RSFSR had a much more stable position in economic, geopolitical and military terms, without taking into account demographics. This is not surprising, because the USSR ended the war with a victory, and the Russian Federation clearly lost from the collapse of the Union.

What have we purchased?

It should be noted that the dynamics of the country's economic development was studied using averaged values, since there are a huge number of sources citing different figures. In the days of the Soviet Union, such a difference was primarily due to propaganda tendencies, as well as the closeness of the Soviet system - the USSR officially published data on GDP only in 1989.

Gross domestic product

The average GDP growth in the RSFSR from 1945 to 1950 was 9.11% (the national average is about 14.7%). Such high growth was ensured, despite numerous difficulties and hunger, due to the initially sharp positive impulse after the victory, the millionth free labor force of prisoners of war and convicts, "dividends" from the Great Victory and all its derivatives. Across the country, growth was even higher as First of all, there was an active restoration of the liberated and most destroyed territories. The average GDP growth of the Russian Federation from 1995 to 2000 is 1.81%. This is due to the continuation of the inertial recession of the economy, the crisis of 1998 and, perhaps most importantly, the inability of the government to turn the tide.

The period from 1951 to 1960 shows an average increase of 5.81%, from 2001 to 2010 - 5.07% (taking into account the consensus forecast for GDP growth in the Russian Federation in 2010, about 5%) . At the same time, in 2009, GDP fell by 7.9% due to the strong impact of the global financial crisis on the fledgling economy, the withdrawal of foreign capital (including due to the August 2008 war), a decrease in business activity, as well as a drop in business community confidence indicators. and the entire population of Russia. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that due to a sharp reduction in the level of consumption and business activity, many goods have ceased to be sold, there has been a huge accumulation of them in warehouses. After the restoration of confidence, all this will be instantly sold out and we can expect an early economic recovery.

Let us display on the graph (Fig. 2) GDP growth for the periods under consideration by the beginning of these periods, i.e. for the RSFSR by 1945, and for the Russian Federation by 1995.

Rice. 2 GDP growth of the RSFSR and RF by the beginning of the period

By the end of 1960, compared with 1945, the GDP in the RSFSR increased by 271% (while the GDP of the entire USSR, according to various sources, averaged about 450%). Russia's GDP growth since 1995 by the end of 2010 is estimated at 175.5%.

However, it is important to understand that measuring GDP quantitatively is based on the assumption that product quality and competitiveness are fixed parameters. This is not the case in the real economy. To measure the real strength of the economic development of the state, it is necessary to measure the increase in GDP per capita (Fig. 3).

Rice. 3 Growth of GDP per capita at the beginning of the period (1945/1995)

The results of the comparative analysis turned out to be unexpected: the RSFSR and the Russian Federation developed in a similar way in terms of this indicator. Moreover, the growth rate over the past ten years has been higher than in the days of the RSFSR: the annual increase averaged 5.21%, while from 1950 to 1960 this figure was 4.35%. In 2010, GDP per capita will grow by more than 5% by the end of the year.

Thus, we can draw a very important conclusion: the development of the economy of the RSFSR, in terms of each individual citizen, proceeded at the same pace as the development of the economy of the Russian Federation.

However, although per capita GDP growth rates were about the same, and the growth of GDP itself was higher from 1945 to 1960, the modern Russian citizen is still more than twice as rich as in 1960.

The data presented in Fig. 4 clearly show the ratio of the size of the economy and GDP per capita in 1960 and in 2010 when converted to 2009 US dollars.

Rice. 4. Comparison of indicators of the Russian economy in 1960 and 2010 when converted to 2009 US dollars:

4a -GDP

4b - GDP per capita

But there is one more plus before Soviet times. In addition to the fact that a modern Russian has a higher purchasing power, today there is no shortage of goods in Russia, and even more so there is no shortage of food. And this is a very significant plus.

In this article, we will not consider all the reasons for the shortage in the RSFSR and abundance in the Russian Federation. In short, the point is the colossal difference in the volumes of economies. Despite the years of devastation in the 1990s, Russia's GDP in 2010 significantly exceeds the GDP of 1960 (Fig. 4 a)). In other words, in order to feed the Russian Federation in 1960, it was necessary to allocate about 4% of GDP for solving food problems; in 2010, no more than 1.6% is required for the same needs. The higher volume of the food sector in Russia explains the abundance of food. A similar situation exists with other products and services that were lacking in Soviet times.

Structure of the Russian economy

In fact, the economic structure that modern Russia has was laid down in the 1950s. It was in the late 1950s that the Soviet Union began to create the basis for a resource-based economy, and in the 1960s one of the main tasks was to secure the status of an energy superpower. However, Western countries strongly opposed this and the process dragged on for decades. This task was successfully fulfilled by modern Russia.

When comparing the structure of the economies of 1960 and 2010 (Figure 5), one should not forget that the size of economies has changed significantly. In 2010, GDP approximately corresponds in its volume to 1990, but it is many times greater than the GDP of 1960 in absolute terms. So, if in 1960 the extraction of minerals accounted for 5.1% of the country's GDP, in 2010 this industry already occupies 7.87%. At the same time, oil production increased by 238.3%, and gas production by 7458.5%.

Also, do not forget that the oil and gas industry consists not only of production and in general takes about 25% of GDP in 2010.

Rice. 5 Structure of the economy:

5a - RSFSR 1960

5 B - RF 2010.

The volume of exports in general in 2010 exceeds the volume of exports in 1960 by a little more than 5 times. The volume of oil exports (excluding oil products and natural gas) in 2010 is 7.5 times higher than in 1960 (Fig. 6).

Rice. 6 Increase in Russian exports in 2010 relative to the RSFSR in 1960

Thus, the dependence of modern Russia on the export of raw materials is obvious. The course taken by the government to modernize the Russian economy has had minimal effect so far. It will be possible to talk about any significant results of the start of modernization no earlier than 2015, while the modernization itself will be able to clearly manifest itself only by 2020. By this time, the now unacceptably small volume of electronics production will have to grow tenfold. Cause certain hopes for civil and military shipbuilding and, in particular, the aircraft industry. There should be a qualitative leap in the production of space technology. Predicting the domestic automotive industry is a thankless task, but we can expect an increase in the production of foreign brand cars in the Russian Federation. Probably the formation of Moscow as an international financial center. But these are all just predictions and hopes. Let's see how these things were in the period 1945-1960. and 1995-2010

The development of industry, especially heavy industry, was a key area for the USSR. Therefore, it is not surprising that by 1948 the volume of industrial production exceeded pre-war levels.

The USSR made tremendous efforts and achieved incredible results: more than 14.2 thousand large enterprises were built; the volumes of the chemical and petrochemical industries grew in 1945-1960. more than 660%; oil production increased by 650%, gas - by 1250%, coal - by 235%. The output of mechanical engineering and metalworking is almost 600%. Steel and pig iron production increased by 430%, from 12.3 million and 8.8 million to 65.3 million and 46.8 million, respectively. At the same time, the share of heavy industry in the economy of the USSR grew steadily. So, in 1945 it was 60.0%, and light - 40%; in 1950 - already 68.8% against 31.2%, by 1960 - 72.5% against 27.5%. Due to mechanization and the first stages of automation in industrial production, labor productivity increased by 50% from 1945 to 1950, and by 200% from 1945 to 1960.

The results of such impressive results in comparison with the results of modern Russia are presented below.

Rice. 7. Growth in industrial production

Of course, in the current era, industry is not growing at such an impressive pace, but it is not entirely correct to compare industrial growth indicators in percentage terms. First, although the end of industrialization is generally called 1940, in terms of the ratio of industrial production to other sectors of the RSFSR economy, it came out only by 1960.

The dynamics of growth in the share of industry in total GDP is shown in Fig. 8.

Rice. 8 Industrial development coefficient

The coefficient of industrial development dynamics is the ratio of GDP growth to the growth of industrial volumes. This coefficient shows the growth dynamics of other sectors of the economy in relation to industry.

In 1960, the share of industrial production in the country's GDP was about 55%, and later this figure reached 60-70%, while in the modern economy this figure does not exceed 40% (in 2009 it was 37%). However, the share of industry in relation to other sectors is not an indicator of the standard of living of citizens and the competitiveness of the state. In general, the value is 37% higher than in most Western countries, but the standard of living of the population and GDP per capita in Russia still lags behind the corresponding indicators of its Euro-Atlantic competitors.

In 1945, Russia was still significantly behind in terms of the number of cars, civil aircraft, etc. Therefore, it is not surprising that their growth was exponential until 1960. Not to mention rocket and space technology, which, by and large, did not exist before the 1950s.

The growth in the number of consumer goods lagged significantly behind the growth of industry as a whole. This is explained by the fact that under planned command management of the economy, all production was divided into two main groups: "A" - the production of means of production and "B" - consumer goods. The production of the "A" group proceeded at a faster pace, since the militarized, industrially oriented economy of the RSFSR constantly demanded a high level of development of the "A" group. Such a distribution does not mean at all that the production of means of production is a net investment in the future of the country, i.e. future exponential growth in the number of products produced. Otherwise, the USSR would have overtaken all countries of the world in production, including the USA by 1980. That did not happen. At the same time, the shortage of consumer goods remained invariably in the Soviet Union.

In modern Russia, the production of consumer goods has fallen to an indecently low level - 1.35% (against 8.50% in 1960), light industry goods are imported in large volumes.

We will not compare the volume of production of military equipment. The USSR was a militarized state, which not only set itself the task of catching up and overtaking the United States, but also constantly preparing for a new world war.

As for the production of civilian equipment (aircraft and aircraft equipment, ships, buses, trucks, cars, tractors and other agricultural equipment, refrigerators and other household appliances), the growth rates here were lower than the growth rates of the industry as a whole. At the same time, the growth in individual units of production in different periods was different. For example, the number of agricultural tractors produced has been falling since 1995, and from 2006 to 2008. in the Russian Federation, the production of tractors almost doubled - from 6500 to 12500. At the same time, the use of some other agricultural equipment is growing, and productivity is increasing.

At the same time, the consumption of other products, such as cars, is growing. If we compare the level of motorization of the RSFSR and the Russian Federation, it must be taken into account that in the RSFSR the transport issue was resolved primarily through state and public transport. In the 1940s and 1950s, there were practically no cars on the market. Therefore, for a correct comparison, the analysis of the level of motorization in Russia in the period 1945-1960. made taking into account the state passenger and public transport, and in the period 1995-2010. taking into account only private cars.

According to the results of our study, the level of motorization from 1945 to 1960 increased by 2.4 times, while from 1995 to 2010 it increased by almost 2.8 times. Average growth in 1945-1950 amounted to 6.15% per year, and in 1951-1960. - 5.35%. Against 7.49% and 6.13% in the periods 1995-2000. and 2001-2010 respectively.

An analysis of the grain harvest in Russia during the periods under review gives a positive picture (Fig. 9). A well-planned food security policy is bearing fruit. Despite the horrendous drought of 2010, which Russia has not seen for more than a hundred years, the grain harvest remains at a very high level.

Rice. 9. Collection of grain crops in Russia

Labor productivity in Russia remains lower than in the most developed countries, however, very high growth rates of this indicator are observed (Fig. 10) . The Russian Federation is ahead of the RSFSR both in terms of the average level of labor productivity and in terms of the growth dynamics of this indicator in all sectors of the economy, especially in agriculture and the service sector. At the same time, the Russian Federation demonstrates a higher level of labor productivity in industry, both in absolute terms and in terms of growth rates.

Rice. 10. Labor productivity growth in Russia:

10a - in industrial production

10b - generally

Demographic component

Modern Russia has missed one of the most important factors of development - population growth. The demographic crisis has already had very serious consequences and has an economic expression that can be defined as the failure to receive 95.8% of GDP growth. Russia is in dire need of a demographic boom, which would inevitably lead to additional growth in the economy of the entire country.

From 1991 to the mid-2000s, there was a dramatic decline in the population. However, the process was stopped, and since 2003-2004 there has been a decrease in mortality. A little earlier, in 1999, the process of birth rate growth started again. Migration also demonstrates positive trends. There is every reason to believe that in the next year or two the number of Russia will begin to grow steadily again, and by 2020 the growth rate can probably be called a boom.

The analysis shows that for the period from 1945 to 1960. The average life expectancy in Russia was 57.2 years, from 1995 to 2010. - 66.3 years. The dynamics of the increase in life expectancy from 1945 to 1946 is explained by the end of the war. This is followed by a sharp drop due to the famine of 1946-1947. By the end of the 1960s, due to the rapid development of the country, life expectancy reached an average of 63-67.5 years. By the end of the 2010s, this figure was 66.7-68 years.

Thus, characterizing the quality of life (without taking into account the level of comfort and availability of modern high technologies) by its duration, we can draw the following conclusion. Life in the modern Russian Federation in 1995-2010 better life in Soviet Russia 1945-1960. by an average of 15.9%.

Development potential

If we compare the most significant indicators of the country's development level for the last year of the periods under review, we can get a clear idea of ​​the dynamics of the country's development and its potential.

Table 1. Indicators of the level and potential of the development of the state

* - Indicative coefficient - the relative ratio of the evaluation criteria of the Russian Federation and the RSFSR. It is calculated as the ratio of the best parameter to the worst one. So, for example, when assessing the level of corruption, the best parameter is 0.02 for the RSFSR, and the worst is 0.3 for the Russian Federation, while when assessing the level of motorization, 240 for the Russian Federation will be the best parameter.

As the study shows, the Russian Federation outperforms the RSFSR by 2.17 times in a wide range of comparison criteria. I must admit that when I started my analysis, I assumed that modern Russia could only boast of a higher level of freedom, a nascent civil society, and some other not so significant advantages. However, the results were very encouraging and strengthened the belief in Russia's huge potential for development.

The economy of the USSR was laid during the period of industrialization until 1940 and in the post-war period in 1945-1960. It was during this period that the USSR showed the most rapid growth rates. And although by inertia the Soviet Union continued to develop for another 20 years, reaching a peak in the 1970s, as a result, the state gave a systemic failure. The USSR fell under the onslaught, first of all, of itself. One of the most important reasons was the stagnation of the economy, laid down in the period 1945-1960. Comfort, freedom and people's lives were sacrificed to progress.

The fall lasted a long time and dragged on until 1998. But Russia began to rise again above all difficulties.

We paid a heavy price in the 1940s and 1950s for building the foundation of industry, and in the 1990s for civil liberties. And only now does modern Russia have a truly great opportunity to create a strong and prosperous State.

Materials used in the article:

Interview with Gennady Petrovich Chizhov, Deputy Director of Marketing PKF "Tiras" LLC and President of the South Ukrainian Center for Ethnic and Political Studies "LAD". Magazine "Real EstateM" No. 30 dated July 30, 2009

The national economy of the USSR for 70 years. Anniversary Statistical Yearbook // M.: "Finance and Statistics", 1987

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. Losses of the Armed Forces: A Statistical Study. Under the guidance of a consultant of the Military Memorial Center of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Grigory Krivosheev, 1993

Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century / Ed. by Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheev. London: Greenhill Books, 1997.

Federal State Statistics Service.

Estimated value. According to the State Statistics Committee of the USSR - 1.6 trillion. rubles, which, according to various estimates, corresponds to approximately 2.7-3.4 billion dollars (in 2009 dollars). "POLITIKA" No. 47(508) dated 12/18/2006. Approximately $2.53 billion (in 2009 dollars) before the collapse of the USSR, according to the CIA Factbook. According to Boris Ikhlov (KPRF.Ru) in 1990 - 3325 billion dollars (in 2003 dollars). The question of the volume of the USSR's GDP remains the most controversial.

According to the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), CIA Factbook, IMF.

Estimated value. The national economy of the USSR for 70 years. Anniversary Statistical Yearbook // M.: "Finance and Statistics", 1987. 1. History of the USSR. Under the editorship of Ostrovsky V.P. - M., 1990. Kara-Murza S. History of the Soviet state and law. Russia and the world. Edited by Danilov A. A. - M., 1994. Hosking Jeffrey. History of the Soviet Union. 1917-1991. - M., 1994. TSB, third edition. 1969-1978. A.V. Poletaev GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1960-2004 Moscow. GU HSE. 2006.

According to the Federal State Statistics Service.

TSB, third edition. 1969-1978

Alexey Shumkov, lecturer at the Samara State Aerospace University, Ph.D.